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EVALUATING THE PALESTINIANS’ CLAIMED  
RIGHT OF RETURN 
ANDREW KENT* 
ABSTRACT   
This Article takes on a question at the heart of the longstanding 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute: did Israel violate international law 
during the conflict of 1947–49 either by expelling Palestinian 
civilians or by subsequently refusing to repatriate Palestinian 
refugees?  Palestinians have claimed that Israel engaged in illegal 
ethnic cleansing, and that international law provides a “right of 
return” for the refugees displaced during what they call al-Nakbah 
(the catastrophe).  Israel has disagreed, blaming Arab aggression 
and unilateral decisions by Arab inhabitants for the refugees’ 
flight, and asserting that international law provides no right of the 
refugees to return to Israel.  Each side has scholars and advocates 
who have supported its factual and legal positions.  This Article 
advances the debate in several respects.  First, it moves beyond the 
fractious disputes about who did what to whom in 1947–49.  
Framed as a ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Article 
assumes arguendo the truth of the Palestinian claim that the pre-
state Jewish community and later Israel engaged in concerted, 
forced expulsion of those Palestinian Arabs who became refugees.  
Even granting this pro-Palestinian version of the facts, however, 
the Article concludes that such an expulsion was not illegal at the 
time and that international law did not provide a right of return.  A 
second contribution of this Article is to historicize the international 
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law relevant to the dispute.  Many relevant areas of international 
law have changed significantly since 1947–49—such as the law of 
armed conflict, refugee law, human rights law, and law regarding 
nationality, statelessness, and state succession.  Previous 
scholarship and advocacy finding that international law requires 
return of Palestinian refugees have impermissibly sought to hold 
Israel to legal standards developed decades after the relevant 
events.  This Article’s third contribution is to assemble detailed 
data, summarized in several tables in the Appendix, on the actual 
practices of states regarding expulsions of ethnic groups and 
repatriation of refugees.  Analysis of these data sets allows the 
Article to conclude that Israel’s actions regarding the refugees of 
1947–49 was legal and consistent with the actions of many other 
members of the international community. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The two-year war which gave birth to Israel also made refugees 
of approximately 600,000 to 760,000 Palestinian Arabs.  Starting in 
1947, the Yishuv, the pre-statehood Jewish community in Palestine, 
and its Palestinian Arab neighbors fought a guerilla war against 
each other.  That year, the Yishuv had accepted a two-state 
solution proposed by the United Nations—called “partition,” just 
like the contemporaneous partition of India and Pakistan.  The 
Arab states and Palestinians rejected partition because they would 
not abide a Jewish state in any part of Palestine.  After Israel 
declared independence in May 1948, a more conventional war 
ensued, pitting Israel against invading armed forces of Egypt, 
Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and other Arab countries.  That 
conflict ended in 1949 with armistice agreements but no 
comprehensive peace.  Since then, Palestinians displaced by the 
conflict of 1947–49 have claimed that international law provides 
them a “right of return” to their homes and lands in what became 
Israel.  Israel disagrees, placing the blame for the refugees’ flight on 
Arab aggression and denying that international law requires 
return.  Though tens of millions of other people made refugees by 
twentieth-century conflicts resettled in new lands—including 
many hundreds of thousands of Jews who fled oppression in Arab 
lands in the 1940s and 1950s—the Arab leaders decided that most 
Palestinian refugees would neither be granted citizenship nor 
permanently resettled in the Arab states where they found refuge.  
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The claimed “right of return” to Israel has been a crucial stumbling 
block in the series of failed Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in 
recent decades.1 
This Article evaluates whether the Palestinians’ claim of a 
“right of return” to Israel is supported by international law—
international treaties or customary international law (“CIL”).2  It 
concludes that no binding source of international law prohibited 
expulsion of Palestinians or requires that Israel allow Palestinians 
who fled or were expelled during the conflict of 1947–49 to return 
to Israel.  The basic legal issues have been debated for years,3 and 
given the passions that this issue arouses, it is perhaps the case that 
few minds can be changed purely by legal arguments.  
Nevertheless, this Article seeks to advance the legal debate in 
several ways.  Stale factual disputes are put aside, where doing so 
helps sharpen the legal issues.  The legal debate is situated in a 
broader historical and legal context.  And the actual practices of 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., DENNIS ROSS, THE MISSING PEACE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE 3–4, 624, 655, 663–64, 812 (2005) (discussing the “right of 
return” as among the concessions that were required to end the conflict between 
Israelis and Palestinians); Akram Hanieh, The Camp David Papers, 30 J. PALESTINE 
STUD., no. 2, Winter 2001, at 75, 82 (stating that Israelis would not discuss a right 
of return for the Palestinians as it would amount to “declaring a war of 
destruction” on Israel). 
2 CIL is the consistent practice of states performed from a sense of legal 
obligation, which crystallizes over time into norms that bind all states.  See infra 
notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
3 Leading works contending that international law supports a right to return 
include VICTOR KATTAN, FROM COEXISTENCE TO CONQUEST: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1891–1949 (2009); W. THOMAS 
MALLISON & SALLY V. MALLISON, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR 
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINE QUESTION, U.N. Doc. 
ST/SG/SER.F/4, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.19 (1979) (published at the request of the 
U.N. Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People); Alfred de Zayas, The Illegality of Population Transfers and the Application of 
Emerging International Norms in the Palestinian Context, 6 PALESTINE Y.B. INT’L L. 17 
(1990–1991); Kathleen Lawand, The Right to Return of Palestinians in International 
Law, 8 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 532 (1996); John Quigley, Displaced Palestinians and a 
Right of Return, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 171 (1998); Lewis Saideman, Do Palestinian 
Refugees Have a Right of Return to Israel? An Examination of the Scope of and 
Limitations on the Right of Return, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 829 (2004); LEX TAKKENBERG, THE 
STATUS OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998).  Leading works 
denying that international law supports a right to return include JULIUS STONE, 
ISRAEL AND PALESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1981); Ruth Lapidoth, The 
Right of Return in International Law, With Special Reference to the Palestinian Refugees, 
16 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 103 (1986); Kurt René Radley, The Palestinian Refugees: The 
Right to Return in International Law, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 586 (1978); Robbie Sabel, The 
Palestinian Refugees, International Law, and the Peace Process, 21 REFUGE, no. 2, 2003 
at 52. 
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nations are examined far more comprehensively than in any 
previous study. 
This Article does not base its legal analysis on an attempted 
resolution of disputed facts.  Instead, in the sections applying law 
to fact, I assume the truth of the Palestinian version of history—
that most or all of the Palestinian refugees from the conflict of 
1947–49 fled as a result of Israeli force or threats.  This assumption 
is made for the purpose of separating legal disputes from factual 
disputes and focusing on the former.  Think of this Article as a 
judicial ruling on a motion for summary judgment.4  The 
Palestinian legal arguments fail even when their version of the 
facts is credited.  This helps move the Article beyond the current 
state of the literature—almost all previous analyses explicitly or 
implicitly stake out positions on contested factual issues about the 
reasons for the refugees’ flight, thereby muddying their legal 
analysis.5 
Previous studies finding that the expulsion of Palestinians was 
illegal, or that international law supplies a right of return for 
Palestinian refugees, have committed a number of common errors.  
The most significant error is temporal.  Recent treaties, 
declarations, and state practice are used to derive a right of return 
for refugees displaced by war or other crises, and that right is then 
retroactively applied by fifty or sixty years to the conflict in 1947–
49, when very different legal rules applied.  A second, and related 
error, is methodological.  Instead of looking to treaties or CIL to 
                                                     
4 In American civil procedure, a litigant may ask the court to assume the 
version of the disputed facts most favorable to the other side and then rule on 
whether there is a viable legal claim based on those facts and any undisputed 
facts.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.  
5 Compare, e.g., KATTAN, supra note 3, at 170 (characterizing “the manner in 
which some 750,000 Palestinian Arabs were forced to flee their homes” as “an act 
of expulsion” by Israel); Quigley, supra note 3, at 173–80 (claiming to demonstrate 
near total Israeli responsibility for Palestinian refugees’ flight); de Zayas, supra 
note 3, at 35 (charging the Israelis with “the displacement of the indigenous 
Palestinian population from their homeland and the implantation of settlers in 
their territory”), and Wadie E. Said, Palestinian Refugees: Host Countries, Legal Status 
and the Right of Return, 21 REFUGE, no. 2, 2003 at 89, 90 (2003) (“The only real 
scholarly debate now is whether the ethnic cleansing of that part of Palestine that 
became Israel was deliberate or merely the result of battlefield decisions.”), with 
Lapidoth, supra note 3, at 111–12 (stating that “[i]n the wake of the 1948–49 Arab-
Israeli war, many Palestinian Arabs . . . fled to the neighbouring Arab countries,” 
and subsequently failing to consider whether international law might have been 
violated by any expulsions of Palestinians); Radley, supra note 3, at 592–95 
(claiming to demonstrate that many Palestinian Arabs left for reasons other than 
direct Israeli coercion). 
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locate binding law, proponents of a Palestinian right of return 
often rely on so-called “soft law,” such as norms announced in 
nations’ formally non-binding political statements in international 
diplomatic forums—primarily the U.N. General Assembly—or in 
the pronouncements of international commissions or conferences.6  
The lexical status of soft law is quite unsettled and controversial 
today.7  About the kind of soft law most relevant to this Article—
U.N. General Assembly Resolutions—there has been for decades, 
and still is today, persistent disagreement about whether or how it 
can function as binding law.8  This Article notes these debates but 
ultimately moves beyond them because there was no agreement or 
even widespread opinion in 1947–49 that relevant forms of soft law 
could constitute binding legal obligations.  The claim that soft law 
binds states has only been made in recent decades; at the time of 
the 1947–49 conflict and for many years afterward, a positivism 
prevailed that located binding international law only in sources to 
which states had consented, namely treaties and CIL. 
There is a third common problem in previous studies of 
international law as applied to Palestinian refugees, closely related 
to the temporal and methodological issues just discussed.  Though 
advocates of the Palestinian view claim otherwise, there is in fact 
very little relevant state practice on which to base a CIL right to 
return in the unique circumstances of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  A few of the factors which distinguish this conflict from 
situations where legal norms of return have developed in recent 
years include its longevity (more than sixty years), the fact that the 
refugees are noncitizens of the state to which they seek 
admittance,9 the size of the refugee population compared to the 
                                                     
6 See infra Section 4.5.  While there is no single accepted definition of “soft 
law,” the phrase is generally used to refer to (1) statements of norms or 
obligations made in formally non-legally binding texts, and (2) vague provisions 
adopted in legally binding texts.  See, e.g., C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: 
Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 850, 851 (1989); 
Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 292 
(2006).  We are here dealing with the first kind of soft law. 
7 See generally Daniel Thürer, Soft Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2011), available at 
www.mpepil.com (last updated Mar. 2009). 
8 See infra Section 4.5. 
9 Supporters of the Palestinian right of return seek to overturn or render 
irrelevant Israel’s municipal law decision about Palestinian non-citizenship by 
resorting to an international law argument about state succession.  As discussed 
in Section 4.4, infra, this argument is unavailing. 
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population of the state to which they seek admittance, and the fact 
that there has been no comprehensive peace settlement between 
the warring parties or even a permanent cessation of violence.  
Even if these factual differences are not thought to make the case of 
the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees unique, general CIL norms 
favoring a right of return have only solidified in the last two 
decades.  Up through the time of the 1947–49 conflict and beyond, 
forced transfers or expulsions of ethnic minorities were common 
and, in many instances, legal, and there was no norm requiring 
repatriation in the aftermath of a forced expulsion. 
A few caveats are in order, to clarify what this Article covers 
and what it does not.  The Article is concerned solely with the legal 
rights, if any, of Palestinian refugees created by the 1947–49 conflict.  
The legal rights of the much smaller number of refugees from the 
later Arab-Israeli wars are not considered;10 thus, the status of the 
West Bank and Gaza, and the rights of Palestinian refugees to 
return there, are beyond the scope of this Article.  Religious, moral, 
philosophical, and other non-legal considerations are similarly 
omitted; this Article takes no position on the morality or justice of 
the competing Jewish and Arab claims to the disputed land.11  By 
now, more than half a century removed from the events of 1947–
49, many of the refugees from that conflict are no longer living.  
The Article does not directly address the question whether, as 
many Palestinians claim, second-generation or later descendants of 
the original refugees may assert the rights of their forbearers;12 but, 
                                                     
10 The number of refugees displaced by the 1967 war is disputed.  Probably 
about 200,000 to 300,000 Palestinians were displaced from the West Bank and 
Gaza, many of whom were already refugees from the 1947–49 conflict.  See BENNY 
MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMS: A HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST-ARAB CONFLICT, 1881–2001, 
327 (2001). 
11 I do not question that, for many, the claimed “right of return” “has become 
a major part of Palestinian identity and symbolizes Palestinian historical 
narratives.”  Abbas Shiblak, The Palestinian Refugee Issue: A Palestinian Perspective 1 
(Chatham House, Briefing Paper MENAP/PR BP 2009/01, 2009), available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Middle%2
0East/bp0209_pri_shiblak.pdf.  My caveat is not meant to suggest that concerns of 
morality and justice are entirely absent from the analysis.  Human rights law, 
which embodies many such concerns, is discussed in detail in Section 4.3. 
12 Since the 1960s, the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East (UNRWA) has taken the position that descendants of original 
refugees are themselves refugees entitled to its protection and services.  See 
BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, REFUGEES UNTO THE THIRD GENERATION: U.N. AID TO 
PALESTINIANS 7 (1995).  On the basis of this UNRWA definition, Palestinian 
spokesmen now claim that anywhere from 3.5 million to 5.5 million Palestinians 
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since the legal rights of descendants regarding expulsion and 
return are derivative of the rights of their ancestors alive in 1947–
49, the Article’s analysis of the original refugees’ claims is 
dispositive for everyone.  A final caveat: this Article addresses the 
return of people, not questions of property restitution, a related but 
separate issue.13 
This Article’s argument proceeds in four main parts.  Section 2 
is a historical overview of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the creation 
of the refugee problem.  Several contemporaneous population 
transfers are discussed to provide factual context for assessing the 
legality of the events of 1947–49 in Palestine and Israel.  Section 3 
addresses important background issues, notably, the inter-
temporal problem with applying changed law to preexisting 
events.  Section 4 examines treaty-based law—refugee law, human 
rights law, the law of armed conflict (international humanitarian 
law), the law of state succession, and immigration and nationality 
law—and relevant U.N. resolutions, and concludes that none of 
these provides a right of return for Palestinians.  Section 5 
examines the question under CIL through analysis of data sets I 
collected of similar ethnic conflicts, expulsions or transfers of 
ethnic groups, and repatriations of refugees.14  State practice in 
these conflicts shows no right of return that could be applicable to 
the Palestinians. 
2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
At the root of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the fact that two 
peoples claim the same land.  History provides support for both 
claims.  For significant parts of the first millennium B.C.E., the 
Hebrews or Jews governed and were a majority of the population 
in the area later known as Palestine.15  Persians, Greeks, and others 
ruled at times as well.  Romans invaded in the first century A.D., 
and had killed or exiled the largest part of the Jewish population 
by the second century.16  After the Roman Empire disintegrated, 
                                                                                                                        
are refugees who have a right of return to Israel.  See Sabel, supra note 3, at 54; 
Said, supra note 5, at 89. 
13 The leading treatment of this topic is Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private 
Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 
295 (1995). 
 14 See infra Appendix Tables 1, 3. 
15 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 4. 
16 Id. 
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the area was governed by a rotating cast of invaders—Mongols, 
Crusaders, Arabs, Turks, and others—for a millennium and a 
half.17  From the mid-sixteenth century until World War I, the area 
was under the nearly unbroken rule of the Ottoman Turks,18 and 
“Palestine” was a unit in the Ottoman administrative district of 
greater Syria.19 
Around the beginning of the nineteenth century, Palestine had 
a total population of about 275,000 to 300,000, the vast majority of 
which were Muslim Arabs; Jews numbered only about seven to ten 
thousand.20  Starting in the 1880s, waves of Jewish settlers began to 
arrive in Palestine.  Many fled pogroms in Russia and Eastern 
Europe; they were also driven by “age-old millenarian impulses 
and values of Jewish religious tradition,” and the political ideology 
of ethnic-national self-determination that was developing in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century.21  A Zionist movement 
emerged at this time under the leadership of Theodor Herzl, and 
Jews began to purchase large amounts of land in Palestine.22  At the 
outset of World War I—a conflict that would have profound 
consequences for the Jews’ and Arabs’ national aspirations—about 
sixty thousand Jews were living in Palestine.23 
To gain Arab support against the Ottoman Turks during World 
War I, Great Britain made territorial promises to the Arabs 
concerning the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant.24  In the Balfour 
Declaration of 1917, Britain also, perhaps inconsistently, promised 
Zionist Jews that it “view[ed] with favour the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and [would] use 
[its] best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object,” 
provided that “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil 
                                                     
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 4, 7. 
19 See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, Palestine: On the History and Geography of a Name, 2 
INT’L HIST. REV. 1, 5–6 (1980); George J. Tomeh, Legal Status of Arab Refugees, 33 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 110, 112 (1968). 
20 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 4. 
21 Id. at 14–19, 24–25. 
22 Id. at 20–24, 38. 
23 Id. at 37. 
24 British promises were embodied in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence 
of 1915–16.  For this correspondence and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, 
Sir Henry McMahon’s subsequent explanation of its meaning, see THE ARAB-
ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 2–19 (Ruth Lapidoth & 
Moshe Hirsch eds., 1992). 
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and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine . . . .”25 
With the war over, Britain, France, Russia, Arabs, and Jews all 
sought their piece of the former Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern 
territory.  President Woodrow Wilson’s calls for an “association of 
nations” committed to pursuing lasting peace and self-
determination for formerly oppressed peoples26 had far-reaching 
effects on the resolution of this territorial dispute.  The victorious 
powers—minus the United States after the Senate blocked U.S. 
entry—formed a League of Nations with power to appoint and 
oversee a “Mandatory” (trustee) nation which would govern 
various territories “on behalf of the League” with the goal of 
eventual independence for previously oppressed nationalities.27  
France became the Mandatory power for the land comprising 
modern-day Syria and Lebanon, while Britain took up the Mandate 
in a territory covering modern-day Jordan, Israel, the West Bank, 
and the Gaza Strip–denominated Palestine.28 
The Palestine Mandate required Britain to administer the 
territory to “secure the establishment of the Jewish national home,” 
“develop[ ] self-governing institutions,” and “safeguard[ ] the civil 
and religious rights of all inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of 
race and religion.”29  Soon Britain decided to subdivide the 
Mandate, and granted by far the larger piece, the sparsely 
inhabited desert stretching from the Jordan River east toward 
Mesopotamia, to a son of the Sharif of Mecca.30  The “Jewish 
national home” provision of the Palestine Mandate was declared 
                                                     
25 Letter from Lord Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild (Nov. 2, 1917), 
reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 24, at 20.  See generally JONATHAN SCHNEER, THE BALFOUR DECLARATION: 
THE ORIGINS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (2010). 
26 See, e.g., 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (1916) (reprinting Wilson’s speech). 
27 Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 22 (June 28, 1919), reprinted in, THE 
ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 24, at 
23 (authorizing Mandate regimes for “[t]hose colonies and territories which as a 
consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States 
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”).  
28 QUINCY WRIGHT, MANDATES UNDER THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 46 (1930). 
29 Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine, art. 2 (July 24, 1922), reprinted in 
THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 
24, at 25, 26. 
30 See Marvin B. Gelber, The Palestine Mandate: Story of a Fumble, 1 INT’L J. 302, 
304 (1946). 
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inapplicable to this separated territory,31 which comprised three-
quarters of the original Mandate.  This territory would become the 
independent Kingdom of Trans-Jordan in 1946 (later Jordan).  The 
remaining piece, to which Jewish emigration was still allowed, 
thus comprised about one-quarter of the original Palestine 
Mandate.32 
Fleeing violence and uncertainty in Europe, and encouraged by 
the Mandate’s requirement that “a nationality law” be framed “so 
as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews 
who take up permanent residence,”33 waves of European Jews 
rolled into Palestine.  Arab inhabitants reacted angrily.  During a 
terrible week of riots in 1929, Arabs killed 133 Jews and wounded 
hundreds.34  In the early 1930s, both sides armed themselves into 
small paramilitaries.  The British overlords were losing control of 
the situation. 
In 1937, Britain’s Peel Commission reported that the 
burgeoning conflict was “irrepressible” and recommended a 
partition of land and an “exchange of population.”35  Without the 
transfer of 225,000 Arabs and 1,250 Jews, said the Peel report, the 
prospective Jewish state would have as many Arabs as Jews.  The 
“exchange” should occur through agreement but if Arabs objected, 
the report advised the British “in the last resort” to compel 
partition and population exchange.36  The Peel Commission’s 
population exchange recommendation was based on the view that 
population exchange had recently resolved other long simmering 
ethnic conflicts in the area.37  After World War I, war had broken 
                                                     
31 See MUTAZ M. QAFISHEH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FOUNDATIONS OF 
PALESTINIAN NATIONALITY 46–47 (2008) (describing the Council of the League of 
Nations’ approval of Britain’s request to exclude Trans-Jordan from the scope of 
Palestine’s territory and hence from the “Jewish national home” provision of the 
Palestinian Mandate). 
32 See EFRAIM KARSH & P.R. KUMARASWAMY, ISRAEL, THE HASHEMITES, AND THE 
PALESTINIANS 55 (2003). 
33 Terms of the British Mandate for Palestine, art. 7 (July 24, 1922), reprinted in 
THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 
24, at 25, 26. 
34 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 116. 
35 Id. at 138–39 (quoting Peel Commission report). 
36 Id. at 139. 
37 Some Zionists had long thought that a population transfer was the only 
way to establish a viable Jewish state in Palestine.  See id. at 139–42.  Morris 
concludes that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that the Zionist leaders played a role 
in persuading the Peel Commission to adopt the transfer solution.”  Id. at 142. 
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out between Turkey and Greece.  Turkey killed or expelled 
hundreds of thousands of Christian Greeks within its borders and 
within former Ottoman lands granted to Greece under the Treaty 
of Sevres of 1920.38  With mediation by the representatives of the 
victorious Allied powers, Turkey and Greece signed the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne, which mandated a compulsory population 
exchange to “unmix the populations” to “secure the true 
pacification of the Near East.”39  Either individually or pursuant to 
treaty mechanisms, approximately 1.3 million ethnic Greeks 
transferred from Turkey to Greece and nearly 400,000 ethnic Turk 
Muslims in Greece were sent in the opposite direction.40  The Peel 
Commission hoped that the parties to the Palestine dispute “might 
show the same high statesmanship as that of the Turks and the 
Greeks and make the same bold decision”—compulsory 
population exchange—“for the sake of peace.”41  The British 
government endorsed the Peel plan, and the League of Nations—
the supervisor of Britain’s mandate over Palestine—concurred that 
partition and population transfer should be studied.42 
Zionist leaders agreed that population transfer might be 
necessary, but no part of the Peel plan was acceptable to the 
Palestinians and Arab states, which “stridently opposed the Jews’ 
                                                     
38 See Christa Meindersma, Population Exchanges: International Law and State 
Practice, 9 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 335, 338 (1997). 
39 The quotation is from the League of Nations’ representative to the treaty 
talks.  Id. at 339–40.  According to the treaty: “[T]here shall take place a 
compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion 
[residing in] Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion 
[residing in] Greek territory.”  Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and 
Turkish Populations, art. 1, Jan. 30, 1923, 32 L.N.T.S. 75, reprinted in 18 SUPP. AM. J. 
INT’L L. 84 (1924) [hereinafter Treaty of Lausanne]. 
40 Meindersma, supra note 38, at 346.  See generally STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE 
EXCHANGE OF MINORITIES: BULGARIA, GREECE AND TURKEY (1932).  During 
approximately the same time, Britain had partitioned Ireland in an attempt to 
settle the ethnic-religious conflict there.  The largely Catholic South was granted 
independence in 1921, while Northern Ireland was separated and kept part of 
Britain.  With the population of Northern Ireland comprising about two-thirds 
Protestant and one-third Catholic residents and characterized by “irregular and 
commingled settlement patterns,” this partition did not in fact “separate the 
antagonistic communities” and hence did not stop the conflict.  See Chaim D. 
Kaufmann, When All Else Fails: Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the 
Twentieth Century, 23 INT’L SECURITY 120, 126–28 (1998) (arguing that mixed 
demography was central to the relationship between the partition of Ireland and 
violence in the early 1920s). 
41 JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN, POPULATION TRANSFERS IN ASIA 87 (1949) (quoting 
the Peel Commission report). 
42 Id. at 88–90. 
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getting any part of the country they viewed as rightfully theirs, 
and as sacred Muslim soil.”43  The Arab Higher Committee (AHC), 
the chief organ of the Arab residents of Mandate Palestine, rejected 
both partition and the prospect of living under a Jewish state.44  
When Arab gunmen assassinated a British official in 1937, the 
British declared the AHC illegal and sought to arrest its members.45  
Arab militias responded with more than four hundred attacks on 
British police and Jewish settlements.46  The next year, over fifteen 
hundred Arab attacks left 77 Britons and 255 Jews dead.47  This 
Arab violence made the British government and the League of 
Nations suddenly wary of partition and population transfer.48 
In 1939, on the eve of war in Europe, about 1,070,000 Arabs and 
460,000 Jews lived in Palestine.49  By now, the looming peril of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan had become paramount for the British 
Empire.  The Middle East was strategically important because it 
contained huge oil reserves and many British military bases. To 
protect these assets, Arab and Muslim public opinion needed to be 
propitiated.50  As a result of these considerations, the partition and 
population exchange option, put on the table by the Peel 
Commission, was taken off by the British government’s “White 
Paper” in November; Jewish immigration was curtailed at this 
especially inauspicious time.51  Churchill called the reversal of 
Britain’s pledge to create a Jewish homeland another “Munich” 
and a “surrender to Arab violence.”52  The AHC resisted even 
greatly limited Jewish immigration.53  In October 1941, Churchill, 
now prime minister, pledged that if the British won the war, the 
“creation of a great Jewish state in Palestine inhabitated [sic] by 
millions of Jews will be one of the leading features of the Peace 
                                                     
43 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 138, 143. 
44 Id. at 144. 
45 Id. at 145. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 150–51. 
48 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 90–91. 
49 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 122. 
 50  See id. at 155.  
51 Id. at 155, 158.  Many other countries, including the United States, also did 
little to help Jews seeking to immigrate to escape the Nazis.  See generally DAVID S. 
WYMAN, THE ABANDONMENT OF THE JEWS (1984). 
52 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 159. 
53 “The English to the sea and the Jews to the graves” remained the slogan.  
Id. at 158. 
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Conference discussions.”54  Roosevelt, for his part, managed to 
avoid any commitment to a Jewish state; there was “the plight of 
European Jewry” on one hand, but oil and realpolitik on the other.55  
In 1944, Roosevelt did declare that “full justice will be done to 
those who seek a Jewish national home,”56 and just before the war 
in the West ended, Roosevelt, at Yalta, declared himself a Zionist, 
as did Stalin.57  “The growing Zionist orientation of American 
public opinion” found a surer champion in the next president, 
Harry Truman, who advocated resettling Jewish displaced persons 
from Europe in Palestine, even as the Arab League warned that 
this could cause a religious war.58 
At the Potsdam Conference of 1945, the victorious Allied 
powers approved a massive population transfer.  “The polyethnic 
nature of East European states and territorial incongruity in the 
region, where frontiers failed to conform to the natural boundaries 
of ethnolinguistic communities, were considered particularly 
troublesome.”59  Indeed, many considered them to be a leading 
cause of two world wars.  At the conference, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary received the approval of the United 
States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain to expel to Germany 
their ethnic German populations, which had proved so 
unmanageable in the inter-war years and in World War II.60  
                                                     
54 Id. at 168. 
55 Id. at 171. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 171–72.  Stalin, a murderous anti-Semite, added that Jews were 
“parasites.”  Id. at 172. 
58 Id. at 172.  The seven-nation Arab League, founded in fall 1945 in 
Alexandria, had assumed control of the Palestine negotiations. 
59 Bohdan Kordan, Making Borders Stick: Population Transfer and Resettlement in 
the Trans-Curzon Territories, 1944–1949, 31 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 704, 704 (1997). 
60 See, e.g., TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 25–26 
(2005); Joseph B. Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: A Survey, 15 
REV. POLITICS 151 (1953) (specifying the number of German groups that were re-
settled in Europe between 1944 and 1951); Timothy William Waters, Remembering 
Sudetenland: On the Legal Construction of Ethnic Cleansing, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 63, 75–76 
(2006) (explaining that parties to the Potsdam Protocol were aware of German 
expulsions and offered no fundamental objections).  Article 13 of the Potsdam 
Protocol provided: “The three Governments, having considered the question in all 
its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or 
elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to 
be undertaken.  They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in 
an orderly and humane manner.”  Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, A Historical Survey of 
Twentieth Century Expulsions, in REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR 15, 24 (Anna 
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Moreover, as the border between Poland and the Soviet Union was 
to be delimited, populations of different ethnic groups were 
relocated.  Pursuant to the Potsdam agreement and unilateral 
decisions of victorious Allied nations or nations freed by Allied 
armies, approximately twenty million people belonging to ethnic 
minorities were transferred and resettled between 1944 and 1951.61  
The prevailing view of statesmen was that “the policy of 
compulsory transfer of population [was a] solution of the 
minorities problem.”62 
After the war, in spring 1946, an Anglo-American Committee 
of Inquiry toured European displaced-person camps and the 
Middle East to hear testimony from all sides about the future of 
Palestine.63  Despite this and further efforts, no compromise was 
reached.  Arab leaders insisted on independence and majority (i.e., 
Arab) rule for the entire Mandatory territory.64  Britain was ready 
to rid itself of the bother.  In February 1947, the exhausted British 
handed the matter to the United Nations,65 the new and improved 
international organization born out of the League of Nations, 
which had collapsed from America’s absence and the inability to 
restrain Axis aggression. 
Violence was nearly out of control in Palestine, especially once 
Britain began to evacuate its troops and civil officials.66  In early 
1947, the U.N. General Assembly, in special session in New York, 
formed a U.N. Special Committee on Palestine to forge a 
settlement.  The Palestinian leadership boycotted it,67 while the 
Arab League, meeting with the U.N. mediators, rejected partition.  
The Arab League and Palestinian leadership claimed that the U.N. 
lacked legal competence to order partition68 and sought a unified 
                                                                                                                        
C. Bramwell ed., 1988) (offering political explanations for German population 
transfers). 
61 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 40, 41, 43–48, 50). A very large but still 
disputed number of transferees died en route.  
62 J.R., The Exchange of Minorities and Transfers of Population in Europe Since 
1919: II. Repatriation of Germans by Agreement, 21 BULLETIN INT’L NEWS 657, 657 
(Aug. 1944). 
63 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 177. 
64 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 93; Henry Cattan, Recollections on the United 
Nations Resolution to Partition Palestine, 4 PAL. Y.B. INT’L L. 260, 260–61 (1987–1988). 
65 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 180. 
66 Id. at 183. 
67 Cattan, supra note 64, at 261. 
68 FRED J. KHOURI, THE ARAB-ISRAELI DILEMMA 49 (3d ed. 1985); Cattan, supra 
note 64, at 262. 
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state from which illegal Jewish immigrants would be expelled and 
where most of the remaining Jews would have no political rights.69  
In November 1947, Resolution 181 came before the General 
Assembly.70  It proposed, along the Committee’s recommended 
lines, a second partition of Mandate Palestine.  The plan was to 
give fifty-five percent of the territory remaining in the Mandate to 
the prospective Jewish state, with about 500,000 Jews and a large 
Arab minority of more than 400,000.71  About 100,000 Jews and an 
approximately equal number of Arabs would live in Jerusalem, 
which would be placed under international control.72  The 
proposed Arab state would have about 800,000 Arabs and 10,000 
Jews.73  
When the partition plan came to a vote, thirty-three nations 
voted “yes” in favor of partition, thirteen voted “no,” and ten 
abstained.74  The Zionists had won this round.  But Arab states 
declared the Resolution invalid and began to prepare for war.75  A 
Jewish state itself, and a Muslim minority living under Jewish rule, 
was unacceptable to the Arabs.76  The Yishuv indicated that it 
accepted the U.N.’s two-state partition plan, but Britain refused to 
implement it because of the Arab rejection.  Instead, Britain 
insisted it would simply terminate the Mandate and speedily 
complete its withdrawal by May 1948, leaving events on the 
ground to take their course.  Thereafter, the U.N. Security Council 
deadlocked over whether to enforce the partition plan,77 and an 
Arab attempt to refer the matter to the new International Court of 
Justice (“ICJ”) failed.78 
                                                     
69 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 182; SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 97. 
70 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 186; see also Resolution on the Future Government 
of Palestine, G.A. Res. 181 (II), U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov. 29, 1947). 
71 KHOURI, supra note 68, at 54; MORRIS, supra note 10, at 184. 
72 KHOURI, supra note 68, at 47; MORRIS, supra note 10, at 184. 
73 KHOURI, supra note 68, at 53. 
74 The ayes were the United States, the British Commonwealth states, 
Western Europe, the Soviet bloc, and most of Latin America.  Abstainers included 
Britain, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and China.  The nays were the Arab and 
Muslim states, Cuba, and India.  MORRIS, supra note 10, at 186. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 See Statement of Mr. Austin (U.S.), U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., 271st Mtg., U.N. 
Doc. S/PV.271 (Mar. 19, 1948) (memorializing the events that occurred up to, and 
including, the negotiations regarding the partition of Palestine). 
78 See Victor Kattan, The Nationality of Denationalized Palestinians, 74 NORDIC J. 
INT’L L. 67, 70 (2005). 
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Though Britain ultimately rejected this solution for Palestine, 
its troops and administrators used territorial partition elsewhere, 
in a different colonial possession, to solve an ethnic-religious 
conflict.  When World War II ended and independence seemed 
inevitable, India was about twenty-two percent Muslim and sixty-
eight percent Hindu, with Sikhs and smaller groups accounting for 
the remainder.  The Muslim community decided that, without 
British control and protection, it needed its own state to protect its 
interests.  In the summer of 1947, Britain and Muslim and Hindu 
representatives agreed to partition, which would begin in just a 
few months.79  A new Muslim state of Pakistan would be created 
out of majority-Muslim areas on both the western and eastern 
edges of India, a secular Hindu-majority state would remain in the 
middle, and Hindus or Muslims left in the area granted to the 
other group would be allowed to transfer.   
As it happened, the partition of India was exceptionally 
bloody.  Much of the violence occurred in, and around, Punjab 
Province, home to most of India’s population of six million Sikhs.80  
The wealthy and powerful Sikh community did not want to live 
under Muslim rule, but it was denied an independent state in the 
negotiations leading to partition.81  Muslims would not give 
political or security guarantees to Sikhs, and thousands of Sikhs 
were being killed by organized and unorganized Muslim 
violence.82  Refugee flight and retaliatory Sikh violence began, and 
violent chaos soon engulfed the province and spread to 
surrounding areas.  Overall, hundreds of thousands died and 
perhaps twelve million people were exchanged between India and 
West Pakistan.83  Most refugees fled on their own accord and 
without assistance; however, some governmental and civil society 
organizations assisted their own people’s flight or, less frequently, 
helped to expel other groups.84  In the east of the country, where 
                                                     
79 Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 134–36. 
80 Id. at 135. 
81 Id. at 136–38. 
82 Id. at 138. 
83 Id. at 138–40; ANDREW BELL-FIALKOFF, ETHNIC CLEANSING 41 (1996). 
84 See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 9–28, 41–42 (describing the Hindu-
Muslim exchange of population); Gyanendra Pandey, “Nobody’s People”: The Dalits 
of Punjab in the Forced Removal of 1947, in REMOVING PEOPLES: FORCED REMOVAL IN 
THE MODERN WORLD 297, 307 (Richard Bessel & Claudia B. Haake eds., 2009) 
(explaining the circumstances that lead to the expulsion of thousands of Muslims 
in Tihar). 
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the partition lines had fairly neatly separated the Muslim and non-
Muslim populations of Bengal—part of which became East 
Pakistan and later, after an intra-Muslim civil war, the 
independent state of Bangladesh—there was relatively less 
violence.85  After the mass refugee flights of 1947, some changed 
their minds and attempted to return home.86  Both the Pakistani 
and Indian governments immediately regulated this—allowing 
only the holders of special permits to return,87 and then setting a 
strict time limit.88 
Back in Palestine, blood was flowing.  From 1947 to 1949, the 
Jews in Palestine fought Palestinian Arabs and armed forces from a 
number of Arab nations for control of Palestine.  A guerrilla or civil 
war began in November 1947, immediately after the U.N. vote for 
partition and the Arabs’ rejection.  True to its word, in May 1948, 
Britain formally ended its control of Palestine and soon completed 
the withdrawal of its military and civil personnel.  At the same 
time, the Yishuv proclaimed itself the independent State of Israel, 
and a more conventional war began between Israel and armed 
forces from Syria, Trans-Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq.89  
Atrocities were committed on both sides during the war.90  In all, 
about six thousand Jews and ten thousand Arabs—both 
combatants and civilians—were killed or died.91  Though smaller 
in numbers, the Jewish forces proved stronger.  They razed some 
Arab villages and expelled a still-disputed number of Palestinian 
civilians. 
                                                     
85 Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 138–41. 
86 Schechtman estimates that 52,000 Muslims returned to India from Pakistan 
in spring 1948.  See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 41. 
87 Id. 
88 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 54 & n.69). 
89 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 215–18.  In addition, small numbers of troops 
from Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Sudan came to fight the 
Jews.  See DAVID TAL, WAR IN PALESTINE 1948, 288 (2004); EDGAR O’BALLANCE, THE 
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 1948, 77–78 (1957). 
90 Two are infamous.  At Deir Yassin, investigations indicate that 100 to 110 
Arab villagers, including women, children and other noncombatants, were 
massacred by Jewish irregular forces.  Then, days later, at Mount Scopus, Arab 
guerillas burned alive in their vehicles a large group of Jewish civilians, including 
nurses and doctors heading to Hadassah Hospital.  Seventy or more were killed in 
the attack.  See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 207–09. 
91 Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 144. 
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Israel’s declaration of independence had avoided specifying the 
borders of the state;92 Israel did not want to publicly reject the U.N. 
partition boundaries, for fear of upsetting the U.N., the United 
States, and other key players, but it also desired “to leave open the 
possibility of expansion beyond the United Nations borders.”93  
The war’s end found Israel in control of most of the territory 
allotted to it under the U.N. partition plan as well as some territory 
that the U.N. had allocated to the Palestinian Arabs or to 
international control (Jerusalem and some suburbs).   
Previously separated into three population clumps—Jerusalem, 
eastern Galilee, and the coastal area from Haifa to Tel Aviv—with 
Arab areas in between, the Jewish community of Palestine was 
consolidated by war into a contiguous whole.94  Some 600,000 to 
760,000 Palestinian Arabs were either expelled or fled of their own 
accord from territory controlled by Israel.95  As noted at the outset, 
the legal analysis in this Article assumes the truth of the Palestinian 
claim that the refugee flight was wholly the fault of Israeli 
misdeeds.  Somewhat more than 100,000 Palestinian Arabs 
remained in Israel.96  Many refugees settled in the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, controlled by Arab armies.97  The bulk of the rest 
went to Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, while much smaller 
                                                     
92 See Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, May 14, 1948, 
reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 24, at 61–62 (declaring that “a Jewish state” was established “in Eretz-
Israel”—meaning in part of the entirety of the God-given Land of Israel—“on the 
strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly,” but not 
specifying the new state’s boundaries). 
93 AVI SHLAIM, THE POLITICS OF PARTITION 169 (1990).  In fact, the Israeli 
diplomat in Washington informed the United States that “the state of Israel has 
been proclaimed as an independent republic within the frontiers approved by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947.”  
Letter from Eliahu Epstein, Agent of the Provisional Gov’t of Isr., to Harry 
Truman, President of the U.S. (May 15, 1948), reprinted in S. COMM. ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, A DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: BASIC DOCUMENTS 1941–1949, 
S. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 843 (1950).  Epstein made an identical 
statement in a contemporaneous letter to the President of the U.N. Security 
Council.  See TAL, supra note 89, at 163–64 (quoting letter). 
94 Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 144–46. 
95 See, e.g., MICHAEL DUMPER, THE FUTURE FOR PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 37 (2007); 
BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM REVISITED 602–04 
(2d ed. 2004); Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 297; Sabel, supra note 3, at 53. 
96 MORRIS, supra note 95, at 603. 
97 Id. at 602–03.  Trans-Jordan ended up annexing the West Bank, and Egypt 
occupied Gaza.  During the 1967 war, Israel took possession of both territories.  
See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 329, 605; SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 368. 
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numbers reached Egypt, Iraq and the states of the Arabian 
Peninsula.98  During 1949, approximately 900,000 Jews lived in 
Israel.99  The Palestinian refugees left behind a great deal of real 
and personal property in Israel, which has been held by Israel or 
disposed of through a complicated series of domestic Israeli legal 
regimes, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article.100 
Given the scale of the personal and financial tragedy for the 
Palestinian people, and the negative impact on their national 
aspirations, one can understand why Palestinians mourn these 
events as a catastrophe (al-Nakbah). 
In 1950, the Israeli parliament enacted the Law of Return, 
which provided that “[e]very Jew” had the right to emigrate to 
Israel and become a citizen.101  Because the parliament enacted the 
Law of Return but has refused to recognize a Palestinian right of 
return, Israeli citizenship and immigration policies are denounced 
by many Palestinians and their supporters as racist.102  In 1952, 
Israel enacted nationality legislation providing that only those 
former citizens of Mandatory Palestine who remained in Israel 
from its establishment in 1948 until the enactment of the law could 
become Israeli citizens.103  Because almost all Palestinian refugees 
abroad did not fit those criteria, they were not Israeli citizens under 
                                                     
98 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 252.  According to Dumper, in 1949, 34% of 
Palestinian refugees were in the West Bank, 26% in Gaza, 10% in Jordan, 14% in 
Lebanon, 10% in Syria, and 1% or fewer in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and other Arab countries.  DUMPER, supra note 95, at 46 tbl.2.3. 
99 I am citing the average Jewish population for the year 1949.  Mainly 
because of immigration from post-war Europe, the Jewish population increased 
from approximately 759,000 at the end of 1948 to approximately 1,014,000 at the 
end of 1949.  For all of this data, see Statistical Abstract of Israel, No. 61, subject 2, 
tbl.2, Population, By Religion, ISR. CENT. BUREAU STAT., available at 
http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/shnatone_new.htm?CYear=2010&Vol=
61&CSubject=2.   
100 Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 297–98, 300–01. 
101 See Shlomo Guberman, The Law of Return, 1950, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFF., (Aug. 20, 2001), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/ 
2000_2009/2001/8/The%20Law%20of%20Return-%201950. 
102 See, e.g., HENRY CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (1973); 
Ali Abunimah & Hussein Ibish, The Palestinian Right of Return, AMERICAN-ARAB 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, ADC Issue Paper No. 30, at 15 (2001). 
103 See, e.g., Don Peretz, The Arab Minority of Israel, 8 MIDDLE EAST J. 139, 146 
(1954) (stating residency requirements to obtain Israeli nationality); see also 
Acquisition of Israeli Nationality, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., (Aug. 20, 2001), 
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/ 
8/Acquisition%20of%20Israeli%20Nationality (explaining the implications of 
Israeli nationality legislation for Palestinians).  Here and elsewhere when I note 
the views of the parties to this dispute, I do not mean to endorse them as my own. 
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Israel’s municipal law.  Trans-Jordan, which, after its 1950 
annexation of the West Bank, was home to about 500,000 
Palestinian refugees,104 enacted nationality legislation in 1954 
giving citizenship to resident Palestinians “except the Jews.”105  For 
various reasons, with political and diplomatic considerations 
foremost, all other Arab states besides Trans-Jordan resolved that 
Palestinian refugees would retain their nominal Palestinian 
nationality and not be naturalized in their states of refuge.106 
For years, different tales about the reasons for the Palestinian 
refugees’ flight were told by Israelis and Arabs.  The Israeli 
position was that almost all of the Arabs left voluntarily, urged or 
ordered by leaders to make way for the conquering Arab armies.  
Immediately after the war, some Arab journalists and government 
officials told the same story that Israelis did.  The shame of losing a 
war to the Jews mandated that the Palestinians’ flight had been 
voluntary and driven by military tactics or a principled refusal to 
live a single day under Jewish rule.107 Arab states and Palestinian 
leaders maintained that Israel had no legitimate, legal existence 
and would soon be swept away by their resurgent armies.  They 
demanded that the U.N., Israel, and other nations of the world 
recognize and enforce a right of the Palestinian refugees to return 
to their homes and lands, and often made clear that this meant the 
                                                     
104 TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 20, n.62 (providing statistical data regarding 
distribution of refugees). 
105 The law stated: “Any person with previous Palestinian nationality except 
the Jews before the date of May 14, 1948 residing in the Kingdom during the 
period from December 20, 1949 and February 16, 1954 is a Jordanian citizen.”  
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JORDAN: THE SILENT TREATMENT: FLEEING IRAQ SURVIVING IN 
JORDAN, at 78 n.240 (2006). 
106 See Jalal Al Husseini, The Arab States and the Refugee Issue: A Retrospective 
View, in ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 435 (Eyal Benvenisti et al. eds., 
2007); OROUB EL-ABED, UNPROTECTED: PALESTINIANS IN EGYPT SINCE 1948 (2009); 
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 298; Abbas Shiblak, Residency Status and Civil 
Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries, 25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 36, 38–39 
(1996); Georgiana G. Stevens, Arab Refugees: 1948–1952, 6 MIDDLE E. J. 281, 287, 294 
(1952).  The collective decision that Palestinians in Arab states would not be 
naturalized was formalized in the 1965 Casablanca Protocol.  See TAKKENBERG, 
supra note 3, at 141.  In recent years, Jordan, the only Arab state to grant 
citizenship to significant numbers of Palestinians, has been withdrawing it.  See 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JORDAN: STATELESS AGAIN: PALESTINIAN-ORIGIN 
JORDANIANS DEPRIVED OF THEIR NATIONALITY (2010). 
107 See, e.g., JON & DAVID KIMCHE, A CLASH OF DESTINIES 122 (1960); 
SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 124–25; Radley, supra note 3, at 587 n.7, 589 (citing 
CHRISTOPHER SYKES, CROSSROADS TO ISRAEL 420 (1965)). 
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destruction of Israel.108  It was only somewhat later that the 
unanimous Arab narrative was that Palestinian flight had resulted 
from a systematic and brutal expulsion by Jewish forces.109 
Neither side’s explanation for the refugees’ flight is entirely 
accurate, says Professor Benny Morris, the leading historian of the 
Palestinian refugee problem.110  Morris’s revisionist history, which 
found no Zionist master plan to expel Arabs but asserted that 
numerous actions taken by Jewish forces, often with official 
political connivance, caused the flight of many Palestinians,111 has 
not been universally accepted.  Professor Efraim Karsh, for 
example, has argued that Morris misinterpreted the evidence and 
that Palestinian Arabs fled for many reasons of their own besides 
feared or actual Jewish violence.112  On the other hand, there are 
those who claim that the Yishuv and then Israel planned and 
implemented an illegal “ethnic cleansing.”113  Nevertheless, for 
purposes of clarity, the following legal analysis of the Palestinians’ 
alleged right of return will assume the truth of the Palestinian 
version of events—that the Palestinian refugees’ flight was the 
direct or indirect result of Jewish violence or threats of violence.   
Spurred by tensions in Palestine, in 1948 the ancient Jewish 
communities in many Arab states began to flee or be expelled.  
Overall, about half a million or more Jews eventually left Arab 
states, such as Iraq and Egypt, and many came to Israel.114  In many 
cases, the Jewish refugee exodus was accompanied by Arab 
violence against Jews and official or unofficial property 
confiscation.  When Palestinian refugees and Arab states began to 
demand post-war that refugees be allowed to return to Israel, Israel 
responded that a de facto “population exchange” had taken place 
between Arab countries and Israel and that this separation of the 
                                                     
108 See, e.g., Radley, supra note 3, at 602 n.64 (quoting Mohammad Sala el Din 
Bin Bey, Foreign Minister of Egypt in 1949, as stating, “More clearly, they 
envisage the liquidation of Israel.”). 
109 See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 106, at 282–83; Tomeh, supra note 19, at 122.  
Some Arabs did say contemporaneously with events that Jewish atrocities had 
caused the flight of the Palestinian Arabs.  See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 41, at 123 
(quoting Henry Cattan of the Arab Higher Committee in 1948 that Arabs were 
forced to flee through “Zionist terror and horror from their homeland . . . .”). 
110 MORRIS, supra note 10, at 253. 
111 See generally MORRIS, supra note 95. 
112 See generally EFRAIM KARSH, PALESTINE BETRAYED (2010). 
113 See, e.g., ILAN PAPPE, THE ETHNIC CLEANSING OF PALESTINE (2006). 
114 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 58 & 59). 
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communities would not be reversed by Palestinian refugee 
repatriation. 
No Arab state agreed to formally end its state of war against 
Israel, but under U.N. supervision, bilateral armistices were 
reached in 1949 between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, 
and Syria.  These armistices declared that they were made without 
prejudice to future negotiation of the status of refugees and 
borders.115 
A U.N.-appointed mediator, the Swedish aristocrat Count 
Folke Bernadotte, had reported mid-war his view that Palestinian 
“Arab refugees” had a “right” to return to their homes inside 
Israel.116  Neither Bernadotte nor his vision for an Arab-tilting 
settlement survived; the Count was assassinated by Jewish 
terrorists soon after his report to the U.N., and the complex 
resolution on Palestine drafted and approved by the U.N. General 
Assembly in December 1948 did not describe the return of 
Palestinian refugees as a “right.”  Resolution 194 (III) created a 
Conciliation Commission for Palestine empowered to “facilitate 
the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social 
rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation,” 
and: 
                                                     
115  Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Syria each stipulated in their respective 
armistice agreements with Israel that the territorial lines referenced were military 
armistice lines rather than permanent political boundaries, and that the agreement 
about military lines was without prejudice to later discussions of political matters.  
See Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Syria, arts. II.2, IV.2 & V.1, 
July 20, 1949, No. 657, 42 U.N.T.S. 327, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm04.asp; General Armistice 
Agreement Between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel, Jordan-Isr., arts. 
II.2, IV.2, VI.8 & VI.9, Apr. 3, 1949, No. 656, 42 U.N.T.S. 303, available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/F03D55E48F77AB698525643B00608D34; 
Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Egypt-Isr., arts. IV.3, V.2 & V.3, 
Feb. 24, 1949, No. 654, 42 U.N.T.S. 251, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm01.asp.  Lebanon agreed to call the 
boundary between its territory and the former Palestine Mandate an 
“international boundary,” even while insisting that agreement itself only 
concerned military armistice lines and did not prejudice later discussions of 
political matters.  See Lebanese-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Isr.-Leb., 
arts. II.2, IV.2 & V.1, Mar. 23, 1949, No. 655, 42 U.N.T.S. 287, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm02.asp. 
116 See Progress Rep. of the U.N. Mediator on Palestine, 3rd Sess., at 18, U.N. 
Doc. A/648 (Jan. 1, 1948) (“The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes 
in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by 
the United Nations.”). 
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Resolve[d] that the refugees wishing to return to their homes 
and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted 
to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that 
compensation should be paid for the property of those 
choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to 
property which, under principles of international law or in 
equity, should be made good by the Governments or 
authorities responsible[.]117  
Israel did not outright accept or reject Resolution 194 (III) but 
publicly indicated that it believed that resettlement in Arab 
countries was required for the majority of Palestinian refugees; 
privately, Israeli leaders had decided months earlier that no return 
of any substantial size would take place.118  The Palestinians and 
Arab states rejected Resolution 194 (III) because it presupposed the 
legitimate existence of Israel and did not provide a total, 
unconditional right to return—any return of refugees was made 
conditional on peace and perhaps subject to Israeli approval.119  For 
many Arabs at that time, the Palestinians would return only, as the 
then Egyptian foreign minister put it, “as master of their country 
and not as slaves,” and in the context of “the liquidation of 
Israel.”120  For this reason, the Arab states voted against Resolution 
194.121 
                                                     
117 G.A. Res. 194 (III), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/194(III) (Dec. 11, 1948). 
118 See generally MORRIS, supra note 95, at 549–51, 559–60.  Under pressure 
from the United Kingdom, United States, and others, Israel in 1949 offered to take 
back up to 100,000 Palestinian refugees as part of a comprehensive peace 
settlement, but the Arabs rejected this offer.  See id. at 570–78. 
119 But today, some advocates of the Palestinian position on refugees claim 
that the U.N. resolution required a right of “unconditional return” for the 
refugees.  See, e.g., PAPPE, supra note 113, at 188. 
120 Radley, supra note 3, at 602 n.64 (citing Al Misri (Oct. 11, 1949), quoted in 
Talmon, Israel and the Arabs and in THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 284 (Laqueur ed., 
1971)).  
121 To obtain the vote tally, see, http://unbisnet.un.org, (follow “Voting 
Records” hyperlink; then search “U.N. Resolution Symbol” for “A/RES/194(III)” 
and search “Keyword” for either “Egypt,” “Iraq,” “Lebanon,” “Saudi Arabia,” 
“Syria,” “Yemen,” or other non-Arab states which voted against the resolution; 
then follow red arrow hyperlink).  Trans-Jordan was not yet a U.N. member state, 
but almost certainly would have voted ‘no.’  The Arab states’ vote against the 
resolution on refugee return does not appear in the histories written by some 
supporters of the Palestinian side.  See, e.g., PAPPE, supra note 113, at 188 (touting 
the significance of the supposedly “unconditional return” of refugees demanded 
by Resolution 194 by noting that it “was overwhelmingly supported by most of 
the member states” of the United Nations). 
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3. BACKGROUND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
A “right of return” under international law for Palestinian 
refugees has been asserted since Israeli independence in 1948.  
Different substantive areas of treaty-based or customary law 
potentially apply, namely refugee law, nationality and 
immigration law, the law of armed conflict (also known as 
international humanitarian law), law concerning state succession, 
and human rights law.  Some Palestinian advocates also claim that 
the United Nations has created binding international law that 
requires return through repeated General Assembly resolutions 
specifically directed at the Palestinian refugee issue.  Moreover, 
some Palestinians claim that general CIL requires return. 
This Section first sets out certain background principles that 
must be kept in mind during discussion of the right of return.  
Next it addresses the temporal question: does the law as it existed 
in 1947–49 govern, or does international law as it has changed and 
developed through the present day govern?  
3.1. Legal Framework 
There are three primary sources of international law: treaties, 
CIL, and “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.”122  Since World War II, numerous multilateral treaties 
have come into force and treaties have become the most important 
source of international law.  “General principles” are the least 
important and will not be considered here.123  CIL is a significant 
source of international law but quite controversial.  For centuries it 
has been thought that binding international law can result from the 
universal or at least general practices of states over time, if 
performed from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris) rather than 
                                                     
122 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1033 U.N.T.S. 993 (listing these three as the primary sources of 
international law). 
123 There is no agreement on what are considered “general principles.”  See 
G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (1983) 
(describing contrasting opinions about the meaning and relevance of the “general 
principles” in the ICJ Statute).  The leading view is that “general principles” are 
gap-filling principles or presumptions, and are identified because they are used 
universally or nearly universally in domestic courts.  See id. at 139–41; Rudolf B. 
Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 
51 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 736 (1957).  Many commentators hold that “general 
principles” are applicable only in international courts and, perhaps, in 
international organizations.  See id. at 734–36 (discussing the vagueness of how 
general principles are determined in international tribunals). 
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for reasons of self-interest, comity, tradition, or the like.124  To 
constitute CIL, consistent state practice over time must be done 
under a “conscious[ness] of having a duty” to so act.125  But 
accurately identifying which state practices have been consistently 
performed over a sufficient period of time because of a state’s 
sense of legal obligation has often proved difficult.126  Despite these 
difficulties, CIL has been and continues to be recognized as a 
crucially important form of international law.  “Soft law” is 
sometimes said to be a fourth kind of international law, in addition 
to treaties, CIL, and general principles.127  Though the term soft law 
has various meanings, here it is used to describe statements of 
norms or obligations which, even though announced in non-legally 
                                                     
124 See generally PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Routledge 7th rev. ed. 2007) (describing how customary 
international law has traditionally been located: for a rule imposing a duty, state 
practice must be “accompanied by the conviction that it reflects a legal 
obligation,” rather than, for example, conduct motivated by “courtesy or 
tradition,” while for permissive rules, state practice must be accompanied by “a 
conviction felt by states that a certain form of conduct is permitted by international 
law.”); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) 
(“Wherever and as soon as a line of international conduct frequently adopted by 
States is considered legally obligatory or legally right, the rule which may be 
abstracted from such conduct is a rule of customary [i]nternational [l]aw.”). 
125 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 (Sept. 7); see also 
North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 20) 
(“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must 
also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this 
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”). 
126 See generally ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1971) (“[T]he literature contains no standards or criteria 
for determining how much time is necessary to create a usage that can qualify as 
customary international law . . . .”); MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 
(5th ed. 2008) (observing that CIL “is ordinarily found by a more or less subjective 
weighing of the evidence, and subjective scales tilt differently in different 
hands.”); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 1, 1 (1975) (“[I]nternational lawyers . . . invoke rules of customary 
international law every day, but they have great difficulty in agreeing on a 
definition . . . .“).  Recent literature suggests that much state practice which has 
been assumed to be done from a sense of legal obligation can often be more 
parsimoniously explained as based on rational choices about national interest.  
See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005).  When states take actions simply to suit their interests, it is theoretically 
difficult to explain why other states should be legally bound to follow the same 
rules of conduct.  For a sophisticated response to Posner and Goldsmith and an 
attempt to provide a firmer foundation for CIL, see ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008). 
127 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing “soft law” as either: (1) 
standards and obligations created from formal but non-legally binding 
agreements or (2) ambiguous terms of legal binding documents). 
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binding texts, are said to have, or to have acquired over time, some 
kind of binding legal quality.  This Article will address one specific 
form of soft law—formally nonbinding U.N. General Assembly 
resolutions. 
3.2. The Temporal Issue 
Non-retroactivity is a foundational principle in both domestic 
and international law.  It is a default rule of treaty interpretation128 
and a core component of the customary rules regarding the 
responsibility of states for international wrongs: “An act of a State 
does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless 
the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act 
occurs.”129  Human rights bodies130 and international courts apply 
this rule.131  As the Vice President of the ICJ wrote, “acts should be 
judged in the light of the law contemporary with their creation.”132 
                                                     
128 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 28, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter 
VCLT] (“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which 
took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into 
force of the treaty with respect to that party.”).  On the customary nature of this 
rule, see Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 2 (Aug. 30); Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), Preliminary Objection, 1952 I.C.J. 
28, 40 (July 1). 
129 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 13, U.N. Doc. 10 A/56/10 (2001).  “Article 13 
states the basic principle that, for responsibility to exist, the breach must occur at a 
time when the State is bound by the obligation,” and is thus “a guarantee against 
the retrospective application of international law in matters of State 
responsibility.”  International Law Commission, Commentary on Article 13 of Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. 10 
A/56/10 (2001). 
130 See, e.g., X. and Y. v. Portugal, App. No. 8560/79, 8613/79, 16 Eur. 
Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209 (1979) (refusing to apply a right gained from the 
European Convention on Human Rights to an action occurring before the 
Convention came into force). 
131 See Phosphates in Morocco (It. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A/B) No. 74 (June 14) (dismissing a dispute where the French government 
engaged in conduct prior to an agreement prohibiting such conduct); Minquiers 
and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17) (determining British sovereignty 
over the islets after analyzing claims of title dating back to the fourteenth 
century). 
132 T. O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 285, 286 
(1980); see also Anthony D’Amato, International Law, Intertemporal Problems, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1234, 1235 (1992) (“Clearly, when 
changes occur in rules of international law, the changes are normally expected to 
apply prospectively and not retroactively.”); Inst. de Droit Int’l, The Intertemporal 
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Most legal analyses finding a Palestinian right of return do not 
acknowledge the temporal problem in seeking to hold Israel’s 
conduct in 1947–49 to legal standards developed decades later.133  
In a few instances where right-of-return proponents have 
addressed the temporal problem, they have sought to evade it by a 
strained application of the so-called “continuing violations” 
doctrine,134 which originated in domestic law.  In domestic law, 
this doctrine is widely deplored for its theoretical confusion and 
doctrinal instability,135 and it seems exceedingly unlikely that it has 
somehow solidified into fixed and universally binding CIL.  
Notwithstanding this, the doctrine on its own terms does not help 
the Palestinian refugees.  The doctrine has traditionally been 
                                                                                                                        
Problem in Public International Law ¶ 1 (Aug. 11, 1975) (“Unless otherwise 
indicated, the temporal sphere of application of any norm of public international 
law shall be determined in accordance with the general principle of law by which 
any fact, action or situation must be assessed in the light of the rules of law that 
are contemporaneous with it.”). 
133 See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 3, at 196–98, 201–02 (assessing the right to 
return under treaties subsequent to the 1947–49 conflict).  The attempt to hold 
Israel responsible today based on contemporary international law for actions 
more than sixty years ago contrasts with the recognition by EU governments and 
EU institutions that Czechoslovakia’s expulsion of its ethnic German minority 
after World War II must be judged in light of law contemporaneous with the 
expulsion.  See generally Waters, supra note 60. 
134 See, e.g., KATTAN, supra note 3, at 212–14 (arguing that if one views the 
Palestinian expulsions of 1948 as part of a larger continuing offense on the part of 
Israel, then the governing law is the law in force at the time the dispute is settled); 
Gail J. Boling, The Question of “Timing” in Evaluating Israel’s Duty under 
International Law to Repatriate the 1948 Palestinian Refugees, in ISRAEL AND THE 
PALESTINIAN REFUGEES 219, 231 (Eyal Benvenisti et al. eds., 2007) (arguing that, 
under the continuing violation doctrine, if an issue is not resolved before the 
signing of a new treaty, then the new treaty governs the continuing situation once 
it comes into force).  A partial exception is Saideman, who acknowledges that 
non-retroactivity is the default rule for treaties and that CIL by definition cannot 
apply retroactively.  See Saideman, supra note 3, at 846–47.  But he then asserts that 
a treaty post-dating 1947–49 by many years (the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, ICCPR), binds Israel retroactively “because Israel could have 
asserted otherwise by filing a reservation,” but did not.  Id. at 847.  This cannot be 
right.  The relevant articles of the ICCPR give no indication that they are meant to 
apply retroactively, and non-retroactivity is a universally-recognized default rule 
of treaty interpretation.  Thus no special reservation was needed for the ICCPR to 
apply only prospectively. 
135 See, e.g., Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 
1983) (stating that, in the Title VII employment discrimination context, “the 
precise contours and theoretical bases” of the continuing violation doctrine “are at 
best unclear”); Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 29 P.3d 175, 183 (Cal. 2001) (“A 
review of federal case law regarding the continuing violation doctrine reveals the 
doctrine to be, as one leading treatise has noted, ‘arguably the most muddled area 
in all of employment discrimination law.’”) (citation omitted). 
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applied with regard to statutes of limitations in tort or employment 
discrimination cases—if a wrong was repeated or continuing, 
sometimes a plaintiff’s time to sue was extended.136  But note that 
the initial act needed to be wrong at the time it was committed.137  
If there was no initial wrongful act, then there could be no 
continuation of anything sufficient to toll a plaintiff’s obligation to 
timely file suit.138  This part of the doctrine is ignored by some 
proponents of the right of return, who argue that even if Israel 
committed no wrong in 1947–49 under the law then in force, the 
“situation” of the refugees being denied the ability to return has 
continued in time—until today.139   
Thus, it is concluded, Israel’s conduct in 1947–49 and any rights 
of the refugees which arose from that must be evaluated under the 
international law in force today—which happens to be after 
decades of unprecedented growth and change in human rights law 
and other relevant areas of international law.  But treaties do not 
apply retroactively unless their text specifies it.  As discussed 
below, relevant treaties post-dating 1947–49 do not contain 
language indicating that they apply retroactively.  And CIL by 
definition does not apply retroactively. 
Right-of-return proponents’ slippery inter-temporal claims 
help them less than one might suppose.  Since World War II, some 
areas of international law have extended their scope dramatically 
and grown very detailed; have been extensively codified in 
binding legal instruments; have developed important international 
and regional enforcement institutions; and have seen marked 
improvements in compliance in state practice.  This development 
has failed to happen in other substantive areas of the law.  In other 
areas, there is still relatively little substantive coverage, states have 
been wary about making binding written commitments, 
enforcement institutions are few and relatively powerless, and 
                                                     
136 See, e.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380–81 (1982) 
(concluding that, under § 812(a) of the Fair Housing Act, a claim of a continuing 
violation is not barred, even if some conduct occurred outside of the limitations 
period, as long as “the complaint is timely when it is filed within 180 days of the 
last asserted occurrence of that practice”). 
137 Id.  
138 Continuing consequences are not sufficient to toll a statute of limitations.  
See generally McGregor v. L.S.U. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).  
This rule does not hold in the complicated area of Title VII hostile work 
environment.  See generally Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 
(2002). 
139 Boling, supra note 134, at 231. 
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state practice has generally not come close to conforming to 
already-existing written commitments, much less the aspirations of 
NGOs and other proponents of broader rights and greater 
enforcement.  The bodies of law most applicable to the issue of the 
return of Palestinian refugees fall into this latter category.  States 
have been reluctant to make binding commitments about the 
treatment of refugees in general.  In particular, the major treaty on 
refugees does not even address the issue of repatriation, much less 
create any kind of specific and binding right.140  In the areas of 
immigration and nationality law, most states have persisted in 
zealously guarding what they see as a domestic, sovereign 
prerogative to determine who will enter their borders and be 
deemed citizens.141  States have been similarly loath to bind 
themselves to rules governing state succession.  The laws of war 
governing international conflicts have been extensively codified in 
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which essentially every state 
has agreed to, and in other important instruments.  By contrast, 
there is a much smaller amount of written, binding law governing 
non-international conflicts, and such as there is did not develop 
until the 1970s through Additional Protocols of the Geneva 
Conventions. As to CIL, even if the continuing violations doctrine 
did somehow allow current CIL to be applied retroactively, I show 
below in Section 5 that even today it is far from clear that CIL 
would recognize a right of return for refugees in the highly 
unusual circumstances of the Palestinian refugees from 1947–49. 
                                                     
140 See infra Section 4.2 (analyzing the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the 
reason why it does not create a right of return for Palestinians). 
141 See infra Section 4.4 (exploring the Palestinian argument that international 
laws of state succession should supersede Israel’s domestic immigration laws that 
deny citizenship to Palestinian refugees from 1947–49); see also Jan Penrose, The 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: The Case For and Against Reform, in 
FORCED MIGRATION AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD: CHALLENGES TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 17, 17–18 (Andrzej Bolesta ed., 2003) (“[A] world of nation 
states which zealously guard their right to determine who shall gain entry to their 
territory and enjoy state protection and the benefits of the social, cultural and 
economic life of that country. . . .”).  The statement in the main text above is 
subject to limitations and qualifications.  Within the European Union, for example, 
there has been a remarkable move to drop internal barriers to movement and to 
render citizenship unimportant.  But the EU still vigorously protects its outer 
boundary and its common citizenship from outsiders.  
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4. TREATIES AND U.N. RESOLUTIONS DO NOT PROVIDE                         
A RIGHT OF RETURN 
No positive laws—treaties or legally-obligatory U.N. 
resolutions—were violated by Israel’s expulsion of Palestinians 
during the 1947–49 conflict; nor does any positive law source 
provide a right of return for Palestinian refugees.  Because the 
1947–49 Palestinian refugees were expelled or fled during armed 
conflict, it makes sense to first examine the international law of 
armed conflict.  This Section then reviews treaties embodying 
refugee law, human rights law and law governing nationality and 
state succession, as well as U.N. General Assembly and Security 
Council resolutions.  Where relevant, CIL norms interstitial to 
written law are discussed.  However, the discussion of whether 
CIL in general provides a right of return is not taken up until 
Section 5. 
4.1. Law of Armed Conflict 
4.1.1. Geneva Conventions of 1949   
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which governs the 
treatment of civilians in war (hence the ‘Civilians Convention’), is 
cited as recognizing a right of return applicable to the case of the 
Palestinians.142  Specifically, Article 49 of the Convention bars 
“[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of 
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the 
Occupying Power or to that of any other country . . . .”143  But this 
does not apply to the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees because Israel 
only became a party to the treaty in June 1951,144 well after the 
1947–49 conflict had generated the Palestinian refugee problem.  
As discussed in Section 3.2 above, absent treaty language to the 
contrary, the substantive provisions of the treaty cannot be applied 
retroactively to judge prior conduct.  Nothing in the Civilians 
Convention indicates that the relevant provisions are meant to 
                                                     
142 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilians 
Convention].  
143 Id. 
144 See State Parties, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2012) [hereinafter State Parties Geneva] (listing dates of 
signature, ratification, and reservation by states to the 1949 Geneva Conventions). 
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have retroactive effect.  In any event, the prohibition on 
deportations is inapplicable to what occurred during the conflict 
over Palestine because the treaty provision applies only in 
“occupied territory.”  As discussed below as part of the analysis of 
the applicability of earlier treaties, the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907 concerning rules for land warfare in inter-state wars, 
Israel was not a military occupier of a hostile nation’s territory 
during the 1947–49 conflict. 
4.1.2. Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 
In 1899, delegates to an international conference at The Hague 
negotiated and signed the Convention with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, which contained an Annex of 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land.145  
A second peace conference in 1907 adopted a revised but nearly 
identical treaty and annex of regulations.146  But because some state 
parties to the 1899 convention did not adopt its replacement, both 
conventions have remained in force.  Neither Israel nor its 
adversaries during the 1947–49 conflict—Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, 
Trans-Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia—were parties to either 
treaty.147  During the time that it governed the Palestine Mandate, 
the United Kingdom was a party to the 1907 Hague Convention.  
Because Israel was created out of part of the territory of the 
Mandate, it might be argued that Israel was a “successor state” and 
succeeded to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Hague 
Convention.  As discussed in more detail in Section 4.4 below, 
Israel has consistently denied that it was the successor to U.K. 
                                                     
145 Convention (II) Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899 Hague Convention]. 
146 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention].  On the 
two conferences and conventions, see James L. Tryon, The Hague Conferences, 20 
YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1911) (discussing the history behind the conventions). 
147 See State Parties, Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The 
Hague, 18 October 1907, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ 
ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=195&ps=P (last visited Oct. 17, 2012) (listing 
dates of signature, ratification, and reservation by states to the 1907 Hague 
Convention); State Parties, Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land, The Hague, 29 July 1899, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS,  
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=150&ps=P (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2012) (listing dates of signature, ratification, and reservation by states to 
the 1899 Hague Convention). 
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treaties or any other obligations of the United Kingdom or the 
Mandate, and there is no basis, under international law in force at 
the time, to question this.   
But even if one believes that Israel somehow succeeded to the 
U.K.’s treaty obligations, there is an alternative reason why Israel 
was not directly bound by the 1907 Hague Convention.  The 
Convention’s “general participation clause” provides that the 
Convention and the annexed regulations “do not apply except 
between Contracting Powers, and then only if all the belligerents 
are parties to the Convention.”148  The war over Palestine involved 
many states that were not parties to the 1907 Hague Convention, 
such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.149  As a result, even if it had 
succeeded to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the 
Convention, Israel was not directly bound by the Convention’s 
provisions and regulations during the 1947–49 conflict.   
Even though Israel was not directly bound by the Conventions’ 
provisions and their annexed regulations, Israel might still have 
been bound indirectly, by virtue of the 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions’ contents having become part of CIL at some time 
before the 1947–49 conflict. In 1946, the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg judging Nazi war crimes declared that the 
Hague rules had, by 1939 when World War II started, become CIL.  
The Tribunal rejected the German defendants’ argument that the 
general participation clause and the presence of non-parties among 
the belligerents in World War II relieved Germany of its 
                                                     
148 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, art. 2 (specifying when 
regulations in the Convention apply). 
149 Two of Israel’s adversaries—Trans-Jordan and Iraq—might possibly have 
succeeded to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the 1907 Hague 
Convention.  Both states were created out of Mandate territory overseen by the 
United Kingdom—Iraq in 1932 and Trans-Jordan in 1946.  Upon independence, 
both countries signed treaties with the U.K., which contained provisions 
governing which treaty obligations of the United Kingdom’s would be deemed to 
descend upon the newly independent states.  See, e.g., Treaty of Alliance, U.K.-
Trans-Jordan, art. 8, Mar. 22, 1946, U.K.T.S. No. 32 (providing that Trans-Jordan 
succeeded to (1) any treaty “obligations and responsibilities devolving on [the 
U.K.] in respect of Trans-Jordan,” and (2) “[a]ny general international treaty, 
convention or agreement which has been made applicable to Trans-Jordan by [the 
U.K.] as mandatory”).   Whether or not the United Kingdom had done anything 
during the mandate to make the 1907 Hague Convention “applicable to Trans-
Jordan,” that Convention still would not have applied during the war over 
Palestine because, as noted in the main text above, other parties to the conflict like 
Egypt had not signed the Convention. 
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obligations to follow Hague rules.150  One might perhaps quibble 
about the strength of this precedent with regard to a non-party to 
the Hague Conventions, such as Israel.151  The Israeli government 
apparently did not believe that the Hague provisions and 
regulations bound its actions during the conflict.152 
But even assuming that Israel was, during the war, bound by 
the Hague rules as CIL, an analysis of the provisions of the 
Conventions shows that none was applicable to the unique factual 
and legal situations presented by the conflict over Palestine.  The 
only arguably relevant provisions of the 1899 and 1907 
Conventions are their essentially identical provisions on the 
military occupation of “the territory of [a] hostile state.”153  In the 
context of such a military occupation, both Conventions declare 
that “the lives of persons” and “private property” “must be 
respected;” that “[p]rivate property cannot be confiscated;” that 
“public order and safety” must be “restore[d] and ensure[d], as far 
as possible;” and that the occupying military force must “respect[ ], 
unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force” in the occupied 
territory.154  Note that these provisions of the Hague Conventions 
do not expressly prohibit the expulsion of enemy civilian 
populations from occupied territory.  And no right of return is 
mentioned in either Convention for expellees.  A number of 
proponents of a Palestinian right of return explain the absence in 
                                                     
150 See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment, Oct. 1, 1946, 
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 248–49 (1947) (holding The Hague rules 
applicable to Germany, a signatory, as of 1939). 
151 Holding a treaty party like Germany to obey the parts of the Hague 
Convention as CIL is arguably supported by the Martens Clause, a consideration 
which does not apply to a non-party like Israel.  See infra notes 157-58 and 
accompanying text. 
152 The legal adviser to the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs wrote in 1951, 
while analyzing legal issues arising during the war, that he relied on provisions of 
the 1907 Hague Convention “by way of exemplification only,” because “[n]one of 
the states involved in the fighting in Palestine was signatory or had adhered to 
this Convention.”  SHABTAI ROSENNE, ISRAEL’S ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WITH THE 
ARAB STATES 25 n.1 (1951).  Rosenne did not expressly state that the Hague 
provisions were not CIL, but had Israel considered them to be binding CIL, 
Rosenne would not have said that they were relied upon “by way of 
exemplification only.”  I have been unable to determine whether any of the Arab 
states took a position on the applicability of the Hague rules as CIL. 
153 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, § III (enumerating actions that are 
forbidden during military occupation of a hostile state). 
154 Id. arts. 42, 43, 46.  Essentially identical provisions of the 1899 Hague 
Convention, supra note 145, are found in articles 42, 43 and 46 (specifying what 
defines occupied territory and how to deal with private property in this territory). 
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the Hague Conventions of treaty terms providing a right of return 
with the mistaken historical claim that no nation in that era even 
considered engaging in population transfers or forcible expulsions 
and that therefore transfers were not on the minds of the treaty-
makers.155  In fact, forced population transfers occurred in many 
armed conflicts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,156 
and the learned delegates who drafted the treaties were surely 
aware of this. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to conclude that the Hague 
provisions on military occupation of enemy territory should be 
read expansively to prohibit the expulsion of civilians and, 
perhaps, by implication, to require return of civilians illegally 
expelled.  The so-called Martens Clause of the Hague Conventions 
is the reason for favoring a very broad construction of the treaty 
terms.157  Though “there is no accepted interpretation of the 
Martens Clause,”158 it should be uncontroversial to use the clause 
                                                     
155 See generally MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 3, at 28 (“Historically, the 
right of return was so universally accepted and practiced that it was not deemed 
necessary to prescribe or codify it in a formal manner.”); Abunimah & Ibish, supra 
note 102, at 21 (quoting and agreeing with Mallison & Mallison’s statement).  It 
would have seemed equally unnecessary, wrote one, “to the delegates convened 
at The Hague in 1907 to draft special articles to prohibit cannibalism or human 
sacrifices.”  Alfred M. de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population Transfers, 16 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 211 (1975). 
156 Forced expulsion of civilian populations occurred during the American 
Civil War (for instance, in parts of Missouri) and in many U.S. wars against 
Indians.  Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus was accompanied by the killing and 
expulsion of Chechens, Circassians and other local peoples.  After achieving 
independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, Bulgaria forcibly expelled 
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Turks.  Britain in the Second Boer War (1899–
1902), Spain in putting down the Cuban revolution (1895–1898), and the United 
States in putting down the Filipino revolt (1899–1902) all used the technique of 
expelling the civilian population from areas where guerrillas drew their support 
and then “concentrating” the civilians in camps or towns under armed guard.  
The list could go on.  Suffice it to say that diplomats, generals, and other officials 
were well aware of the military use of forced expulsion of civilians when the 
Hague Conventions were negotiated. 
157 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, pmbl. (“Until a more 
complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting Parties 
deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection 
and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates 
of the public conscience.”). 
158 Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 125, 126 (1997). 
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as a reason to liberally interpret the humanitarian protections in 
the Hague Conventions. 
Assuming that the Hague Conventions are best read to prohibit 
the expulsion of civilians from occupied territory and implicitly 
require return of civilians illegally expelled, the question is, 
therefore, whether any of the territory from which Palestinian 
refugees were expelled was: (1) “territory of [a] hostile state,” and 
specifically territory in which that hostile state had been “the 
legitimate power,” and; (2) which territory Israel had “occupied” 
and over which “the authority of” Israel’s “army” had “been 
established and [was being] exercised.”159  The applicability of the 
relevant Hague Convention rules thus turns on two inquiries about 
the factual and legal status of territory from which Israel (or pre-
statehood Jewish forces) expelled Palestinian refugees: First, did 
any state besides Israel, and “hostile” to Israel, have legitimate 
sovereign authority over the territory at the time of the expulsions; 
and, second, had the Yishuv’s armed forces or, after independence, 
Israeli forces, displaced that legitimate authority and established 
and exercised the authority of a military occupier, prior to the 
expulsion of Palestinians from that territory.160 
To analyze whether these two requirements for the 
applicability of Hague regulations were met, it is helpful to look at 
two distinct periods of time during which refugees fled.  Upon 
careful analysis, it emerges that the Hague rules regarding 
                                                     
159 See 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146 (describing Convention 
guidelines for military occupation by a hostile army). The relevant provisions of 
the 1907 Convention are the following: 
SECTION III.  MILITARY AUTHORITY OVER THE TERRITORY OF 
THE HOSTILE STATE 
Art. 42. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under 
the authority of the hostile army.  The occupation extends only to the 
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. 
Art. 43. The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into 
the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his 
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, 
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country. 
160 In a recent case, the International Court of Justice construed the CIL of 
occupation, as evidenced by the 1907 Hague Convention, in conformity with my 
description of the governing law.  See Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, ¶172–73 (Dec. 19) 
(interpreting Articles 42 and 43 of the Hague Convention as reflected in CIL).  
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occupied territory were not binding on the Yishuv or Israel, and 
were not violated by the Yishuv or Israel, during either period. 
4.1.2.1. Period 1. From the U.N. General Assembly Partition 
Resolution until the End of the Palestine Mandate: 
November 29, 1947 to May 15, 1948   
A civil war in Palestine started when the U.N. voted for 
partition in November 1947.  During this period there was a 
legitimate sovereign government in Palestine—the United 
Kingdom—exercising authority under the Palestine Mandate and 
the supervision of the League of Nations.  During the civil war, 
prior to Israeli independence, Jewish paramilitary units fought 
Arab paramilitary units.  Approximately 350,000 Palestinian Arabs 
became refugees during this time period.161  The Hague regulations 
(as CIL) did not apply during this period, for several reasons.  
First, the Hague Conventions were not applicable to civil wars or 
to non-state actors like the Yishuv.162  At the time, there was 
substantial disagreement about which rules of international law, if 
any, regulated internal conflicts in which one or more parties were 
not recognized as formal “belligerents” under the laws of war.163  
There was nothing approaching a consensus which could have 
bound the Yishuv at the time.  As it turned out, not until 1977, 
through Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
was there a clear prohibition on expulsion of civilians in non-
international armed conflicts.164 
                                                     
161 Morris estimates that 100,000 Palestinian Arabs fled their homes in the 
period from the U.N. partition resolution through the end of March 1948. See 
MORRIS, supra note 10, at 67.  Another 250,000 to 300,000 fled in April and May 
1948. See id. at 262.  Because I am seeking an estimate for a period two weeks 
shorter than Morris’ (until May 15, instead of the end of May), I used the lower 
number, 250,000. 
162 See de Zayas, supra note 155, at 220. 
163 See LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 50 (2006) (noting that before World War II, 
“states were not yet ready to accept binding legal obligations restraining their 
action during the conduct of hostilities in internal armed conflicts. . . . Even later, 
after the Second World War, when there was a growing international concern for 
the protection of human rights . . . states clearly showed their reluctance to accept 
international legal obligations during the conduct of hostilities in internal armed 
conflicts”); id. at 52 (stating that during the draft of what became Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, there was great disagreement between states 
about whether international rules should govern internal armed conflicts). 
164 Article 17 provides that “1. The displacement of the civilian population 
shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the 
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Second, the United Kingdom, the Mandatory power that had de 
jure sovereign control of the territory from which the refugees were 
expelled, was not a “hostile” state whose territory could be 
deemed occupied by the Yishuv forces, as would be required for 
the Hague rules on belligerent occupation to be applicable.  
Although Britain’s role in trying to maintain a chaotic and rapidly 
deteriorating status quo sometimes brought it into conflict with the 
contending parties, it is fair to say that the armed forces of the 
Yishuv were fighting Palestinian Arab guerillas and some 
infiltrated armed forces of the Arab Liberation Army, not the 
United Kingdom.165 
Finally, the Palestinian Arabs who fled appear to have done so 
in advance of or during pitched battles for control of territory;166 
they had already fled by the time armed forces of the Yishuv 
consolidated control and could possibly have been said to 
constitute an occupying army.  Recall that Hague regulations apply 
only once “[t]he authority of the legitimate power having in fact 
passed into the hands of the occupant,” the occupying army’s 
“authority has been established and can be exercised.”167  As a 
British commentator on the Hague rules put it, the law 
“distinguishes between the invasion and the occupation. . . . 
Invasion ripens into occupation when the national troops have 
                                                                                                                        
civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand. . . . 2. Civilians shall 
not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the 
conflict.”  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II), art. 17, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.  Israel is not a party to this 
Protocol.  See State Parties, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol II) 8 June 1977, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ 
ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited Nov. 25, 2012) (listing 
dates of signature, ratification, and reservation by states to Protocol II).  Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which Israel is a party, is applicable 
to “conflict[s] not of an international character.”  See Civilians Convention, supra 
note 142, art. 3.  Even if this treaty is somehow retroactively applicable to the 
1947–49 conflict—which it is not—there is no reason to think that it required a 
right of return for the refugees of 1947–49.  Even as late as 1975 a proponent of the 
right of return had to concede that “[i]nternational law is silent on the question 
whether mass deportations in the course of a civil war constitute a violation of 
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.” See de Zayas, supra note 
155, at 221. 
165 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 191–204 (describing the first stage of the war 
between Palestinian Arabs and the Yishuv, from November 1947 to May 1948). 
166 See, e.g., id. at 181–262. 
167 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 146, arts. 42 and 43. 
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been completely ousted from the invaded territory and the enemy 
has acquired control over it.”168  The period of mere invasion, as 
distinguished from occupation, is “the period of resistance, of 
combats,” in which “neither belligerent was complete master of the 
theatre of war.”169  Any refugees who were expelled during the 
period of combat, or before combat began, are not protected by the 
Hague rules on belligerent occupation.  The great majority of 
Palestinian refugees appear to have fled prior to or during combat 
operations, not after the establishment of control by the Yishuv’s 
armed units.  Even though the facts are relatively clear about this, I 
recognize that some might disagree and then point out that the 
“summary judgment” posture of this Article requires taking the 
pro-Palestinian view of all relevant disputed facts.  And even if 
readers accept that the great majority of Palestinian refugees left 
before or during the military conflict, that still leaves some small 
numbers who may have been expelled or fled after the Yishuv’s 
forces established control.  These two objections are ultimately not 
necessary to resolve, however, because the prior points—that the 
Hague rules did not apply to civil wars, and that the armed forces 
of the Yishuv could not be described as a hostile occupying army 
vis-à-vis the United Kingdom—are dispositive. 
4.1.2.2. Period 2. From the End of the Palestine Mandate until 
the Armistice Agreements: May 15, 1948 until Mid-
1949   
The day after Israel declared independence, May 15, 1948, 
armies from Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, 
assisted by small units and individuals from other Arab states, 
                                                     
168 J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 321 (1911); see also WILLIAM E. 
BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 72 (3d ed. 1914) 
(interpreting the Hague Conventions as holding that military occupation begins 
“only from the time when, the original governmental authorities having been 
expelled, the commander of the occupying army is able to cause his authority to 
be respected.”); PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 297–98 
(1908) (“Occupation exists only where the authority of the invading belligerent 
can be effectively exercised. . . .The accepted criterion of the commencement of 
occupation exists in the cessation of local resistance.”). 
169 SPAIGHT, supra note 168, at 321; see also GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE 
OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 28 (1957) (noting that territory is not considered 
occupied under the Hague Conventions when “the invading forces have not yet 
solidified their control to the point that a thoroughly ordered administration can 
be said to have been established”); JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN. U.S. ARMY, FIELD 
MANUAL 27–10: RULES OF LAND WARFARE 74 (1940) (to the same effect). 
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entered the territory that had been Mandatory Palestine.  The Arab 
states declared that they were acting to prevent partition, i.e., the 
creation of a Jewish state; to protect Arab civilians from massacre; 
restore law and order; and to prevent refugees and disorders from 
crossing into neighboring Arab countries and destabilizing them.170  
The armed forces of Israel resisted the invasions and pressed 
offensive operations to expand the territory of the state and 
neutralize internal Arab resistance.  During this phase of the war, 
approximately 300,000 to 400,000 additional Palestinian Arab 
refugees fled or were expelled.  As noted above, the legal analysis 
in the Article will be based on that version of the facts most 
favorable to the Palestinians—that the refugees fled directly or 
indirectly as a result of Israeli military actions.   
The Hague regulations (as CIL) did not apply during this 
period, for several reasons.  First, notwithstanding the end of the 
Palestine Mandate, withdrawal of U.K. civil and military 
personnel, and declaration of independence by Israel, the conflict 
might still have been best characterized as an internal or civil war, 
rendering the Hague rules inapplicable, for the reasons discussed 
above.171  This legal view of the conflict–that it remained a civil war 
even after May 15, 1948—is premised on the claim that Israel did 
not then exist as an independent state.  As Michael Akehurst 
explains: 
Arab states have always regarded the formation of the state 
of Israel as a nullity from the point of view of international 
law because it infringed the legal rights of the population of 
Palestine (or, rather, of the Arabs who formed the majority 
of the population of Palestine).  In Arab eyes, the struggle 
of 1947–1949 was more in the nature of a civil war than of 
an international war . . .; a minority of the population [the 
Jews], with foreign assistance, was trying to secede from or 
dominate or expel the majority.172 
By summer 1949, there can really be no question that Israel 
existed as an independent nation.  In May 1949, Israel was 
                                                     
170 See Arab League Declaration on the Invasion of Palestine (May 15, 1948), 
reprinted in 1 ISRAEL’S FOREIGN RELATIONS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 1947–1974, 135–
38 (Meron Medzini ed., 1976). 
171 See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (explaining the 
inapplicability of the Hague regulations to a civil war). 
172 Michael Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and International Law, 5 N. Z. 
UNIV. L. REV. 231, 236 (1973).  
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admitted to the U.N.173  During the spring and summer of 1949, 
Israel signed armistice agreements with its principal military 
adversaries, Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan and Syria.  By that time, 
Israel had been diplomatically recognized by many countries, 
including the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and by the United Kingdom, the former Mandatory power 
and the principal diplomatic supporter of the Arab states during 
the conflict.  Though Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Syria refused to 
confirm the political legitimacy and permanence of Israel’s borders 
with them, the de facto borders were stable and conformed to the 
agreed upon armistice lines; moreover, no other possible borders 
had any international legitimacy.  Therefore, by summer 1949 at 
the latest, Israel met the four-part test for international statehood, 
as specified by the Montevideo Convention: a permanent 
population; a defined territory; an effective government; and the 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.174  However, 
prior to summer 1949—and it was during this prior period that 
essentially all of the refugees were expelled or fled—the question 
of Israel’s de jure statehood is closer and more difficult to resolve, 
particularly because of the lack of clarity about whether Israel had 
a “defined territory.”175 If the Arab states were right that, while the 
military conflict raged in 1948-49, Israel had not yet achieved full-
fledged independent statehood, then Israel was not bound by the 
Hague rules as CIL because it was still a non-state actor fighting in 
a conflict, which was primarily a civil or internal one, even though 
outside states—Syria, Egypt, and the other Arab nations—had 
invaded and were giving military assistance to the Palestinian 
population. 
When Israel became a de jure independent state is a difficult 
question that need not be definitively answered because the Hague 
regulations (as CIL) did not apply during this period for a second, 
alternative reason. In order for relevant Hague regulations to apply 
during this time period, it must be found that Israeli forces were 
military occupiers that expelled refugees from territory over which 
another “hostile” state had previously exercised “legitimate” 
authority.  This cannot be done.  Although the precise legal status 
                                                     
173 See G.A. Res. 273 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/273 (III) (May 11, 1949) 
(documenting Israel’s official membership to the United Nations). 
174 See Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 
3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention] (enumerating the four 
qualifications for an international state). 
175 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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of the territory of former Mandate Palestine was complicated and 
to some extent ambiguous during this time period, there is no 
plausible claim that any state besides Israel had actual and 
“legitimate” authority over territory of the former Mandate which 
was then displaced by an Israeli occupation. 
As noted above, Israel’s declaration of independence had 
avoided specifying the borders of the state, but Israel indicated to 
the United States that its borders were those of the U.N. partition 
resolution.176  Nevertheless, Israel’s position was that the partition 
resolution was a dead letter because the British and the Arab states 
had rejected it, and the Security Council had declined to enforce it.  
Israel announced that the partition plan borders were “an 
irreducible minimum” and that it intended to take and incorporate 
into the state more territory during the war.177  The United 
Nations’ mediator for the conflict, as well as key players such as 
the Arab states, the United States and the United Kingdom, 
concurred that the partition resolution’s demarcation of borders 
had no legal effect; final borders would be determined by war and 
diplomacy.178 
During the relevant time period, no other state besides Israel 
existed in Palestine.  Trans-Jordan had territorial designs on part of 
the area, but did not effectuate those until 1950, when it annexed 
the territory now known as the West Bank.179  This action was not 
recognized by other Arab states.  To counter Trans-Jordan’s 
designs, Egypt supported the creation of an Arab government for 
Palestine.  At the end of September 1948, the Arab League, acting 
at Egypt’s behest, announced the creation of the All-Palestine 
Government, to be based in Gaza, and with a writ purporting to 
extend over all of the territory of former Mandatory Palestine, 
including the part held by Israel.180  During its brief and essentially 
                                                     
176 See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
177 See Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel [to the U.N.], 
Letter dated July 7 1948 from the Representative of the Provisional Government of 
Israel [to the United Nations] addressed to the Secretary-General Containing 
Israel’s Reply to the United Nations Mediator’s Suggestions (Document S/863), 
U.N. Doc. S/870 (July 8, 1948). 
178 See, e.g., SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 161, 198, 215–17 (detailing the difficulties 
of recognizing the demarcation of borders and the difficulty in implementing the 
scheme peacefully). 
179 See MORRIS, supra note 10, at 605 (describing Trans-Jordan’s annexation of 
the West Bank in 1950). 
180 See SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 219 (discussing the formation of the All-
Palestine government and the new administration). 
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notional existence, the All-Palestine Government had “no civil 
service, no money, and no army of its own.”181  Trans-Jordan 
rejected the validity of this government, and attempted to organize 
a council of Palestinians in Amman as a competing power center.182  
No nation besides members of the Arab League recognized the All-
Palestine Government.183  Soon after it was proclaimed, the 
government had to leave Gaza because of Israeli military 
pressure.184  The All-Palestine Government never met the four 
Montevideo criteria for independent statehood—permanent 
population, defined territory, effective government and the 
capacity to enter into relations with the other states.185  Therefore, 
the Hague rules as CIL did not apply because Israel was not 
occupying the territory owned by another legitimate sovereign 
nation.  In any event, by the time the All-Palestine Government 
was proclaimed, in late September 1948, the vast majority of 
Palestinian refugees had already left their homes.186 
In sum, neither the 1949 Geneva Conventions nor the earlier 
Hague Conventions rendered the expulsion of Palestinian refugees 
illegal at the time it occurred or required that they be returned.  
4.1.3.  War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity   
Some proponents of the Palestinian right of return claim that the 
charter of the post-World War II Nuremberg war crimes tribunal 
and the tribunal’s judgments, by treating forced expulsion of 
civilian populations as a “war crime” or “crime against humanity,” 
implicitly recognized a customary international right to remain in 
or return to one’s home country, applicable to the Palestinian 
                                                     
181 Id. (characterizing the All-Palestine government as a “farce” in claiming 
jurisdiction over Palestine, but having no civil or armed services). 
182 See id. at 219–20 (detailing Trans-Jordan’s resistance and denunciation of 
the All-Palestine government). 
183 The All-Palestine government was given diplomatic recognition by Egypt, 
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Afghanistan.  See JOHN QUIGLEY, 
THE STATEHOOD OF PALESTINE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 
109 (2010). 
184 SHLAIM, supra note 93, at 244. 
185 See Montevideo Convention, supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
186 An unknown number of Palestinian Arabs, including many Bedouins, 
probably numbering 20,000 to 40,000, fled or were expelled after October 1948 in 
border-consolidating military operations by Israel.  See MORRIS, supra note 95, at 
536.  Subtracting these numbers from the total of 600,000 to 760,000 refugees (see 
supra text accompanying note 95), means that approximately 580,000 to 720,000 
total refugees fled or were expelled by October 1948.   
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refugees of 1947–49.187  The Nuremberg charter’s grant to the 
tribunal of jurisdiction over war crimes, however, was limited to 
“violations of the laws or customs of war,”188 which in 1947–49, as 
previously shown, did not contain rules governing expulsion of 
civilians in civil wars like the conflict in Palestine.  Moreover, the 
charter’s jurisdictional grant covers only expulsion of civilians 
from “occupied” territories,”189 and, as discussed above, in the 
relevant territory Israel was not a belligerent occupier of another 
sovereign’s territory.  
The charter’s jurisdictional grant over “crimes against 
humanity” was broader, however, including “murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,”190 
and thus might potentially have been applicable to Israeli actions.  
At the time of Nuremberg, there were significant concerns that the 
concept of “crimes against humanity” had been created as an 
international wrong only after the fact and applied retroactively to 
Nazi defendants, violating the maxim nullum crimen sine lege.191  
One prominent justification for enforcing a seemingly newly-
invented and somewhat amorphous international criminal law was 
that the Nazis’ crimes had been so massive and immoral that 
justice was served by punishing them even under impermissibly 
retroactive or otherwise defective legal rules.192  Another 
                                                     
187 See, e.g., BADIL RESOURCE CENTER FOR PALESTINIAN RESIDENCY AND 
REFUGEE RIGHTS, SURVEY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED 
PERSONS 2008–2009, at 96 (2010). 
188 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the 
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis 
art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 [hereinafter London 
Charter]. 
189 Cf. de Zayas, supra note 3, at 25 (“[T]he Nuremberg judgment held that 
population transfers and colonisation in occupied territory constituted both a war 
crime and a crime against humanity.”). 
190 London Charter, supra note 188, art. 6 (emphasis added). 
191 See, e.g., Kirsten Sellars, Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 21 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 1085, 1089, 1092 (2010).  See also William A. Schabas, Retroactive Application 
of the Genocide Convention, 4 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 36, 50 (2010) (“[F]or 
crimes against humanity . . . the Tribunal produced no real authority, nor did it 
even seriously try to demonstrate that such acts had been punishable under 
international law in the past.”). 
192 See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a 
Precedent in International Law?, 1 INT’L L.Q. 153, 165 (1947) (“[I]ndividual criminal 
responsibility [was] certainly also morally most objectionable, and the persons 
who committed these acts were certainly aware of their immoral character, [so] 
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justification was that the crimes actually alleged in the Nuremberg 
indictments were penal under domestic law in most civilized 
countries, and hence there was no surprise or prejudice from 
applying them to the Nazis.193  Recognizing the legal problems 
associated with “crimes against humanity,” the Nuremberg 
tribunal decided that such crimes would be punished only when 
they occurred in connection with recognized war crimes or crimes 
against the peace.194  In sum, it was recognized that the legality and 
justice of Nuremberg’s punishment of “crimes against humanity” 
was intimately bound up with the exceptional scale and barbarity 
of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities, and their connection to 
Nazi war crimes.195  The link of “crimes against humanity” to 
specific and astoundingly widespread Nazi atrocities is seen in the 
fact that the post-World War II Tokyo tribunal for Japanese crimes 
essentially ignored “crimes against humanity,” though its charter 
allowed those to be punished, and focused instead on non-
retroactive international wrongs like war crimes based on 
preexisting law-of-war treaties.196  As discussed elsewhere in this 
Article, in the post-World War II period, Western statesmen and 
international lawyers thought that the compulsory transfer of 
ethnic minorities for the purpose of preserving international peace 
was legal and morally justified.197  Given all of this, it seems 
                                                                                                                        
the retroactivity of the law applied to them can hardly be considered as absolutely 
incompatible with justice.”). 
193 See, e.g., Leslie Mansfield, Crimes Against Humanity: Reflections on the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of Nuremberg and a Forgotten Legacy, 64 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 293, 
295 (1995) (quoting Justice Jackson’s argument for the recognition of crimes 
against humanity); Max Radin, Justice at Nuremberg, 24 FOREIGN AFF. 369, 375 
(1946) (“Every one of the acts described in the indictment as crimes against 
humanity would be punishable by the penal codes of every one of the United 
States, the penal codes of France and of the Soviet Union, and of the eight other 
nations which with France took part in the London Conference, the penal codes of 
the British Dominions and of India which were guests at that Conference.”). 
194 See Mansfield, supra at 193, at 307; Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against 
Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. IN’T L. 178, 205 (1946). 
195 See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 193, at 309 (stating that “a central feature of 
‘Crimes Against Humanity’. . . [is]. . .the scope or magnitude of the crime.  ‘War 
Crimes’ were already defined at the time of the Charter; however, the systematic, 
large-scale effort to exterminate millions of people, which characterized the Nazi 
war effort and set it apart from previous war crimes, demanded a separate 
category of war crimes.”). 
196 Sellars, supra note 191, at 1092.  A “decisive factor[] must have been the 
Allies’ tacit recognition that nothing committed by Japan could compare to 
German crimes . . . .”  Id. 
197 See supra notes 59–62 and infra Section 5.1. 
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extremely unlikely that statesmen or international lawyers in 1947–
49 would have thought that expulsion of civilians in the sui generis 
context of partition of Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
accompanied as it was by very small-scale and isolated atrocities 
by Jewish or Israeli military forces, would have constituted “crimes 
against humanity.”198 
4.2. Refugee Law 
For two basic reasons, the Refugee Convention of 1951199 does 
not create or recognize a right of the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees 
to return to live in Israel.  First, the Convention was drafted, at the 
behest of Arab states and Palestinian representatives, to exempt 
most Palestinians from its coverage.200  Second, even if Palestinian 
refugees from the 1947–49 conflict were not excluded from the 
                                                     
198 Recall that only about ten thousand Arabs total (combatants and civilians) 
were killed or died during the conflict, and no one contends that more than a 
fraction of those deaths can be attributed to intentional Jewish or Israeli attacks on 
civilians.  Compare the scale to Nazi atrocities: depending on the definitions used, 
as many as seventeen million civilians and prisoners were killed by the Nazi 
regime, including five to six million Jews.  DONALD NIEWYK & FRANCIS NICOSIA, 
THE COLUMBIA GUIDE TO THE HOLOCAUST 45 (2000).  Of course any deaths are 
tragic; nothing said here is intended to deny or minimize that.  My point is about 
the factual predicate for invoking new legal rules concerning war crimes in 1947–
49. 
199 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
200 Article 1(D) excludes from the protections of the treaty “persons who are 
at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.”  
Refugee Convention, supra note 199.  In 1949, the U.N., acting at the behest of 
Arab states and Palestinian representatives, created an entirely separate agency to 
serve only Palestinian refugees, called the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (“UNRWA”).  See Assistance to 
Palestinian Refugees, G.A. Res. 302 (IV), ¶ 7, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 12, 
U.N. Doc. A/1251, at 23 (1949) (establishing the UNRWA).  It has operated since 
that time, and currently works in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank and 
Gaza.  These actions have effectively removed from the jurisdiction of the 1951 
Convention the vast majority of Palestinian refugees from the 1947–49 conflict.  
See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Revised Note on the Applicability of Article 
1D of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees to Palestinian 
Refugees, para. 1 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
pdfid/4add77d42.pdf (“[Article 1D] excludes from the benefits of the 1951 
Convention those Palestinians who are refugees as a result of the 1948 or 1967 
Arab-Israeli conflicts, and who are receiving protection or assistance from the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(“UNRWA”).”).  See generally Sabel, supra note 3, at 54 (“[D]ue to political pressure 
from Arab States, Palestinian refugees were excluded from the U.N. Convention 
definition of refugees.”). 
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Refugee Convention, it still would not support a right of return 
because the Convention does not purport to grant such a right to 
any type of refugee in any situation.  In fact, the Convention does 
not address the issue of a right of return at all.  The parties that 
drafted the treaty could not or would not agree to that kind of 
provision.  The Convention is primarily concerned with preventing 
the return of refugees to their state of origin and guaranteeing their 
rights in the state to which they fled.  The Convention was only 
acceptable once it promised states “the right ultimately to decide 
which, if any, refugees, would be allowed to resettle in their 
territories” on a permanent basis.201  Notwithstanding the 
exclusion from the Convention of any right related to refugee 
return, some assert that a right of return is a fundamental 
background principle of refugee law, or a rule of “customary 
refugee law,” and therefore binds Israel to allow the Palestinian 
refugees to return.202  As discussed below, even in 2012, when CIL 
norms against expulsion and in favor of repatriation are so much 
more robust compared to 1947–49, it is debatable whether CIL 
would require return in the unique circumstances of the 
Palestinian refugees.  As of 1947–49, it is clear that CIL did not 
provide any such right.203   
4.3. Human Rights Law 
4.3.1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
In 1948, the U.N. General Assembly announced the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).  Article 13, providing 
that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, including his 
own, and to return to his country,”204 is cited by advocates of a 
                                                     
201 James C. Hathaway, The Meaning of Repatriation, 9 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 551, 
552 (1997).  It is also not clear that Palestinians, even were they not specifically 
exempted from coverage of the 1951 Convention, would be covered by its 
definition of “refugee.”  A person is a refugee under the Convention only if he or 
she is currently outside the country of residence “owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion,” and is unable to seek the protection 
of the home country on account of such a fear.  Refugee Convention, supra note 
199, art. 1(A)(2). 
202 See, e.g., TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 233 (declaring that refugees’ rights of 
returning to the places of their origin should be recognized as a general principle 
of international law). 
203 See infra Section 5.1. 
204 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), art. 13(2), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
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right of return for Palestinian refugees.205  But by the terms of the 
U.N. Charter, General Assembly resolutions like the UDHR are not 
legally binding.206  In fact the non-binding, non-legal nature of the 
UDHR was stressed repeatedly in the U.N. debates prior to 
voting.207  Many commentators have urged that some or all parts of 
the UDHR have subsequently become binding customary 
international law.  But in 1994, a report for the International Law 
Association concluded that there was not “sufficient consensus” on 
whether Article 13, regarding return, had yet become a customary 
norm.208  If not in 1994, “the UDHR surely was not a binding 
instrument” at the time of the 1947–49 conflict.209 
The UDHR does not by its terms ban the individual or mass 
expulsion of foreign nationals.  It only speaks to the issue of 
“exile,” that is, expulsion of a national, and only bans “arbitrary” 
exile.210  The lack of a ban on collective expulsions is explained by 
the fact that the Allied powers at the time thought that mass 
expulsion of German minorities from Eastern Europe was 
                                                     
205 See, e.g., FRANCIS A. BOYLE, PALESTINE, PALESTINIANS AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 69, 156–57 (2003) (claiming that the UDHR requires the “absolute right of 
return” for Palestinian refugees and viewing it as a legal obligation which Israel 
must fulfill before it can allow more Jewish settlers to settle). 
206 See Dinah Shelton, Commentary and Conclusions, in COMMITMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM 449 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2003) (stating that the UDHR is “non-binding,” 
though it was hoped that, as a “first step,” it might “lead to a binding 
agreement”).  On the general question of the binding nature of General Assembly 
resolutions, see infra Section 4.5. 
207 H. Lauterpacht, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 25 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 354, 354 (1948) (citations omitted) (reporting the statement of the 
President of the General Assembly that the UDHR “does not provide by 
international convention for States being bound to carry out and give effect to 
these rights”).  Eleanor Roosevelt, the United States’ spokesperson on the issue, 
told the General Assembly that the proposed declaration on human rights “is not 
and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation.”  Id. at 358.  
Some delegates thought UDHR’s wording was not important because it was not a 
legal document.  Id. at 360. 
208 COMM. ON THE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, INT’L LAW ASS’N, 
FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, in 66 INT’L L. ASS’N REP. CONF. 525, 547 (1994).   
209 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 89 (1995). 
210 UDHR, supra note 204, art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest, detention or exile.”). 
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necessary to achieve lasting peace and hence had to be considered 
legal.211 
4.3.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 12(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides in full: “No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.”212  
Proponents of a Palestinian right of return frequently assert that 
Article 12(4) gives refugees from the 1947–49 conflict the right to 
return to their homes in what is now Israel, because they were 
citizens of the Palestine Mandate and thus the territory that 
became Israel was their “own country.”213  Article 13 of the ICCPR 
is relevant to the Palestinian refugees on a somewhat different 
theory, that even if Palestinians were not nationals of the newly-
created state of Israel, they were lawfully present there because of 
their habitual residence.  Article 13 provides that: 
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the 
present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law 
and shall, except where compelling reasons of national 
security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the 
reasons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed 
by, and be represented for the purpose before, the 
competent authority . . . .214 
The ICCPR entered into force in March 1976, after it had been 
ratified by enough states.  Israel became a party in 1991.215  It 
                                                     
211 HENCKAERTS, supra note 209, at 8–9.  See also supra notes 59-62 and infra 
notes 305-17 and accompanying text (discussing the views and actions of the 
victorious Allied powers regarding the compulsory transfer of ethnic minority 
populations).  
212 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
[hereinafter ICCPR]. 
213 See, e.g., Saideman, supra note 3, at 848–54 (defining “own country” as 
“place of habitual residence” and adding that first generation Palestinian refugees 
also had British-authorized passports naming them as citizens of Mandatory 
Palestine). 
214 ICCPR, supra note 212, art. 13. 
215 Data on states parties to this and other multilateral treaties is available at 
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 25, 2012). 
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would be extraordinary if, by Israel’s 1991 ratification, the words of 
Articles 12(4) or 13 reached back retroactively more than forty 
years and implicitly overturned Israel’s consistently maintained 
legal position that it had no obligation to allow the return of 
refugees from the 1947–49 conflict.  Yet that claim is made 
repeatedly by supporters of the Palestinian right of return.216  It is 
not persuasive.  As discussed above in Section 3.2, non-
retroactivity is a default rule of treaty interpretation.  Non-
retroactivity is also a core component of the customary rules 
regarding the responsibility of states for international wrongs.217  
Nothing in the ICCPR suggests that Articles 12 or 13 are meant to 
have retroactive effect.218  As of 1991 when Israel became bound by 
the ICCPR, Article 13 had no applicability to Palestinian refugees 
from the 1947–49 conflict because they were not “lawfully in the 
territory of” Israel, but rather were abroad.  
Even assuming that Article 12 can be retroactively applied to 
the events of 1947–49, it does not necessarily provide those 
refugees with a right of return.  According to a leading expert, 
“[t]here is no evidence that mass movements of groups such as 
refugees or displaced persons”—rather than individuals asserting 
an individual right—“were intended to be included within the 
scope of article 12 of the Covenant by its drafters, particularly 
where those seeking to return are not nationals of the state of 
destination.”219  This “individual only” reading may be correct, but 
                                                     
216 See, e.g., BADIL, supra note 187, at 96; Lawand, supra note 3, at 546–53; 
Quigley, supra note 3, at 202–04; Saideman, supra note 3, at 848–54. 
217 This rule is eminently sensible.  Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, for example, 
which joined the ICCPR regime in 1982, 1970 and 1969, respectively (see supra note 
214), would no doubt be quite surprised to learn that Article 12(4) retroactively 
requires them to repatriate or compensate the Jews they drove out in the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s.  Certainly Israel (and presumably many Arab states parties too) 
would have acceded to the ICCPR only with a specific reservation regarding 
Article 12(4) if it has the retroactive meaning that is ascribed to it by some 
proponents of the Palestinian right of return.  Similarly, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and other Eastern European states did not expect that their accessions to 
the ICCPR (in 1977, 1975 and 1974, respectively, see supra note 215) required them 
to repatriate or compensate the hundreds of thousands of German nationals they 
expelled at the end of World War II.  
218 Compare ICCPR, supra note 212 (showing no reference to retroactive 
application), with Refugee Convention, supra note 199, art. 1(A)(2) (stating 
explicitly that the term “refugee” applies retroactively to individuals with certain 
characteristics). 
219 HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 59–60 (1987).  See also Stig Jagerskiold, The Freedom of Movement, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 166, 180 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (determining 
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it must be conceded that it is not compelled by the text.  There are 
other reasons, however, to find Article 12 unavailing for 
Palestinian refugees from 1947–49.  By its terms, Article 12 does not 
purport to announce an absolute right of return.  It only speaks of 
return to one’s “own country,” suggesting that the right may only 
apply to citizens.  Even if the article extends beyond citizens, it is 
hard to see how it covers noncitizens who have not been in a 
country for forty years by the time that country joined the ICCPR 
and became bound by Article 12.  Article 12 also contemplates the 
legality of denials of return not considered “arbitrary.”  It is not a 
stretch to think that reasonable demographic or national security 
concerns could be a non-arbitrary basis to refuse entry to 
Palestinian refugees or their descendants. 
4.3.3. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination  
Under this multilateral human rights treaty, member states 
pledge to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination and guarantee 
certain enumerated rights without distinction as to race, ethnicity, 
and the like.  Among the guaranteed rights is the “right to leave 
any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s 
country”—taken verbatim from the UDHR.220  Israel became a 
party to this convention only in 1979.221  The relevant provision 
contains no indication that it is meant to apply retroactively to 
events occurring before ratification, so Israel’s conduct in 1947–49 
cannot be measured by this convention.  Moreover, in 1979, Israel 
was not “one’s country” to Palestinians who were not Israeli 
citizens and had not been in the territory of Israel for forty years. 
4.4. Nationality and Citizenship Law and the Law of State Succession 
Since enactment of its nationality legislation in 1952, Israel has 
taken the position that only those former citizens of Mandatory 
Palestine who remained in Israel from the establishment of the 
                                                                                                                        
that the ICCPR’s right of return was “intended to apply to individuals asserting 
an individual right” and was not intended “to address the claims of masses of 
people who have been displaced as a byproduct of war or by political transfers of 
territory or population”). 
220 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art. 5(d)(ii), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). 
221 See supra note 215. 
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State in 1948 until the enactment of the law became Israeli 
citizens.222  Because almost all Palestinian refugees from the 1947–
49 conflict did not fit those criteria, they were not Israeli citizens or 
nationals under municipal law.  Therefore, Israel concludes that 
the return of Palestinian refugees is not mandated because 
international law gives it full sovereign discretion to decide 
whether or not to admit non-citizens into its territory. 
The primary Palestinian response to this reasoning is to assert 
that international law overrides Israel’s municipal law decision to 
bar Palestinian refugees from citizenship.  In legal terms, the core 
claim is that Israel is the “successor” state to the British Mandate in 
Palestine and that international obligations to the Palestinians flow 
from this status.223  From independence, Israel took the position 
that it was “in no sense a successor of the Palestine [Mandate] 
administration,”224 and in 1950 announced that it was not the 
successor to Mandate Palestine with regard to treaties.225  
Nevertheless, according to the argument made on behalf of the 
Palestinians, (1) international law requires that a successor state 
grant citizenship to all citizens, nationals or permanent inhabitants 
of the predecessor state; and (2) because many or most Palestinian 
Arabs were citizens of Mandate Palestine,226 Israel was and is 
required by international law to grant citizenship to refugees from 
the 1947–49 conflict who, before flight or expulsion, lived within 
the territory that became Israel. 
On the contrary, in 1947–49, and arguably even today, there 
was no such obligation in international law.  There has never been 
much agreement among states about the international rules 
governing state succession and, as a result, there is little binding 
                                                     
222 See Peretz, supra note 103, at 146.  Before 1952, Israeli courts had taken 
inconsistent positions on whether former citizens of the Palestine Mandate 
automatically acquired Israeli citizenship.  See U.N. Secretariat, Digest of Decisions 
of National Courts Relating to Succession of States and Governments, Int’l Law 
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/157 (1963), reprinted in [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 
95, at 98, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963/ADD.1.  
223 See, e.g., BADIL, supra note 187, at 96; Lawand, supra note 3, at 558–63; 
Quigley, supra note 3, at 206–10; Saideman, supra note 3, at 850–51. 
224 D.P. O’Connell, Secured and Unsecured Debts in the Law of State Succession, 
28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 204, 217 (1951). 
225 See Anthony Lester, State Succession and Localized Treaties, 4 HARV. INT’L 
CLUB J. 145, 153 (1962). 
226 See Mutaz Qafisheh, Genesis of Citizenship in Palestine and Israel: Palestinian 
Nationality During the Period 1917–1925, 11 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1 (2009), for a general 
overview of citizenship in Mandate Palestine. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:00 PM 
2012] PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN 201 
law.  Only a handful of relatively unimportant states are parties to 
the Vienna Convention on Succession in Respect of Treaties.227  
Before, during and after the 1947–49 conflict, there were no fixed 
state practices regarding state succession and nationality that were 
consistently followed from a sense of legal obligation.  In other 
words, there was no CIL on point.  During the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, it was often held by treatise writers that “the 
inhabitants of ceded territory automatically lose their old political 
allegiance and acquire that of the annexing state.”228  But modern 
problems posed by the rise of nationalism and self-determination 
greatly complicated things.  In the wake of World War I, various 
international agreements were made regarding transfer of 
ownership of territory and nationality of inhabitants.  Rather than 
follow any supposed rule of CIL that all inhabitants in the 
successor state automatically receive its nationality, 
new principles were introduced as a solution of some of the 
problems peculiar to the peace settlements.  An effort was 
made to adapt the acquisition of new nationality to existing 
conditions with the predominant purpose of uniting on the 
same territory and under a national government 
individuals of the same race, language, and civilization. . . . 
[N]ationality was acquired ipso facto only in certain cases; 
by reclamation and by naturalization in others; and in still 
other cases, only in accordance with conditions prescribed 
by the local laws.229 
The mid-twentieth century’s leading expert on the effect of 
state succession on nationality wrote—essentially 
contemporaneously with enactment of Israel’s nationality law—
that there were then three different, competing theories about state 
succession and nationality in the conventional context where an 
existing country absorbs a new territory: (i) the nationality of 
inhabitants automatically becomes that of the successor state; (ii) 
                                                     
227 See supra note 215.  Similarly, the Vienna Convention on Succession in 
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts is not now in force and likely will 
never be due to lack of agreement about the relevant rules of conduct.  By 
stipulation in the treaty, only fifteen states need to ratify before it goes into force, 
but as of 2012, only seven had done so.  See Vienna Convention on Succession of 
States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 80/31, 17 I.L.M. 
1488 (1978). 
228 C. Luella Gettys, The Effect of Changes of Sovereignty on Nationality, 21 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 268, 268 (1927). 
229 Id. at 269. 
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“the inhabitants in question acquire the nationality of the successor 
state only by an express or tacit submission to the new sovereign”; 
or (iii) “[t]he more recent and widely accepted theory regards 
nationality as a matter solely of domestic jurisdiction, and contends 
that the successor State has a discretion as to the manner in which 
it extends its nationality to the inhabitants . . . .”230  If the rules were 
disputed in conventional contexts, there surely could have been no 
CIL consensus of how they should apply in the novel context of the 
death of the British Mandate, the aborted U.N. partition of territory 
abandoned by the Mandatory power, and the subsequent birth of 
Israel through war in part of that territory.231 
In 1968, Mohammed Bedjaoui, the International Law 
Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Succession of States in 
Respect of Rights and Duties Resulting from Sources other than 
Treaties, considered it an open question “whether, if no agreement 
[between predecessor and successor state] exists, the successor 
State has unlimited sovereign power to undertake the 
‘denaturalization’ of persons or groups of persons, resulting in 
their expulsion de facto . . . or de jure (through mass transfers).”232  
Even as late as 1995, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) 
conceded that, with regard to state succession and its impact on 
nationality, “the rules of customary law are still at the elementary 
stage and provide a merely rudimentary basis.”233  “According to 
the predominant opinion, the role of international law with respect 
to nationality is very limited,” and it is the recognized “principle 
                                                     
230 D.P. O’CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 245 (H.C. Gutteridge et al. 
eds., 1956). 
231 Cf. 5 J.H.W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: 
NATIONALITY AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO INDIVIDUALS 37 (1972) (“The 
national status of the Palestinian refugees . . . is extremely difficult to define 
juridically. Various theoretical constructions are possible.”). 
232 Special Rapporteur, First Rep. on Succession of States in Respect of Rights and 
Duties Resulting from Sources Other Than Treaties, ¶ 133, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/204 (Apr. 5, 1968) (by Mohammed Bedjaoui), reprinted in [1968] 2 
Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 94, A/CN.4/SER.A/1968/Add.1.  A leading expert 
concluded in 1956 that “there is no rule of international law under which the 
nationals of the predecessor State acquire the nationality of the successor State . . . 
.”  Additionally, “[t]here is no basis in present international law for a right to a 
nationality; . . . nor does international law prohibit loss of nationality after birth by 
deprivation or otherwise.”  See P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 149, 249 (1956). 
233 Special Rapporteur, First Rep. on State Succession and its Impact on the 
Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons, ¶ 70, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/467 (Apr. 17, 1995) (by Václav Mikulka), reprinted in [1995] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 157. 
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that it is for each State to determine under its own law who are its 
nationals . . . .”234  In 1999, the ILC drafted rules on state succession 
and nationality, providing: “When a State dissolves and ceases to 
exist and the various parts of the territory of the predecessor State 
form two or more successor States, each successor State shall, 
unless otherwise indicated by the exercise of a right of option, 
attribute its nationality to . . . [p]ersons concerned having their 
habitual residence in its territory.”235  In short, only in the late 
1990s was the international community beginning to develop a rule 
of CIL that, had it existed half a century before, might have 
required that Israel grant citizenship to Palestinian Arabs expelled 
by war. 
There are several international conventions dealing with 
statelessness, but none of them compelled Israel to treat Palestinian 
Arabs who fled the 1947–49 conflict as citizens of Israel.  At the 
time the Mandate ended, Great Britain was party to the 1930 
Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, but, as noted 
above, Israel took the position that it did not succeed to any of 
Britain’s treaty obligations.  In any event, the 1930 Protocol says 
nothing about the effect of state succession on nationality and 
grants no rights relevant to the dispute about the Palestinian right 
of return.  In 1958, Israel ratified the 1954 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons, but this treaty has no application to 
the Palestinian refugee situation discussed in this Article.236  Israel 
                                                     
234 Id. at 167–68, ¶¶ 52, 61. 
235 Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the 
Succession of States with Commentaries, [1999] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 22, pt. II, 
art. 22, U.N. Doc. A/54/10.  Because “the divergence between States was too 
considerable,” the ILC drafted only “principles” rather than “exact rules.”  Roland 
Schärer, International Law and Nationality, in Particular in the Context of State 
Succession, in CITIZENSHIP AND STATE SUCCESSION 88, 96, ¶ 29 (Sci. & Technique of 
Democracy Ser. No. 21, 1998). 
236 First, Israel’s acceptance of the treaty post-dates the creation of the refugee 
situation, and nothing in the treaty suggests it is retroactive.  Second, the treaty 
contains the same exemption of Palestinian refugees from its coverage as does the 
1951 Refugee Convention.  See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons art. 1(2)(i), Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S 117 (stating that persons presently 
receiving assistance from a United Nations organ or agency other than the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees do not qualify as stateless).  Third, the 
rights granted by the treaty have no bearing on the right of return.  Generally, 
states that become party to the Convention only agree to grant stateless persons 
within their borders the same rights as other aliens.  See id. arts. 7(1), 13–19.  In 
some instances, for example, regarding public elementary education, state parties 
agree to treat stateless persons in their territory the same as nationals. See id. art. 
22. 
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has signed but not ratified the 1961 Convention on the Reduction 
of Statelessness.237  This treaty grants certain rights which are 
theoretically relevant to the dispute regarding the 1947–49 
Palestinian refugees—for instance, a prohibition of depriving a 
person of nationality “if such deprivation would render him 
stateless,” and a prohibition of group denationalization “on racial, 
ethnic, religious or political grounds.”238  However, these rights do 
not accrue to the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees.  Israel never ratified 
the treaty, but its 1961 signature did create an obligation to refrain 
from acts that would defeat the objects of the treaty.239  
Nevertheless, the treaty did not enter into force until 1975 and the 
relevant provisions contain no suggestion that they are retroactive; 
they therefore do not apply to the events of 1947–49.  Relatively 
few populous or important states have ratified this treaty,240 
making it exceedingly difficult to imagine that its provisions 
represent CIL.  There can be no serious argument that in 1947–49—
or for decades thereafter—there was any settled rule of CIL 
requiring that Israel treat Palestinian refugees no longer in its 
territory as Israeli citizens.  Many Arab and Muslim states, for 
example, have often acted as if international law does not impose 
obligations on them to treat as citizens those people in their 
territories—such as the Palestinian refugees—who would otherwise 
be stateless.241 
Since international law did not require that Israel treat the 
Palestinians expelled during the 1947–49 conflict as Israeli citizens, 
Israel was within its rights to consider them aliens under domestic 
law.  As non-citizens, Israel could refuse them admittance to its 
territory under its sovereign power over immigration.  
Furthermore, as the ILC has reported, international law did not 
begin to put real limits on the “collective expulsion of aliens”—
                                                     
237 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, opened for signature Aug. 30, 
1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975) [hereinafter Statelessness 
Convention]; for state parties, see supra note 215. 
238 Statelessness Convention, supra note 237, arts. 8(1) and 9. 
239 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, “[a] State is obliged 
to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . . 
. it has signed the treaty. . . .”  VCLT, supra note 128, art. 18(a). 
240 See supra note 215 (providing instructions to find data showing that the 
United States, China, Japan, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mexico, Egypt, Iran, 
Nigeria, Poland and South Africa are not parties to the Statelessness Convention). 
241 On the lack of citizenship for Palestinian refugees in Arab states, see supra 
notes 105–06 and accompanying text.  On other incidents of statelessness in Arab 
and Muslim nations, see, for example, infra Appendix Table 1, cases 58, 59, 77, 97.   
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apart from specialized contexts involving the belligerent 
occupation of enemy territory or the refugees covered under the 
1951 Convention on Refugees—until the 1960s, at the earliest.242  A 
country’s collective expulsion of enemy aliens who are present in 
its territory during wartime was considered lawful at least until the 
latter part of the twentieth century.243  This will be considered in 
more detail in Section 5 below.  Even if, contrary to both 
international and Israeli law, the Palestinian refugees had 
somehow automatically become Israeli citizens in 1948, 
international law at that time likely would not have prohibited 
Israel from in turn deeming them denationalized.244  Therefore, 
international law concerning state succession, immigration, 
nationality and statelessness did not prohibit expulsion of 
Palestinian refugees in 1947–49 or require their return. 
4.5. U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 
Many proponents of a Palestinian right of return place great 
weight on some resolutions of the General Assembly about the 
Palestine conflict, implying or contending that they represent 
binding law.245  The most cited is Resolution 194 (III) of 1948, which 
“[r]esolve[d]” that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and 
live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at 
the earliest practicable date.”246  As noted above, Palestinians and 
Arab states at the time rejected this resolution because it implicitly 
recognized Israel’s right to exist and did not require immediate 
return of all refugees.247  After repeated failure to solve the refugee 
problem by destroying Israel with military force, it seems a bit too 
                                                     
242 Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Third Rep. on the Expulsion 
of Aliens, ¶¶ 101–03, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/581 (Apr. 19, 2007) 
(by Maurice Kamto). 
243 Id. ¶¶ 116–31, 134 (tracing the history of the lawfulness of expulsion of 
enemy aliens during wartime). 
244 Cf. HERSH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 301 (1933) (“There is no clear rule of international law at present 
which limits the freedom of action of States [with respect to denationalization]. . . 
.”). 
245 See, e.g., Lawand, supra note 3, at 545–46; Quigley, supra note 3, at 185–90. 
246 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (quoting resolution).  
247 MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 3, at 26 (“The Arab States not only 
voted against partition, but they initially took the position that it was invalid.”); 
Menachem Klein, Between Right and Realization: The PLO Dialectics of ‘The Right of 
Return,’ 11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 1, 1–2 (1998) (noting that Arab states rejected the U.N. 
Partition Resolution “because it conditioned return upon making peace”). 
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bold (an example of profoundly “unclean hands”) to claim the 
benefit of the Resolution that the Palestinians and Arab states 
rejected.  Moreover, the Palestinians and Arab states clearly did not 
consider the General Assembly competent to make binding law—
and they were right.  In rejecting the 1947 Partition Resolution, the 
Arab states claimed that it was not legally binding because the 
General Assembly, and even the Security Council, lacked authority 
to legislate under the U.N. Charter.248  The General Assembly, they 
noted, could only make non-binding recommendations about how 
to settle international disputes.249  The only way that resolutions 
and declarations of the Assembly became binding was if the 
Security Council determined that there existed a threat to 
international peace and security and issued orders to implement 
General Assembly resolutions.  The Council did not do this with 
the Partition Resolution and so, according to the Arab states and 
Palestinians, there was no legal authority to enforce the partition 
plan.250  The reasoning of the Arab states and Palestinians, about 
the limits of the General Assembly’s authority regarding the 
Partition Resolution, applies fully to Resolution 194 on return. 
The Arab states were quite correct in their legal analysis about 
the General Assembly’s lack of binding authority over these issues.  
                                                     
248 See, e.g., Cattan, supra note 64 at 265 (noting that the Arab states opposed 
the Partition Resolution for a variety of reasons, including that it “violated the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations” and was beyond “the legal 
competence of the United Nations”); John W. Halderman, Some International 
Constitutional Aspects of the Palestine Case, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 78, 86–88 (1968) 
(explaining that the Arab states contended that the Partition Resolution was a 
mere recommendation because of the limited authority of the General Assembly); 
see also HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 196 n.8 (1950) (citing 
statements from the 128th meeting of the General Assembly by delegates from 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Egypt to the effect that 
the General Assembly lacked authority to make binding decisions on issues 
related to Palestine). 
249 See, e.g., Nabil Elaraby, Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition 
Resolution and the 1949 Armistice Agreements, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 102–03 
(1968); Halderman, supra note 248, at 80, 86–88. In rejecting the Partition 
Resolution, the U.N. representatives of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Yemen each 
stated to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly that the Resolution was 
illegal and non-binding.  The statements are reprinted in THE ARAB-ISRAEL 
CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 24, at 57–60. 
250 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; see also Elaraby, supra note 249, 
at 102–03 (stating that the U.N. General Assembly lacked authority to order 
partition and Arab states did not violate international law in rejecting the plan); 
Halderman, supra note 248 at 86 (reiterating that the Arab states who rejected the 
partition plan saw it as a mere recommendation and not as binding international 
law). 
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Though there is today a substantial academic literature devoted to 
arguing that the General Assembly can create binding international 
law,251 “few governments have taken up international lawyers’ 
suggestions that the Assembly has actually acquired some degree 
of legislative authority over states.”252  Moreover, a recent study 
concluded that, apart from narrow circumstances not relevant to 
the Palestinian refugee situation, the International Court of Justice 
has not understood the General Assembly to have the power to 
issue legally binding commands.253  And even the academic 
commentary is by no means one-sided; there is persistent 
disagreement about whether or how General Assembly resolutions 
can be binding law.  On an issue of such supreme importance to 
the world community—whether the U.N. Charter has been 
implicitly amended by custom such that the General Assembly 
may now issue binding pronouncements about things the Charter 
says it may only discuss and opine about—something approaching 
consensus among states should be required before concluding that 
a new rule is in place.  Even today, there is nothing approaching 
consensus.  And at the time of the 1947–49 conflict, the newly-
written U.N. Charter was understood to mean what is said 
regarding the General Assembly: apart from certain primarily 
internal or housekeeping matters, it had only a power to debate 
and recommend.254  This interpretation of the plain text of the 
                                                     
251 On the debates about this issue, see, for example, JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2005); JORGE CASTEÑEDA, LEGAL 
EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (Leland M. Goodrich & William T.R. Fox 
eds., Alba Amoia trans., 1969); EDWARD MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW 
MAKING (1984); Rosalyn Higgins, The Role of Resolutions of International 
Organizations in the Process of Creating Norms in the International System, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21 (W.E. Butler ed., 1987); 
Samuel A. Bleicher, The Legal Significance of Re-Citation of General Assembly 
Resolutions, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 444 (1969); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal 
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1993); Oscar M. Garibaldi, The Legal Status 
of General Assembly Resolutions: Some Conceptual Observations, 73 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 324 (1979); D.H.N. Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 97 (1955–1956); Marko Divac Öberg, The 
Legal Effects of Resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly in the 
Jurisprudence of the ICJ, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 879 (2005). 
252 M.J. Peterson, General Assembly, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE UNITED 
NATIONS 97, 103 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007) (discussing the 
General Assembly’s role and power as part of the U.N.). 
253 See Öberg, supra note 251. 
254 See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 10 (“The General Assembly may discuss any 
questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter . . . and, except as 
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United 
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Charter was buttressed by the positivism prevailing at that time, 
which located binding international law only in sources to which 
states had consented, namely treaties and CIL.255  A 1949 work on 
the United Nations stated: “Although the General Assembly may 
make recommendations both to Members of the United Nations 
and the Security Council, it should be kept in mind that 
recommendations have no obligatory character, as has been shown 
in the Palestine case, although they may be of the greatest political 
importance.”256  Other leading commentators concurred.257 
                                                                                                                        
Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.”) 
(emphasis added); id. art. 11(2) (“The General Assembly may discuss any questions 
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security . . . and, except as 
provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such 
questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both.”) 
(emphasis added); id. art. 14 (“Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General 
Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, 
regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or 
friendly relations among nations. . . .”) (emphasis added).  The Article 12 limit 
referred to in each of these quoted articles is the following: “While the Security 
Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned 
to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any 
recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security 
Council so requests.”  Id. art. 12(1). 
As noted in the main text above, the General Assembly does have binding power 
with regard to certain housekeeping or internal functions.  See, e.g., id. art. 4(2) 
(“The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be 
effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the 
Security Council.”); id. art. 17(1) (“The General Assembly shall consider and 
approve the budget of the Organization.”). The General Assembly also had certain 
binding powers regarding the so-called international trusteeship system (see id. 
chs. XII & XIII), the successor to the Mandate system of the League of Nations, but 
Palestine was never a trust territory under the U.N. Charter. 
255 See José E. Alvarez, Legal Perspectives, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE 
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 252, at 58, 59 (contrasting the mid-twentieth century’s 
positivism and narrow view of the General Assembly’s powers under the U.N. 
Charter with twenty-first century claims that international organizations, like the 
United Nations, have some legislative power). 
256 LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 151–52 (2d ed. 1949).  
257 A 1950 discussion of the U.N.’s handling of the Palestine issue noted: “The 
decision of the General Assembly on Palestine took the form of recommendations, 
since the General Assembly itself has no executive authority.”  EUGENE P. CHASE, 
THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 151 (1950).  Hans Kelsen’s influential 1950 work 
on the law of the United Nations system was quite clear that, apart from specific 
exceptions, such as resolutions about internal or housekeeping matters, General 
Assembly resolutions were “political” rather than “legal” because the General 
Assembly was not empowered to create binding legal “obligations, rights or 
competences.”  KELSEN, supra note 248, at 193–94; see also id. at 195–96 (regarding 
the Charter power of the General Assembly to make “recommendations,” stating 
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Besides the general problem of relying on formally nonbinding 
General Assembly resolutions to support the right of return, there 
are problems with claims made on the Palestinians’ behalf about 
specific General Assembly resolutions, particularly Resolution 194.  
For instance, it is implied that Resolution 194, itself, states that CIL 
requires the return of the refugees.258  This is false, as perusal of the 
text demonstrates.259  Additionally, the claim that the General 
Assembly’s repeated references to and reenactments of Resolution 
194 have transformed the Resolution from non-binding to binding 
cannot be correct because even today there is no consensus that 
valid CIL forms in that manner—that is, solely through non-
binding votes in a diplomatic forum, the U.N. General Assembly.  
This is particularly the case here, with the issue of refugee return.  
The chief proponents of the theory that the General Assembly has 
binding, legislative authority regarding Israel and Palestinian 
refugees—the Arab and Muslim states— have declared for decades 
in diplomatic forums that international law requires the return of 
Palestinian refugees to Israel.260  At the same time, many of these 
proponents have expelled large numbers of their own nationals 
                                                                                                                        
that “[r]ecommendations, by their very nature, do not constitute a legal obligation 
to behave in conformity with them”); id. at 199–200 (“The intention was to 
establish the General Assembly as ‘town meeting of the world,’ the ‘open 
conscience of humanity,’ that is to say, as a deliberative and criticising organ.  
Hence, legal functions [defined by Kelsen as the power to impose or create legally 
binding obligations or rights] of the Assembly are to be considered as exceptions 
and require special provisions in the Charter.”) (citing The Yearbook of the United 
Nations, 1946–47 U.N.Y.B. 51, U.N. Sales No. 1947 I.18). 
258 See, e.g., GAIL J. BOLING, THE 1948 PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT OF RETURN: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW ANALYSIS 15 (2d ed. 2007) 
(“Resolution 194 unambiguously declared—in reliance upon then-existing 
principles of customary international law—that Israel was obliged immediately to 
allow all Palestinian refugees displaced during the 1948 conflict to exercise their 
right of return.”).  
259 See G.A. Res. 194(III), supra note 117. 
260 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2535 (XXIV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2535(XXIV) (Dec. 10, 
1969), pt. B, pmbl. (claiming that “the Palestine Arab refugees” have been denied 
“their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”); Arab League Stresses on the Palestinian 
Refugees’ Right of Return, OCCUPIEDPALESTINE.COM (May 16, 2012), 
http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2012/05/16/nakba64-arab-league-
stresses-on-the-palestinian-refugees-right-of-return/ (reporting that the Arab 
League voted and decided that Palestinian refugees have a right to return to 
Israel).   
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and resident aliens, including Palestinians;261 have refused to agree 
to minimal international standards regarding the treatment of 
refugees;262 and have denied Palestinian refugees who reside in 
their countries citizenship and some of the most basic of human 
rights.263  “Cheap talk”264 in diplomatic forums that is contradicted 
by states’ actual behavior when their own interests are at stake 
does not create CIL binding on other states. 
Proponents of the Palestinian right of return also assert that 
Israel’s 1949 admission to membership in the U.N. was conditioned 
on compliance with Resolution 194, including its provisions on 
refugee return.265  Thus, it is said, even if Resolution 194 lacks 
inherently binding force (recall that General Assembly declarations 
of this kind are undisputedly treated by the U.N. Charter as non-
binding), nevertheless the General Assembly’s power to decide 
whether or not to admit new member states has made return of the 
1947–49 refugees a binding obligation.266  The factual assertion 
underlying this claim—that the membership vote on Israel was 
conditional—is false.  In fact, Arab representatives at the General 
Assembly meeting on May 11, 1949, concerning the admission of 
Israel, complained that Israel was admitted without having to 
                                                     
261 For some examples, see infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 58, 59, 62, 64, 67, 71, 
74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 84, 86–88, 91–92, 94, 97, 99–102, 107, 113, 114, 117, 120, 126, 133, 
136, 138, 143–50, 152, 155–56, 159). 
262 Among the states that have declined to sign any of the major treaties 
concerning refugee rights (the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
the 1967 Protocol, or the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) 
are: Bahrain, Brunei, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Oman, Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates.  Israel 
is a party to all three treaties.  For data on states parties to these conventions, see 
supra note 215. 
263 See, e.g., TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 131–71. 
264 A term borrowed from economics that is used to contrast cost-free actions 
that are unlikely to reveal the actor’s true preferences with “costly” actions or 
signals which, because they are not free to make, are more likely to reveal true 
preferences.  See John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part 
of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1204 & n.139 (2007). 
265 See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 205, at 69 (“[A]s yet another express 
consideration for its admission to the United Nations Organization, the 
government of Israel officially endorsed and agreed to carry out the 
aforementioned U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194(III) of 1948, which 
determined that Palestinian refugees have the right to return to their homes . . . 
.”); see also BOLING, supra note 258, at 22–23 (to the same effect); Abunimah & Ibish, 
supra note 102, at 7, 23 (same). 
266 Voting on the admission of new member states is one of the few areas 
where the U.N. General Assembly has binding authority.  See U.N. Charter art. 
4(2). 
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commit to refugee return, despite their attempts to make Israel 
comply.267  Moreover, those supporters of a Palestinian right of 
return who tie return to the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership 
ignore that the power of the General Assembly to make 
membership conditional on factors not mentioned in the Charter 
was debated in 1947, soon before Israel petitioned for membership 
and the Arab states’ position was rejected.  At the request of the 
General Assembly, the International Court of Justice issued an 
advisory legal opinion on the subject in May 1948, two weeks after 
Israel proclaimed its independence.  According to the Court, a 
U.N. member called upon to vote on a state’s petition for 
membership is not “juridically entitled to make its consent to the 
admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by 
paragraph [1]” of Article 4 of the Charter.268  The relevant Charter 
provision provides in full: “Membership in the United Nations is 
open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations 
contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these 
obligations.”269  On the basis that Israel fulfilled these written 
requirements, the Security Council advised that Israel be 
admitted,270 and the General Assembly approved Israel’s 
admission.271  The claim that a right of return for Palestinians was 
created by the vote on Israel’s U.N. membership is incorrect. 
4.6. U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
Since “ethnic cleansing” became a topic of international 
concern with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, 
                                                     
267 See INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 
180–81 (1955) (discussing the circumstances surrounding Israel’s application for 
membership in the United Nations). 
268 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations 
(Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 65 (May 28); see also 
Yuen-Li Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations: Conditions of 
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 288 (1949) 
(introducing state membership admission questions that were addressed to the 
ICJ for resolution). 
269 U.N. Charter art. 4(1). 
270 S.C. Res. 69, U.N. Doc. S/1277 (Mar. 4, 1949). 
271 G.A. Res. 273 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/273(III) (May 11, 1949).  
Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, and Yemen voted to deny Israel’s admission to the United Nations.  
U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., 207th plen. mtg. at 330–31, U.N. Doc. A/PV.207 (May 11, 
1949).  
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the Security Council has repeatedly instructed or urged certain 
states that, in the aftermath of an armed conflict, they should or 
must allow refugees to return to their homes.272  Proponents of the 
Palestinian right of return often contend that these Security 
Council resolutions are evidence that CIL requires refugee 
repatriations.  However, these resolutions, coming decades after 
the 1947–49 conflict, do not create CIL retroactively binding on 
Israel in the war of independence, because by definition CIL 
cannot be retroactive.273 
The Security Council has never demanded that Israel allow 
repatriation of the 1947–49 refugees.274  In May 1948, the Security 
Council ordered a ceasefire, directed truce and mediation 
negotiations to occur,275 and ordered the demilitarization of 
Jerusalem.276  In 1949, Israel concluded bilateral military truces 
with Egypt, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Syria—each specifically 
designated as provisional and military only, with all parties 
reserving all rights regarding non-military matters (such as 
permanent borders and refugees).277  Under these truce 
agreements, bilateral “mixed commissions” were created to 
exchange prisoners of war, demilitarize certain border zones, 
negotiate the movement of forces to new positions behind the truce 
                                                     
272 For examples concerning the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, see S.C. 
Res. 947, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/947 (Sept. 30, 1994) (The Security Council 
“[a]ffirms the right of all displaced persons to return voluntarily to their homes of 
origin”); S.C. Res. 820, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (Apr. 17, 1993) (“[The Security 
Council r]eaffirms its endorsement of the principle[] that . . . all displaced persons 
have the right to return in peace to their former homes and should be assisted to 
do so . . . .”); S.C. Res. 787, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787 (Nov. 16, 1992) (“[The 
Security Council] insists that all displaced persons be enabled to return in peace to 
their former homes . . . .”).  See Vic Ullom, Voluntary Repatriation of Refugees and 
Customary International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 115 app. 1 (2001) (listing 
Security Council resolutions on repatriation elsewhere). 
273 For discussion of the non-retroactivity issue, see supra Section 3.2. 
274 Cf. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 3, at 37 (describing the Security 
Council’s involvement with the Palestinian refugee situation as “at the most, a 
minor role”). 
275 See S.C. Res. 50, U.N. Doc. S/801 (May 29, 1948) (specifying the duration 
of the ceasefire and activities that would constitute violations of the ceasefire); 
S.C. Res. 49, U.N. Doc. S/773 (May 22, 1948) (requesting a ceasefire and for all 
parties involved to enter into negotiations for a truce). 
276 See S.C. Res. 54, U.N. Doc. S/902 (July 15, 1948) (calling for “continue[d] . . 
. efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem”). 
277 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.  
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lines, and the like.278  After Egypt complained to the Security 
Council in 1950 that Israel had expelled some civilians during these 
truce implementation processes, the Security Council 
“[r]equest[ed]” that the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice 
Commission take up the issue, and “[c]all[ed] upon” the two 
governments to implement any repatriation orders that might be 
made by the Commission and “to take in the future no action 
involving the transfer of persons across international frontiers or 
armistice lines” without consulting the Commission.279  That was 
the full extent of the Security Council’s contemporaneous 
statements regarding refugees.  The Security Council did not take 
up the refugee issue again until the Six-Day War of 1967, when in 
the aftermath it “[c]all[ed] upon the Government of Israel to ensure 
the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas 
where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the 
return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the 
outbreak of hostilities”280 and later affirmed the necessity of all 
parties “achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem . . . .”281  
Note the omission of any express mention of the refugees from the 
1947–49 conflict.  Given the Security Council’s studied refusal to 
urge or order the repatriation of the hundreds of thousands of 
refugees from the 1947–49 conflict,282 it is a bit odd to find 
advocates for the Palestinians citing after-the-fact Security Council 
resolutions from different conflicts, which contain directives about 
                                                     
278 See, e.g., Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, supra note 115, 
arts. VIII(1), IX(1), (4), X (indicating the requirements as to the demilitarization of 
El Auja village and the vicinity, the exchange of prisoners of war, the search for 
and exchange of missing persons, and the formation and operations of the Mixed 
Armistice Commission). 
279 S.C. Res. 89, ¶¶ 3, 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/1907 (Nov. 17, 1950). 
280 S.C. Res. 237, ¶ 1, U.N. SCOR, 22d Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (June 
14, 1967). 
281 S.C. Res. 242, ¶ 2(b), U.N. SCOR, 22d Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/242 (Nov. 
22, 1967). 
282 The Security Council was clearly willing to recommend or even order 
repatriation when it wanted to.  For instance, in regard to the India-Pakistan 
conflict over Jammu and Kashmir, in April 1948—the same month that Israel 
declared independence—the Council “[r]ecommend[ed]” that India take certain 
actions in conformity with the principle that “[a]ll citizens of the State who have 
left it on account of disturbances are invited, and are free, to return to their homes 
. . . .”  S.C. Res. 47, ¶ 14(a), U.N. Doc. S/726 (Apr. 21, 1948). 
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return that the Security Council specifically chose not to issue 
regarding Israel and the Palestinians.283 
More generally, viewing Security Council resolutions as 
declarations of the requirements of international law can be a 
mistake.  The U.N. Charter does not empower the Security Council 
to legislate as such, but rather to solve disputes and deal with 
threats to international peace and security.284  Thus, when the 
Council urges or demands the repatriation of refugees, it is not 
thereby stating that repatriation is required by international law, 
but rather that the repatriation is conducive to solving the dispute 
and resolving the threat to international peace and security.285 
5. NO RIGHT OF RETURN IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
To date, analysis of whether there is a rule of CIL requiring the 
return to Israel of Palestinian refugees from the 1947–49 conflict 
has tended to be unsystematic, overly general, and focused on state 
                                                     
283 See, e.g., BOLING, supra note 258, at 79–81 (citing U.N. Security Council 
resolutions on the Bosnia and Croatia, Georgian, and Namibian conflicts in 
support of the argument that all refugees have a right to return to their places of 
origin); Quigley, supra note 3, at 200–01, 215–16 (describing U.N. Security Council 
resolutions positing the right of return for refugees in Namibia, Croatia, and 
Georgia); Abunimah & Ibish, supra note 102, at 25 (referring to U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 1255 proclaiming the right of all refugees and displaced 
persons to return to their homes in Georgia). 
284 See U.N. Charter art. 24(1) (“In order to ensure prompt and effective action 
by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree 
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts 
on their behalf.”); id. art. 37(2) (“If the Security Council deems that the 
continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under 
Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider 
appropriate.”); id. art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”).  Chapter I of the Charter, describing 
the organization’s “purposes and principles,” declares that the U.N.’s dispute 
settlement function is to be exercised “in conformity with the principles of justice 
and international law . . . .”  U.N. Charter art. 1(1).  However, saying that U.N. 
organs should follow principles of international law is very different than saying 
that those organs’ pronouncements themselves constitute binding international 
law.  
285 It should always be the case that the Security Council directs conflicts to 
be solved in ways that accord with international law.  And consistent Security 
Council action over time on a given issue contributes greatly to the development 
of norms of CIL.  But the relationship between Security Council action and CIL is 
oblique. 
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practice substantially post-dating the conflict which created the 
Palestinian refugee problem.286  This Section demonstrates that, at 
the time of the 1947–49 conflict, there was no established CIL 
requiring that a state in Israel’s position allow refugees, situated as 
the Palestinian refugees were—that is, refugees from an unsettled 
ethnic conflict, who lacked the nationality of the state to which 
they sought to return—to return to their homes.  In addition, this 
Section shows that CIL did not prohibit the transfer or expulsion of 
civilian populations situated as the Palestinian population was in 
1947–49.  CIL norms against forced movement of populations and 
in favor of refugee repatriation developed only in the decades after 
the 1947–49 conflict.  Even then, there are reasons to question 
whether CIL has crystallized in a way that applies to the highly 
unique facts of the case of Palestinian refugees from 1947–49.  It is 
not necessary to answer this definitively, however, because CIL is 
not retroactive.  This Section discusses these issues primarily 
through discussion of several sets of data I have collected on state 
practice related to mass population expulsions and refugee 
repatriation.  An extraordinary amount of human suffering was 
caused by the many mass expulsions and compulsory population 
transfers of the twentieth century that are discussed in this section.  
My conclusions about legality under CIL at the time of the 1947–49 
conflict are not meant to somehow deny or minimize that fact. 
5.1. Compulsory Transfer, Mass Expulsion or Coerced Flight of Ethnic 
Groups287 
According to an expert on ethnic conflict in Europe, “forcibly 
moving populations defined by ethnicity (race, language, religion, 
culture, etc.) to secure a particular piece of territory . . . has been an 
instrument of nation-state creation for as long as homogeneous 
                                                     
286 See, e.g., BOLING, supra note 258, at 12–17; TAKKENBERG, supra note 3, at 230–
50; Abunimah & Ibish, supra note 102, at 21–25; Quigley, supra note 3, at 211–26. 
287 These are not legal terms of art.  By “compulsory transfer,” I mean a 
movement of a mass of people across an international border pursuant to an 
international agreement.  By “mass expulsion”, I mean a movement of a mass of 
people across an international border by the unilateral action of one government, 
accomplished by official force or compulsion.  By “coerced flight,” I mean a 
movement of a mass of people across an international border, caused by actions of 
government officials or private citizens acting with their connivance, which 
created fear in the affected population. 
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nation-states have been the ideal form of political organization.”288  
This actually substantially understates the longevity of the practice.  
Long before the nation-state emerged, rulers forcibly removed 
ethnic or religious groups for political, military or other reasons of 
state.  While population transfer or ethnic cleansing became 
particularly prevalent after the birth of the modern nation-state, as 
noted by the U.N.’s special rapporteurs of the 1993 report The 
Human Rights Dimension of Population Transfer, “population transfer 
has prevailed as an instrument of State-craft in every age in 
recorded history . . . .”289 
The normative status of population transfers or mass 
expulsions in international law has changed over time and has 
varied by factual context.  By the first decade of the twentieth 
century, the international community was generally recognizing 
the illegality of the deportation of the population of foreign territory 
by a wartime occupying army.290  But outside this narrow context, 
international law had not developed prohibitions on compulsory 
population transfer or mass expulsion.  On the contrary, 
compulsory transfer of populations in order to solve longstanding 
ethnic disputes was generally recognized as legal.  As Professor 
Ewa Morawska has noted: 
[A]t the beginning of the twentieth century and still in the 
early post-World War II era ethnic homogeneity was 
perceived by international organizations and governments 
of the Western world as beneficial for nation-states, and the 
step toward this purpose—forced unmixing of people—as 
                                                     
288 Jennifer Jackson Preece, Ethnic Cleansing as an Instrument of Nation-State 
Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal Norms, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 817, 
818 (1998). 
289 Special Rapporteurs on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population 
Transfer, Including the Implantation of Settlers and Settlements, Preliminary 
Report on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, Including the 
Implantation of Settlers, ¶ 10, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17 (July 6, 1993) (by Awn Shawkat 
Al-Khasawneh & Ribot Hatano).  Indeed, the history of the Jewish people 
provides many examples of the prevalence of ethnic cleansing and forced 
migration over the millennia. 
290 As noted above, the 1907 Hague Convention about the laws of war on 
land contained general principles which seem to prohibit such deportation.  See 
supra Section 4.1.2.  These principles were substantially strengthened by the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the post-World War II war crimes prosecutions.   
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internationally sanctioned as the lesser evil to continued 
interethnic turmoil.291 
Another expert on population transfers and ethnic cleansing 
concurs: 
[The post-World War I] boundaries unavoidably created 
both new nation-states and with them new national 
minorities that could potentially threaten the territorial 
division of the postwar settlement through separatism or 
irredentism.  Ethnic cleansing—then [referred to as] 
population transfer—was viewed as a legitimate means of 
overcoming these national discrepancies (i.e., of improving 
the fit between national boundaries and the ethnic 
composition of the population within them).292 
During the inter-war period, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, with 
its provisions for the compulsory return of Greek and Turkish 
populations to their ethnic homelands, “became an oft-cited 
precedent” for the legality and desirability of population transfer 
“throughout the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.”293  The League of 
Nations’ approval of the compulsory Greece-Turkey population 
exchange treaty in 1923 was discussed above.294  The Greece-
Turkey population exchange 
was hailed by many as a legal measure intended to bring 
peace on the basis of an international treaty and under the 
auspices of the League of Nations.  Thus, State interests 
were given priority over human rights and mass expulsions 
gained international respectability as a legitimate solution 
of demographic problems . . . .295 
During the inter-war years, the problem of refugees in Europe 
became acute, and the seeds of the later international legal and 
                                                     
291 Ewa Morawska, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Forced Migrations: 
A Neglected Aspect of East Europe’s Twentieth Century History, 34 INT’L MIGRATION 
REV. 1049, 1067 (2000). 
292 Preece, supra note 288, at 823. 
293 Id. at 825. (citing Alfred M. de Zayas, International Law and Mass Population 
Transfers, 16 HARV. INT’L L.J. 207, 222–23 (1975). 
294 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.  See also infra Appendix 
Table 1 (case 13). 
295 de Zayas, supra note 60, at 20.  See also Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, 
at 321 (“This [Treaty of Lausanne] approach to potential interethnic violence was 
later praised as the optimal solution . . . .”). 
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institutional regime for handling refugee flows started to develop.  
Refugees came from the great “unmixing of populations” in the 
Balkans and Eastern Europe; the disappearance of the Ottoman, 
Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and emergence of new 
territorial states; the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the rise of 
fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany.296  In this period, “three 
norms characterized the international refugee regime: asylum, 
assistance, and burden-sharing.”297  Repatriation was not a 
significant part of the regime that actually developed in practice.  
Respect for the sovereignty of states was still high, and a state’s 
decisions to expel or admit peoples were more or less sacrosanct.298  
Many refugee host states did view voluntary “repatriation as the 
best solution to their refugee problems.”299  This was not because 
repatriation was viewed as legally obligatory, but for practical 
reasons; financial considerations were important, as was concern 
about the potentially disruptive social and political effects of 
armed, irredentist, politically radicalized or otherwise troublesome 
refugee populations.300  Prejudice, particularly against Jewish 
refugees, also motivated some host governments’ preference for 
repatriation.301  But despite a preference for repatriation, 
[it] did not play a significant part in the achievement of 
durable solutions for refugees in the Inter-war Period.  
More often than not, refugee-producing countries would 
not accept refugees back into their territories, and the 
refugees did not want to return to their home countries 
because of the danger of persecution there.302 
Additional compulsory population transfer agreements were 
concluded after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, further 
demonstrating the perceived legality of the practice of ethnic 
transfer.  The bilateral agreements that brought ethnic Germans  
back to Germany at the beginning of World War II were generally 
compulsory.303  The Craiova Agreement of September 1940, 
                                                     
296 See CLAUDENA M. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE: THE EMERGENCE 
OF A REGIME 16–20 (1995). 
297 Id. at 68. 
298 See id. at 67–68, 72, 156. 
299 Id. at 148. 
300 See id. at 38–39, 149–50, 153.  
301 See id. at 40. 
302 Id. at 148. 
303 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 22–27). 
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concluded by Bulgaria and Romania, also provided for the 
compulsory transfer of ethnic minorities.304  The massive 
compulsory transfers of Sudeten Germans and other ethnic 
minorities approved by the victorious allied powers at the 1945 
Potsdam conference was introduced above.305  With the approval 
of the victorious powers, approximately twenty million people 
belonging to ethnic minority populations in Eastern Europe were 
transferred at the end of World War II.  This was considered a legal 
and rational way to align ethnic nations with territorial boundaries 
and, it was hoped, to thereby resolve one of the causes of the 
conflicts that had so badly scarred Europe. 
Of the post-World War II expulsion of German minorities from 
newly-liberated Eastern Europe, Churchill said: 
[E]xpulsion is the method which, so far as we have been 
able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting.  There 
will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble . 
. . . A clean sweep will be made.  I am not alarmed by these 
large transferences . . . .306 
Roosevelt agreed that the Allies “should make some arrangements 
to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks 
were moved out of Turkey after the last war . . . [;] while this is a 
harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace . . . .”307 
Thus, during and after both world wars, but particularly World 
War II, many statesmen and international lawyers in the West had 
come to believe that compulsory population transfer was an 
unpleasant but sometimes necessary tool to resolving certain 
ethnic conflicts, which had defied other solutions.308  In the wake of 
both world wars, 
                                                     
304 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 31). 
305 See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix Table 
1 (case 45).  In recent years, the Czech government reaffirmed the legality of the 
transfers of Sudeten Germans, and although groups of surviving expellees and 
their descendants claimed that the Czechs should make some kind of reparations 
before being allowed to join the European Union, no EU member state or 
institution endorsed that view.  See Waters, supra note 60, at 86, 90, 93–97.  
306 See Preece, supra note 288, at 828 (citing ALFRED DE ZAYAS, NEMESIS AT 
POTSDAM: THE ANGLO-AMERICANS AND EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS 1 (1979).  Cf. 
Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 13, at 322 n.146 (citing 406 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th 
ser.) (1944) 1484 (U.K.)) (noting that Churchill was influenced by the view that the 
Greek-Turkish population exchange had been a success). 
307 Preece, supra note 288, at 828 (citing DE ZAYAS, supra note 306, at 8). 
308 See JUDT, supra note 60, at 25–28; JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN, POSTWAR 
POPULATION TRANSFERS IN EUROPE, 1945–1955, at 389–95 (1962); see also J.R., The 
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sizeable minorities were viewed as sources of instability . . . 
by the great continental and world powers. 
 Discontented minorities could either be a focal point in 
themselves for the interventionist or irredentist goals of 
neighbouring states with some ethnic or religious affinity, 
or a cause of internal disturbance which might, if severe 
enough, again trigger external intervention.  Either 
eventuality might lead to inter-state warfare, the avoidance 
of which was the main concern of statesmen . . . .309 
Diplomats saw two means of dealing with this problem: 
“guaranteed minority protection” and “internationally sanctioned 
minority eviction.”310  
 “[P]opulation exchange” was the “diplomatic solution of last 
resort . . . .”311  The Allied powers, “from 1942 onwards, became 
enamoured of compulsory population transfer as a potential 
solution to the problem of rendering nation and state co-terminous 
. . . .”312  At the time of the Israeli-Arab conflict of 1947–49, far from 
being illegal, large-scale involuntary population transfers were an 
accepted feature of international statecraft.  According to Stefan 
Wolff: 
[O]nly in the post-Cold War period has there been 
universal condemnation of [“ethnic cleansing”].  For almost 
100 years prior, many states in their search for internal 
                                                                                                                        
Exchange of Minorities and Transfers of Population in Europe Since 1919, 21 BULL. INT’L 
NEWS 657, 657 (1944) (noting that during World War II both democratic and 
autocratic countries of Europe were coming to the view that “the policy of 
compulsory transfer of population [was a] solution of the minorities problem . . . 
.”); Preece, supra note 288, at 826–27 (“Enthusiasm for ethnic cleansing as a 
solution to outstanding minority problems was not confined to the Axis powers.  
As World War II progressed, both the British and US governments also came to 
believe that population transfers would play a key role in the postwar 
settlement.”). 
309 Donald Bloxham, The Great Unweaving: The Removal of Peoples in Europe, 
1875–1949, in REMOVING PEOPLES: FORCED REMOVAL IN THE MODERN WORLD 167, 
199 (Richard Bessel & Claudia B. Haake eds., 2009). 
310 Id. at 200.  Cf. CLAUDE, supra note 267, at 191 (“The wartime trend toward 
the general acceptance of the principle of transfer of populations as a solution for 
difficult minority problems has continued during the early years of United 
Nations activity, and has to some extent been fostered by the world 
organization.”). 
311 Bloxham, supra note 309, at 206–07. 
312 KARL CORDELL & STEFAN WOLFF, GERMANY’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS 
POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC 109 (2005). 
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stability and external security have sought to minimize the 
political impact of ethnic minorities . . . by expelling them 
or exchanging them for ethnic kin of their own.313 
In the wake of World War II, the Soviet Union engaged in 
compulsory population exchanges of ethnic minorities with 
Czechoslovakia, as did the Soviet Union with Poland, and 
Hungary with Czechoslovakia.314  At the same time, approximately 
one million Japanese emigrants in China were transported back to 
Japan by the Chinese government operating with U.S. military 
support.315  The Soviet Union engaged in ethnic cleansing on a 
massive scale, expelling hundreds of thousands of ethnic 
minorities from new territories it incorporated by war.  For 
instance, approximately 400,000 ethnic Japanese were removed 
from Sakhalin Island, about 400,000 ethnic Finns from Soviet-
incorporated Karelia, and about 420,000 Estonians, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians during the armed resistance to Soviet rule of the 
Baltics.316  The Soviets also expelled approximately 1.5 million 
ethnic Poles and surviving Polish Jews.317 
None of these compulsory transfers or mass expulsions was 
authoritatively declared or widely understood to be illegal at the 
time it occurred.  On the contrary, as described above, international 
institutions and powerful states approved many of these actions.  
Nor was a requirement of a “right of return” for the expelled or 
transferred authoritatively enunciated with regard to these actions.  
What was declared illegal at the time was the Nazi practice of 
deporting—often to their death in work camps or death camps—
the civilian populations of wartime occupied countries.  But as 
discussed, that does not describe the situation in Palestine in 1947–
                                                     
313 STEFAN WOLFF, ETHNIC CONFLICT: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 141 (2006).  Cf. 
Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: 
The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1091, 1120 (1998) (“Whereas in the first 
half of the twentieth century population transfers were accepted as a means of 
resolving and avoiding ethnic conflicts, as the century draws to a close, the 
international community now seeks to maintain or recreate multi-ethnic 
communities.  Population transfers and mass expulsions are now deemed to 
violate international law, and voluntary return and repatriation have come to 
occupy a fundamental part of refugee policy . . . .”). 
314 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 47, 40 and 48, respectively). 
315 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 50). 
316 See infra Appendix Table 1 (cases 41, 37 and 52, respectively). 
317 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 40). 
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49, and so the international legal rules developed in that context 
did not apply.318 
5.2. Ethnic Armed Conflict and the Creation of New States 
To get another view of potentially relevant state and 
international practice, in order to help determine whether the 
expulsion of the Palestinian refugees in 1947–49 was illegal or 
whether return was required, I sought to create a data set of 
conflicts similar in relevant respects to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  This has proved a difficult task because the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is, in some respects, sui generis.  Decolonization 
has created many new states, and has often been associated with 
ethnic armed conflict.  However, Britain’s decision to simply 
withdraw from its international trusteeship over Mandate 
Palestine before any new states were created—and hence before 
borders or rules of citizenship settled—made the conflict of 1947–
49 unique.  The “decolonization” created by the collapse of the 
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires during and 
after World War I was managed by the victorious Allied powers 
through multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements, which 
provided the international borders within which citizenship norms 
could be applied.319  The decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East after World War II almost everywhere followed the 
rule of uti possidetis, a norm of territorial integrity—that is, stability 
of previous boundaries.320  Hence, when colonial regimes fell or 
were removed, there were clearly designated international 
boundaries in place, even if groups within those states contested 
their continued inclusion in the state.  But from the outset, 
Mandate Palestine was pledged to two peoples, both of whom 
wanted exclusive states within the same territory.  From the outset, 
and to this day, there has been no definitive agreement about 
whether one or two states should exist within the territory of the 
                                                     
318 See supra Section 4.1. 
319 See, e.g., infra Appendix Table 1 (case 10). 
320 See SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTED WORLD: 
THE ROLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS 3–4 (2002) (defining uti possidetis as a principle for 
maintaining territorial stability and preexisting borders in the creation of new 
states, whether through decolonization, dissolution of a state, or separatism); see 
also Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 62–63 (Dec. 22); Land, 
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond: Nicar. intervening), 1992 
I.C.J. 351, ¶ 67, 95–96 (Sept. 11) (showing the court’s resistance to altering 
established boundaries). 
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former Mandate, and, if two, where the international borders 
should lie.  This fundamental and persistent uncertainty over 
sovereignty, authority, borders, and citizenship has rendered the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict unique, and international norms 
developed in more ordinary circumstances arguably inapplicable. 
To create a set of situations potentially analogous to the conflict 
over the emergence of Israel, I focused only on civil or internal 
wars where the parties disputed control over a piece of territory.  I 
also looked only at ethnic or ethnic-religious civil wars, as opposed 
to ones driven primarily by political or ideological commitments.  
The intense desire to create a national home for their own ethnic 
group321 was a commitment shared by both Jews and Arabs in 
1947–49.  Because the conflict was ethnic and territorial, each side 
directed its force not only against the enemy’s combatants, but, 
occasionally, at the opposing civilian population as well.322  
Conflicts sharing these characteristics are fundamentally different 
than the many ideological or political civil wars that disfigured the 
second half of the twentieth century.  These ideological or political 
civil wars were often settled when one side agreed to live under 
the political-social system preferred by its adversary, or when both 
sides compromised and created a new unity-type government.  
Political beliefs and governmental structures are mutable, unlike 
ethnicity.323  This is crucial to the development of CIL, because the 
intention of the government allowing or refusing the return of 
refugees is key.  A government might well be perfectly happy to 
invite home the civilian population of a rival political movement 
that had given up the struggle and now desired peace and 
                                                     
321 Cf. Charles King, The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s 
Unrecognized States, 53 WORLD POL. 524, 527 (2001) (“Ethnic groups may feel that a 
particular piece of real estate is historically theirs and that allowing it to be 
controlled by an alien group would be tantamount to national betrayal.”). 
322 Cf. Chaim Kaufmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars, 20 
INT’L SECURITY 136, 139 (1996) (“War hardens ethnic identities to the point that 
cross-ethnic political appeals become futile, which means that victory can be 
assured only by physical control over the territory in dispute.”). 
323 See id. at 138–40 (asserting that ethnic conflicts are fundamentally distinct 
from ideological ones because “ideological loyalties are changeable and difficult 
to assess,” whereas ethnic loyalties “are both rigid and transparent”); Carter 
Johnson, Partitioning to Peace: Sovereignty, Demography, and Ethnic Civil Wars, 32 
INT’L SEC. 140, 147 (2008) (“In contrast to ideological wars, where loyalties are 
more fluid both during and after combat, in ethnic wars, members of one ethnic 
group are far less likely to fight for the opposing side, dividing communities and 
making post-war reconciliation in an intermingled state very difficult—some 
would argue impossible.”). 
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political-ideological conformity.  A voluntary repatriation like that 
does not have the opinio juris that CIL requires to make a rule 
binding against the will of the government, especially in other 
dissimilar contexts. 
Once I assembled a set of potentially analogous ethnic conflicts 
in which groups fought over the creation of a new state—found in 
Table 2 of the Appendix—I analyzed the events and circumstances 
of the conflicts to determine whether there were large-scale 
expulsions of ethnic opponents and, if so, whether and under what 
circumstances refugees were repatriated.  Most importantly, I 
looked for evidence that states (or ethnic groups in the process of 
creating states) refrained from expelling their ethnic opponents, 
even if noncitizens, because of the belief that it would be illegal under 
CIL, or for evidence that states allowed the repatriation of their 
expelled ethnic opponents, even if noncitizens, because of a belief that 
it was legally required by CIL.324  I found no evidence of these 
occurrences in the conflicts predating the 1947–49 Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.325  As discussed above, during the period from 
World War I through the aftermath of World War II, repatriation 
was not a significant part of the international regime for handling 
refugees; moreover, compulsory transfer of ethnic minority groups 
was considered legal and desirable in many circumstances.  This is 
additional evidence that neither the expulsion of nor the refusal to 
repatriate the Palestinians was illegal at the time it occurred.  As 
the twentieth century progressed and human rights law and other 
forms of international law developed stronger protections for 
rights, customary norms against expulsion and in favor of 
repatriation emerged.  This evidence is discussed in the next part. 
                                                     
324 See MALANCZUK, supra note 124, at 44 (describing how evidence of 
customary international law for restrictive versus permissive rules is located and 
analyzed). 
325 I recognize that being unable to locate evidence does not prove that no 
evidence in fact exists.  But it is noteworthy that the voluminous literatures on 
ethnic cleansing and refugee repatriation do not appear to document any 
prominent cases of the described phenomenon occurring, and my review of 
historical monographs about the individual conflicts and individual states also 
did not locate any.  In any event, even if my research missed some instances of 
states suggesting that they believed themselves required by international law to 
refrain from expelling persons or to allow them to return, these events would 
have been insufficient to create a rule of CIL.  A widespread and general practice 
of many states over time is required for CIL to develop, and this plainly had not 
occurred as of 1947–49. 
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5.3. Major Repatriations of Refugees, 1992–2008 
A legal norm requiring repatriation of refugees has emerged 
only at the end of the twentieth century, and its development was 
driven by powerful non-legal forces.  Wealthier Western countries 
were increasingly loath to take in large numbers of refugees from 
the Third World, and poorer countries lacked the financial means 
to deal with the burdens imposed by hosting large refugee 
populations.326  There were many reasons for this.  The end of the 
Cold War is frequently cited as one reason why the developed 
world changed its views about the desirability of taking in 
refugees.327  For less developed and stable host states, a primary 
reason they came to favor repatriation is that refugees, “especially 
when remaining in border regions, frequently become politically 
active against their home government,” and not infrequently 
launch or continue guerilla wars from their state of refuge.328  In 
addition, the presence of refugees can “create an unstable ethnic 
balance in the receiving state that encourages a previously 
oppressed minority to confront the state.”329  Ideological and legal 
changes were also important, as international norms against 
statelessness, deprivation of nationality, forced removal from one’s 
home territory, and ethnic separatism gained strength.  But the 
powerful non-legal motives driving changes in state behavior 
                                                     
326 See, e.g., B. S. Chimni, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and the Return of Refugees: 
Concepts, Practices and Institutions, in REFUGEES AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT: 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, HUMAN VULNERABILITY, AND THE STATE 195, 195 (Edward 
Newman & Joanne van Selm eds., 2003) (noting the de-emphasis on “[l]ocal 
integration and resettlement” due to the global North not accepting the evolving 
demographic and political profiles of refugees and the global South not having 
the resources to care for refugee populations); Rosand, supra note 313, at 1105–06 
(explaining the European Community’s effort to limit refugees from the former 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s through increased funding for programs meant to 
care for the refugees within that territory and thereby keep them there). 
327 See, e.g., Monica Duffy Toft, The Myth of the Borderless World: Refugees and 
Repatriation Policy, 24 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 139, 144 (2007) (citation 
omitted) (“The end of the Cold War had magnified every variable of the refugee 
equation.  Instead of trickles of skilled, educated, and enterprising refugees, 
OECD countries would soon be bracing to receive floods of peoples of all ages, 
skills, and backgrounds.”). 
328 John R. Rogge, Africa’s Resettlement Strategies, 15 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 195, 
200 (1981); cf. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 662 (2005) (“Particularly in Africa, the expulsion of refugees is often linked to 
the fear that their presence will embroil the host state in armed conflict, or 
retaliatory attack.”). 
329 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the 
Forced Migration Crisis, 33 INT’L SEC. 95, 101 (2008). 
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counsel caution before assuming that a state’s view that refugee 
repatriation is desirable reflects requisite opinio juris—belief that 
the action is legally required, as must be true if CIL is to develop. 
Accurate and comprehensive data about refugee movements 
have always been hard to obtain.330  The best sources of data on 
historical refugee flows and refugee repatriation are the statistical 
yearbooks produced by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (“UNHCR”).  Comprehensive UNCHR data on the 
number of refugees voluntarily repatriating in a given year is 
readily available going back only to 1992.  I assembled the 
available data into Table 3 of the Appendix.  According to the 
UNHCR data, sizeable voluntary repatriations have occurred in 
twenty-one countries since 1992.  I define this as a repatriation of 
ten thousand or more refugees in a given year, and 100,000 or more 
during the 1992–2008 period.331 
CIL is by definition not retroactive, and therefore a norm 
emerging only in the 1990s—if that is what the UNHCR data show 
—will not be binding in 1947–49.  But looking at the data set from 
the 1990s and 2000s is still instructive because, as discussed below, 
each of these repatriations in recent decades involved 
circumstances that arguably can be distinguished from those of the 
Palestinian refugees.  Each major voluntary repatriation is marked 
by differences that make any analogy to the Israeli-Palestinian 
situation strained if not inapposite.  As a result, even today, CIL 
may not have developed to a point where it is fully applicable to 
the precise situation of the Palestinian refugees of 1947–49.  My 
claim is not that CIL must have developed in precisely similar 
prior contexts in order to bind states, but rather that the Israeli-
Palestinian situation is so dissimilar in so many ways that there is a 
                                                     
330 Refugee flows are typically produced by violent and chaotic events that 
are, by their nature, opaque to outsiders.  Whereas militaries have an interest in 
keeping track of their own, typically no one in a conflict zone is charged with 
identifying and counting refugees.  Refugees do not all flee in the same directions, 
or end up in obvious or known places of refuge, making behind-the-front-lines 
counting inaccurate.  Many refugee flows are produced by internal conflicts in 
which the regime in power denies outsiders access to the battlefield and to 
affected civilian populations.  Often, all sides in a conflict—and perhaps NGOs as 
well—have an interest in under- or over-counting refugees, or counting some but 
not other fleeing populations as actual refugees.  It has always been difficult to 
distinguish between actual refugees fleeing violent conflict or other persecution, 
on the one hand, and economic migrants, perhaps opportunistically using the 
chaos to flee, on the other. 
331 See infra Appendix Table 3. 
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serious question whether today’s CIL covers it—even if CIL were 
retroactively applicable, which it is not. 
The reasons why the twenty-one major repatriations 
documented by the UNHCR differ from the situation of the 
Palestinian refugees are numerous.  First, a chief difference 
between any envisioned Palestinian return and the actual returns 
that have occurred worldwide since 1992 is that, unlike the 
refugees involved in modern returns,  virtually all of the 
Palestinian refugees from 1947–49 were and are not citizens of the 
country to which they desire to return.332 
Second, another important distinguishing factor is the size of 
the returning refugee population as a percentage of the population 
of the receiving state.  In 1949, the number of Palestinian refugees 
was close to equal to the total number of Jews in Israel.333  But in 
every case of a sizeable refugee repatriation since 1992, even the 
largest repatriations (measured by size of returning refugee 
populations relative to the population of the receiving state) do not 
approach such equivalence.  Consider Bosnia, to which about 1.7 
million refugees returned, representing about thirty-seven percent 
of the population.334  A more representative case, in percentage 
terms, is Afghanistan, to which about five million refugees 
returned, representing about eighteen percent of the population. 
Third, major repatriations almost always occur not during a 
state of war, but instead following a formal cessation of hostilities 
or comprehensive peace treaty (often after a decisive military 
resolution has been achieved).  During the Bosnian War (1992–95), 
Slobodan Milosevic’s campaign to create a “Greater Serbia” led to 
the internal displacement of some 1.8 million (perhaps thirty-nine 
                                                     
332 For a discussion of the Palestinian refugees’ lack of Israeli citizenship, see 
supra note 103 and accompanying text, and Section 4.4.  There is an additional 
complicating factor making return difficult, which is that the Palestinian Arab 
refugees are ethnically and religiously different from Jewish Israelis, and that 
many members of each group have ethnically and religiously centered notions of 
what their homeland should be and who should govern it. 
333 Palestinian refugees outside Israel numbered about 600,000 to 760,000; 
well over 100,000 Palestinians remained in Israel after the war; and the 1949 
population of Israel contained about 900,000 Jews.  See supra notes 95–96, 99 and 
accompanying text. 
334 For the total population, see The World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/bk.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
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percent of the Bosnian population).335  His military reverses, armed 
intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”), 
and the Dayton Peace Accords allowed a Bosnian return;336 some 
226,000 returned in the first three years after peace.  Some 194,000 
Iraqis returned home in 2004, after Saddam Hussein’s defeat by 
U.S.-led coalition forces.  Civil war in Mozambique ended with a 
peace treaty in 1992.337  About 159,000 refugees returned that year; 
and 1,408,000 did in the two years after that.338  In 1999 the U.N. 
supervised a popular referendum in which the East Timorese 
voted for independence from Indonesia.339  Under the 
administration of the U.N.’s Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET),340 that year some 128,000 returned to old homes 
in a new nation.341  There are many other instances of this—large-
scale, voluntary repatriation of refugees documented by the 
UNHCR following the end of a conflict and signing of a peace 
treaty.342  Out of the twenty-one major refugee repatriations from 
1992 to 2008, only in Mali, Togo, and Myanmar did repatriation 
                                                     
335 See Henry Kamm, Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe’s Worst Since 40’s, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 24, 1992, at A1. 
336 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND 
DISPLACED PERSONS: LAWS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 31 (Scott Leckie ed., 2007) 
(excerpting the refugee fight of return provisions of the General Framework 
Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement)–Annex 7: 
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons (1995)). 
337 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND 
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 30 (excerpting the repatriation and 
reintegration provisions of The Rome Process: General Peace Agreement for 
Mozambique (1992)). 
338 See infra Appendix Table 3. 
339 See, e.g., Jose Gusmao, Reconciliation, Unity and National Development in the 
Framework of the Transition Toward Independence, in GUNS AND BALLOT BOXES: EAST 
TIMOR’S VOTE FOR INDEPENDENCE 1 (Damien Kingsbury, ed., 2000). 
340 See S.C. Res. 1272, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) 
(establishing and describing the role of the transition government in East Timor). 
341 See infra Appendix Table 3. 
342 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND 
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 30–31, 36–38, 41–43 (excerpting the 
repatriation provisions of the Cotonou Agreement (1993) (Liberia); Arusha Peace 
Agreement (1993) (Rwanda); Erdut Agreement (1995) (Croatia); Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement (2000) (Burundi); Agreement between the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea (2000); Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United 
for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL) and Political Parties (2003); and Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement—Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-Interim and Interim 
Period (2004) (Sudan)). 
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occur without a comprehensive peace treaty that ended large-scale 
hostilities.  Togo and Mali had faced internal turmoil but not full-
blown civil or inter-state war; repatriations followed political 
liberalization and transitions to new governments.343  In Myanmar, 
most of the refugees returned during a brief respite in the military 
junta’s active repression.  Returns following peace agreements—or 
returns to societies where no wide-spread armed conflict calling 
for a comprehensive peace has occurred—are not robust precedent 
for a return in the absence of peace. 
Fourth, from 1992 to 2008 internationally sanctioned military 
forces were present for eighteen out of the twenty-one major 
repatriations.344  United Nations peacekeeping forces were 
deployed at the relevant times in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Burundi, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Macedonia, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and East Timor.345  
                                                     
343 See JENNIFER C. SEELY, THE LEGACIES OF TRANSITION GOVERNMENTS IN 
AFRICA: THE CASES OF BENIN AND TOGO (2009); SUSSANA D. WING, CONSTRUCTING 
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: MALI IN TRANSITION (2010). 
344 Again, only in Mali, Myanmar, and Togo was this not the case. 
345 The U.N. peacekeeping missions were:  
i. United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) 
(1991–1995) and UNAVEM III (1995–1997) 
ii. United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) (2004–2006) 
iii. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (MONUC) (1999–present) 
iv. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) (2000–
2008) 
v. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (2003–present) 
vi. United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) (1992–
1994) 
vii. United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) (1993–
1996) 
viii. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (1999–2005) 
ix. United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I) (1992–1993) 
and (UNOSOM II) (1993–1995) 
x. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) (1999–2002) 
xi. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (initially in Croatia 
and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia) (1992–1995) 
xii. United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO) 
(replaced UNPROFOR in Croatia) (1995–1996).  
Current Peacekeeping Operations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ 
peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). Past 
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African Union peacekeeping forces were deployed in Somalia and 
Sudan.  Repatriations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, 
Afghanistan, and Sudan took place, in part, under the aegis of 
NATO armed forces.346  In Iraq, the U.S.-led international military 
coalition operated under the authority of the U.N. Security Council 
from 2003 through 2008.347 
Fifth, the time elapsed between displacement and return varies, 
but in the last two decades, most major refugee repatriations have 
occurred shortly after displacement.  Only a handful of extant 
conflicts in the world today feature refugee populations claiming a 
right of return, or a right to territory, after more than fifteen years.  
They include Cyprus (four decades), Kashmir (six decades), and, of 
course, Palestinians, who were displaced some six decades ago.  By 
contrast, most Bosnians returned within three years of their 
displacement.  Most Eritrean refugees returned home within four 
years of the peace agreement with Ethiopia and arrival of U.N. 
peacekeepers.348  As time goes on, return is less plausible.  For 
instance, the Burundi Civil War (1993–2005), between the Tutsi-
dominated government and Hutu rebels, left an estimated 250,000 
                                                                                                                        
Peacekeeping Operations, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ 
operations/past.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
346 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO’s Operation Deliberate Force (1995) 
was followed by a U.N.-mandated “Implementation Force” (IFOR) comprised of 
nearly sixty thousand troops.  A NATO “Stabilization Force” (SFOR), with thirty-
two thousand troops, was deployed in December 1996.  EU forces took over in 
December 2004.  Peace Support Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, N. ATL. TREATY 
ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52122.htm (last updated 
June 5, 2012).  In Macedonia, three operations took place between August 2001 
and March 2003.  See Peace Support Operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ 
topics_52121.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2012) (explaining NATO’s role in 
subduing tensions between ethnic Albanians and the Skopje government).  In 
Afghanistan, NATO’s largest commitment, the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), with 130,000 troops, has operated since August 2003.  NATO and 
Afghanistan, N. ATL. TREATY ORG., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ 
topics_8189.htm (last updated Dec. 3, 2012).  In Sudan, NATO assisted the African 
Union peacekeeping forces between June 2005 and December 2007, coinciding 
with the first mass repatriation in a decade.  NATO Assistance to the African Union, 
N. ATL. TREATY ORG.,  http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8191.htm 
(last updated Mar. 30, 2012). 
347 See S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (noting the role 
of and calling on member states and parties in Iraq to cooperate with the military 
occupation forces headed by the United States and United Kingdom); S.C. Res. 
1790, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007) (extending the multi-national force-
Iraq mandate until December 31, 2008).  
348 See supra notes 342 (citing peace agreement) and 344 (citing U.N. mission) 
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dead and displaced hundreds of thousands of people.349  Those 
displaced during the war have since trickled home, except for a 
small group of thirteen thousand people who were first displaced 
in 1972.350  In 2006, this group was resettled in the United States, 
after officials realized that their time abroad—many of them, of 
course, had never seen Burundi—would make it difficult to 
reintegrate.351  This shows what difference a generation abroad can 
make—let alone, as with the Palestinians, two or more 
generations.352 
Sixth, and finally, any consideration of whether a repatriation 
can serve as evidence of the development of a CIL right of return 
must account for the intent of the repatriating state.  In many 
instances, it is questionable whether the nation resettling 
substantial numbers of refugees did so primarily out of a belief that 
international law required it.  In the absence of this intent (opinio 
juris) by the states and other relevant actors involved, CIL does not 
form.  Many states which “voluntarily” accept the return of their 
refugees are pressured to do so by neighbors who cannot or will 
not continue to bear the burdens and risks of supporting large 
refugee populations, by powerful outside states seeking to impose 
settlements on conflicts, and by the UNHCR or other international 
organizations.353  Alternately, some states do, in truth, welcome 
back refugees voluntarily, motivated not primarily by legal norms, 
but by a desire to shore up support for a new, post-conflict regime 
or some other motives.  This Article does not deny that opinio juris 
                                                     
349 Burundi Rebel Group Expected to Disarm, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006, at A10. 
350 See Burundi Refugees to Settle in US, BBC NEWS, Oct. 17, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6058288.stm. 
351 See id. 
352 In a 2003 report, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan discussed proposals 
for property restitution between displaced Greek and Turkish Cypriots.  U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in 
Cyprus, U.N. Doc. S/2003/398 (Apr. 1, 2003).  He acknowledged that the preferred 
solution of the Greek Cypriots, full restitution of property, as opposed to the 
Turkish scheme of liquidation and exchange, prevailed in the former Yugoslavia, 
and further explained that the Cyprus situation was different because of “the fact 
that the events in Cyprus happened 30 to 40 years ago and that the displaced 
people (roughly half of the Turkish Cypriots and a third of the Greek Cypriots) 
have had to rebuild their lives and their economies during this time.”  Id. at 24.   
353 See, e.g., Jeff Crisp, The Politics of Repatriation: Ethiopian Refugees in Djibouti, 
1977–83, 30 REV. AFR. POL. ECON. 73, 75 (1984) (scrutinizing the motives for 
cooperation between the governments of Djibouti and Ethiopia for attempting to 
repatriate Ethiopian refugees who had fled to Djibouti in order to escape war at 
home). 
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about refugee repatriation has been present in these conflicts, but 
simply points out the mixed motives which have driven 
preferences for repatriation by states and international 
organizations. 
Analyzing the sizeable repatriations characterized as 
“voluntary” by the UNHCR reveals complex interactions between 
refugees, host states, states of origin, international organizations, 
and NGOs, with few instances where concerns about international 
legality seem to have played the dominant motivating role.  Take 
Mozambique, for example, the largest repatriation to occur at the 
outset of the 1992–2008 period.354  A long, bloody civil war ended 
in 1992 with an agreement between the government and the 
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) rebel movement.  
The agreement guaranteed political and civil rights for all 
Mozambicans and allowed RENAMO and its leaders to participate 
in domestic politics without persecution.355  The U.N., the 
government of Italy, and leaders of neighboring countries 
sponsored the peace talks and brokered the necessary deals.  The 
civil war had wound down to the point of being resolvable because 
the Soviet Union, patron of the Mozambique government, and the 
white South African government, patron of the rebels, dramatically 
reduced assistance to their clients because of more pressing 
domestic exigencies—both regimes would soon fall.  In October 
1992, the U.N. Security Council authorized a peacekeeping force to 
oversee the cease-fire and the transition to a more democratic 
government in Mozambique.356  In the first year after peace, 
approximately 200,000 refugees who had been camped in Malawi 
spontaneously crossed the border and returned home to 
Mozambique, without having been notified or assisted by any 
national or international organizations.357  While this was 
occurring, the UNHCR and certain refugee host states—Malawi 
                                                     
354 See infra Appendix Table 3. 
355 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND 
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 30 (excerpting The Rome Process: General 
Peace Agreement for Mozambique (1992) which pronounced the directives under 
which Mozambican refugees and displaced persons would be repatriated and 
reintegrated into society). 
356 S.C. Res. 782, U.N. Doc. S/RES/782 (Oct. 13, 1992).  The U.N. force 
deployed in December of that year.  See Mozambique—ONUMOZ, Facts and 
Figures, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/ 
past/onumozF.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
357 See MARJOLEINE ZIECK, UNHCR AND VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF 
REFUGEES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 398 (1997).  
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and South Africa (the two states with the largest populations of 
refugees from Mozambique), as well as Zimbabwe—negotiated 
plans for refugee repatriation.358  After the initial spontaneous 
return, however, fewer refugees agreed to return to Mozambique 
because food rations were available in refugee camps, but 
relatively less food was available to returnees in Mozambique.359  
So the UNHCR and cooperating NGOs stopped providing food to 
refugees in Malawi and South Africa.360  As one author 
euphemistically puts it, this “encouraged” the return of refugees to 
Mozambique.361  In these complex and untidy circumstances, it is 
difficult to discern a dominant role for opinio juris. 
One might think this is an exceptional case.  But take another 
massive refugee repatriation touted by the UNHCR as voluntary—
the case of Rwandan refugees.  In December 1996, Tanzania 
forcibly expelled approximately 500,000 Rwandan refugees, mainly 
Hutus, into Rwanda; Tanzania was concerned with military 
activities emanating from refugee camps and believed that many 
who had committed genocide were sheltered in the camps.362  
Burundi also forcibly expelled Rwandan refugees into Rwanda in 
1996.363  The new Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government had 
earlier agreed to accept the return of refugees,364 because it hoped 
to protect fellow Tutsis, discover and arrest Hutu participants in 
                                                     
358 See Chris Dolan, Repatriation from South Africa to Mozambique—
Undermining Durable Solutions?, in THE END OF THE REFUGEE CYCLE? REFUGEE 
REPATRIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 85, 87 (Richard Black & Khalid Koser eds., 
1999) (discussing UNHCR’s agreement with South Africa); HOUSING, LAND, AND 
PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, 
at 47 (excerpting the Agreement for the Voluntary Repatriation of Mozambican 
Refugees from Zimbabwe (1993), an agreement between Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, and UNHCR to grant “returnees . . . the right of return to return 
[sic] their former places of residence or to any other places of their choice within 
Mozambique”); ZIECK, supra note 357, at 398–99 (describing UNHCR’s work with 
Malawi to encourage voluntary repatriation into Mozambique). 
359 See ZIECK, supra note 357, at 399–401. 
360 See Dolan, supra note 358, at 87 (recounting the intentional reduction of 
food provisions available to refugees in South Africa); ZIECK, supra note 355, at 
400–13 (detailing the plan to cut food supplies in Malawi).  
361 ZIECK, supra note 357, at 412–13. 
362 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 134). 
363 See infra Appendix Table 1 (case 135).  
364 See HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND 
DISPLACED PERSONS, supra note 336, at 51 (excerpting the Agreement on the 
Voluntary Repatriation of Rwandese Refugees from Tanzania (1995), which held 
that “the Republic of Rwanda shall take all measures possible to allow returnees 
to settle in areas of their origin or choice”). 
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genocide who were hiding among refugees, and obtain the 
international legitimacy that would come from doing what the 
U.N. and UNHCR desired.365  For the states involved, the return of 
refugees seems not to have been motivated primarily by a desire to 
abide by international legal norms for their own sake. 
While it is clear that CIL norms against expulsion and in favor 
of repatriation have gained substantial strength in the last two 
decades, the considerations detailed in this subsection suggest the 
difficulties of making a precise analogy between the 1947–49 
Palestinian situation and the recent cases in which a right of return 
has developed as a CIL norm.  CIL does not impose retroactive 
obligations, but even if it did, it is debatable whether CIL has 
developed rules requiring return in the unique circumstances of 
the 1947–49 Palestinian refugees. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This Article is framed as a ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment.  It seeks to move beyond factual debates about what 
exactly happened during the 1947–49 Arab-Israeli conflict and who 
is responsible for the outflow of Palestinian refugees.  I have 
assumed the truth of the Palestinian claim that Israel is entirely to 
blame, in order to sharpen the analysis of the applicable 
international law.  In this posture, it becomes clear that the claimed 
Palestinian “right of return” for refugees from the 1947–49 conflict 
has no substantial legal basis.  While the aspirations of the 
displaced to return to their homeland are understandable and 
compelling, the data compiled for this Article show that tens of 
millions of people were expelled from their countries during the 
twentieth century before international law began to recognize that 
practice as always illegal, and before international law began to 
require that refugees be able to return home in some 
circumstances. 
                                                     
365 On the background circumstances and factors motivating the Rwandan 
government, see generally Beth Elise Whitaker, Changing Priorities in Refugee 
Protection: The Rwandan Repatriation from Tanzania (United Nations High Comm’r 
for Refugees, Working Paper No. 53, 2002), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3c7528ea4.pdf; Deadlock in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis: 
Repatriation Virtually at a Standstill, DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (July 20, 1995), 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article_print.cfm?id=1467.  
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It is a bit surprising to discover that the Palestinian refugees’ 
legal366 claims for repatriation to their homes of 1947–49 are not 
well grounded in law.  For it has long been reported that 
Palestinian statesmen have thought it advantageous to introduce 
considerations of international legality into their periodic “peace 
process” dialogues with the Israelis, while the Israelis by contrast 
have preferred to frame the issue of refugee return (and other 
contested questions) in non-legal, pragmatic terms.367  Palestinians 
have sought to retroactively judge Israeli actions in the 1940s under 
new norms developing in the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.  But international law does not work like that.  Though it 
is no doubt deeply unsatisfying to Palestinians and their many 
supporters, the correct legal answer to the question of whether the 
1947–49 refugees have a right of return under international law 
goes something like this: even if (or assuming that) the Israelis did 
intentionally expel every Palestinian refugee, it was not illegal 
when it occurred, though it almost certainly would be if done 
today under the same circumstances; and the law at the time did 
not require repatriation of the refugees to Israel, though it most 
likely would if the expulsion were to occur today. 
                                                     
366 Again, I emphasize that I do not seek to judge the morality or justice of 
Israel’s and the Palestinians’ competing claims, nor do I question the reality of the 
Palestinians’ view that the 1947–49 conflict was a catastrophe—al-Nakbah, as they 
call it—for their national aspirations and for many individuals and families. 
367 On this topic, see generally Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade? The Roles of 
International Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 61 (2007). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1.  Partial List of Mass Expulsions, Compulsory Transfers, or 
Coerced Flights of Ethnic Minority Groups, 1900–2010 
 
Criteria: 
1. Officially instigated or organized 
2. Directed at masses of people, collectively 
3. 25,000 or more persons displaced 
4. Not voluntary: ranging from overt use of force during armed 
conflict to intimidation causing flight 
5. Ethnically-based expulsion or targeting 
6. From 1900 to 2010 
 
Case 
No. 
Date State(s)  
Involved 
Event  Refugee group, approximate 
number of refugees 
1 1905
–07 
Russian 
Empire 
Pogroms lead to 
coerced flight of 
own nationals 
After Russia’s defeat in Russo-
Japanese war and failed attempt 
by liberals to pressure the Czar 
for reforms, scapegoating of Jews 
led to officially-tolerated 
pogroms, killing hundreds and 
driving more than 300,000 Jews 
to emigrate1 
2 1912
–13 
Bulgaria, 
Ottoman 
Empire 
Wartime 
massacres and 
flight; Convention 
of Adrianople of 
Nov. 1913 for 
voluntary 
population 
exchange  
Approx. 45,000 ethnic Bulgarians 
from Turkish Thrace exchanged 
for 49,000 Muslims from 
Bulgaria;2 in light of massacres 
and flights of hundreds of 
thousands during Balkan Wars 
of 1912–13,3 “voluntary 
character” is “questionable”4 
3 1913 Bulgaria, 
Greece 
Wartime 
massacres and 
expulsions of 
foreign nationals 
in occupied 
territory 
As Greek armies drove into 
Bulgaria in Second Balkan War, 
Bulgarian civilians were 
massacred and about 150,000 
fled deeper into Bulgaria5 
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4 1914
–16 
Ottoman 
Empire/ 
Turkey 
Eve of war and 
wartime expulsion 
of own nationals 
Ottomans killed thousands of 
ethnic Greeks and expelled 
approx. 150,0006 
5 1914
–17 
Russian 
Empire, 
Austro-
Hungarian 
Empire 
Wartime 
expulsion of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals 
During World War I, Russian 
military expropriated and drove 
from home, deported, approx. 
500,000 to 1,000,000 Jews in its 
own territory and occupied 
enemy territory7 
6 1915
–16 
Serbia, 
Bulgaria, 
Austro-
Hungarian 
Empire 
Wartime 
massacres and 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
in occupied 
territory 
Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian 
armies invade and occupy 
Serbia, including newly-annexed 
Albania; Serbian civilians 
massacred and very large, 
unknown number of Serb 
refugees fled; then during formal 
military occupation “[b]etween 
150,000 and 180,000 people were 
deported, most of them to camps 
in Hungary, and others to 
Austria. . . .”8 
7 1915
–18 
Ottoman 
Empire/ 
Turkey  
Armenian 
genocide: wartime 
murder and 
expulsion of own 
nationals and 
aliens 
Perhaps 1,000,000 Armenians 
died and another 1,000,000 fled 
or were expelled9 
8 1916
–17 
Bulgaria, 
Greece 
Wartime 
massacres and 
deportation of 
foreign nationals 
in occupied 
territory 
Bulgaria invaded and occupied 
part of Greece; massacred 
civilians; deported approx. 
42,000 to 100,000 Greek men to 
Bulgaria for forced labor10 
9 1920 USSR Post-civil war 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
After Reds won the civil war, 
approx. 45,000 Cossacks expelled 
from Donbass region11 
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10 1920 Hungary, 
Romania, 
Yugoslavia, 
Czecho-
slovakia 
Post-war, post-
cession expulsions 
of alien ethnic 
group in newly-
acquired territory 
By 1920 Treaty of Trianon, 
Hungary lost three-quarters of 
territory; Romania, Yugoslavia, 
and Czechoslovakia expelled 
some 300,000 ethnic Magyars 
from their new territories12 
11 1919
–26 
Greece, 
Bulgaria 
Convention of 
1920 on Voluntary 
Reciprocal 
Emigration, 
signed after peace 
treaty of Neuilly-
sur Seine  
Treaty for voluntary population 
exchange; when few on either 
side voluntarily emigrated, force 
was used; approx. 30,000 to 
35,000 ethnic Greeks left Bulgaria 
and approx. 55,000 to 92,000 
ethnic Bulgarians and 
Macedonians left Greece13 
12 1922 Germany, 
Poland 
Expulsion during 
border dispute 
Germany expelled approx. 
25,000 ethnic Poles from 
disputed border area14 
13 1922
–33 
Turkey, 
Greece 
1923 Convention 
of Lausanne for 
compulsory 
population 
exchange 
Compulsory exchange treaty;15 
when signed, more than 1 
million Greek refugees from 
Turkey had already fled 
following Greek army’s defeat in 
1922; after treaty, approx. 190,000 
additional Greeks removed from 
Turkey and 356,000 Turks 
removed from Greek Macedonia 
and Epirus;16 those who fled or 
were transferred “were 
prohibited from returning”17 
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14 1925
–39 
Bulgaria, 
Turkey 
1925 convention 
for bilateral 
voluntary 
population 
exchange, 
supplemented in 
1936 and 1937 
Increasing Bulgarian repression 
of Turkish minority caused many 
to leave; in all, approx. 125,000 
Turks left Bulgaria;18 additional 
agreement provided that Turks 
of Bulgaria who previously 
emigrated to Turkey and wished 
to return to Bulgaria, and 
Bulgarians of Turkey who 
previously emigrated to Bulgaria 
and wished to return to Turkey, 
could not do so without consent 
of, respectively, Bulgaria and 
Turkey19 
15 1933 USSR Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
Approx. 200,000 nomadic 
Kazakhs expelled from 
Kazakhstan20 
16 1933
–39 
Germany, 
Austria 
Peacetime forced 
flight of 
denationalized 
people 
Nazi denationalizations, 
expropriations and other civil 
measures against Jews caused 
approx. 360,000 to flee21 
17 1936 Turkey, 
Romania 
1936 convention 
for voluntary 
transfer of 
population 
By 1936 agreement, the Muslim 
and Turkish-speaking 
population of the Dobruja were 
transferred to Turkey; in all 
approx. 61,00022 
18 1937 USSR Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
Approx. 172,000 ethnic Koreans 
deported from sensitive border 
area23 
19 1939
+ 
Poland, 
Germany 
Wartime 
expulsion of 
population of 
occupied territory 
More than 1,000,000 Poles 
expelled by Germany from 
Warthegau into central Poland24 
20 1939
–40 
USSR,  
Poland 
Wartime 
deportation of 
population of 
occupied territory 
USSR removed approx. 330,000 
Poles from occupied territory to 
Central Asia and Siberia25 
21 1939
–40 
Japan,  
Korea 
Wartime 
deportation of 
population of 
occupied territory 
Approx. 440,000 Koreans 
deported to Japan to work, often 
in horrific conditions26 
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22–
27 
1939
–44 
Germany, 
Italy,  
USSR, 
Estonia, 
Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Yugoslavia, 
Romania 
Brink of war and 
wartime population 
transfer agreements 
demanded by Hitler: 
Berlin Accord of 
June 1939 and Italo-
German Agreement 
of Oct. 1939; Russo-
German Agreement 
of Nov. 1939 on the 
Evacuation of 
Ukrainians and 
Belorussians from 
Polish Territory 
(Treaty of Moscow); 
Treaty of Prague 
(Germany-Hungary) 
of May 1940; Note 
Exchanged Sept. 
1940 with Romanian 
Government 
Regarding the 
Transfer of 
Bessarabia and 
Bukovina (Moscow 
Accord); Soviet-
German Frontier 
Treaty of Jan. 1941 
(Convention of 
Moscow); German-
Estonian Protocol of 
Oct. 1939 on the 
Resettlement of the 
German Folk-group 
in the German Reich; 
German-Latvian 
Treaty of Oct. 1939 
on the Resettlement 
of Latvian Citizens 
of German 
Nationality in the 
German Reich 
Under bilateral treaties, several 
granting option to remain, 
Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) 
and Reichsdeutsche (German 
expatriates) emigrated or were 
transferred to Germany or 
German occupied Poland: 
approx. 185,000 from Italy, 
49,000 from Latvia, 13,000 to 
16,000 from Estonia, 26,000 to 
33,000 from Yugoslavia, 66,000 
from Romania, at least 135,000 
from Soviet Union (including 
USSR-occupied Poland, 
Lithuania, Bessarabia, and North 
Bukovina (former Romania));27 
also 30,000 to 40,000 Ukrainians 
and Byelorussians expelled from 
German- to Soviet-occupied 
territory;28 despite option 
clauses, “[i]t is more accurate to 
categorize these events as a 
forced population transfer”29 
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28 1939
–45 
Germany, 
much of 
Europe 
Wartime genocide 
of own nationals 
and populations 
of occupied 
territory 
Germany committed genocide 
against Jews of Europe; approx. 6 
million killed; wartime 
governments of France, 
Romania, Poland, etc. helped 
out; also approx. 200,000 to 1.5 
million Gypsies (Roma) killed30 
29 1940 USSR, 
Finland 
Post-conquest 
population 
transfer treaty 
After Finland lost Soviet-Finnish 
war, forced to cede Karelia; 
treaty gave any desiring to leave 
a short time to do so; more than 
400,000 Karelians fled31 
30 1940
–41 
USSR,  
Latvia, 
Lithuania, 
Estonia 
Wartime 
expulsion of 
population of 
occupied territory 
After conquering Baltic states, 
USSR expelled approx. 85,000 to 
130,000; only stopped because 
Germans drove out Soviets32 
31 1940
–41 
Bulgaria, 
Romania 
Transfers under 
compulsory 
population 
exchange 
convention 
By Craiowa Agreement of Sept. 
1940, compulsory exchange of 
61,000 ethnic Bulgarians from N. 
Dobrudja for 100,000 to 110,000 
Romanians from S. Dobrudja33 
32 1940
+ 
France, 
Germany 
Wartime 
deportation of 
population of 
occupied territory 
More than 100,000 French 
Alsatians expelled by Germany 
into Vichy France34 
33 1941
–44 
Bulgaria, 
Hungary, 
Yugoslavia 
Wartime 
expulsion of 
population of 
occupied territory 
After occupying parts of former 
Yugoslavia with German 
consent, Bulgarian and 
Hungarian governments expel 
approx. 190,000 Yugoslavs, 
primarily Serbs;35 “Many of the 
expelled . . . did not return to 
Kosovo at the end of the Second 
World War, but were instead 
settled in Vojvodina in the 
homes of Germans and 
Hungarians who were killed or 
expelled by the post-war 
communist regime”36 
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34 1941
–44 
Albania Wartime 
massacres and 
expulsions 
Fascist Albanian state (annexed 
to Italy) annexed part of 
Yugoslavia and killed 10,000 
Serbs and Montenegrins and 
expelled approx. 70,000 to 
100,00037 
35 1941
–44 
Croatia Wartime 
massacres and 
expulsions 
During war, Croatia killed 
approx. 300,000 Serbs and 
expelled that many or more38 
36 1941
–44 
USSR Wartime 
deportation of 
own nationals 
 
After invasion by Germany, 
USSR forcibly transferred 
approx. 182,000 to 200,000 
Crimean Tartars, 393,000 to 
400,000 Chechens, 120,000 to 
135,000 Kalmyks, 92,000 Ingush, 
38,000 to 43,000 Balkars, 70,000 to 
76,000 Karachais and 92,000 to 
200,000 Meskhetians from 
western to eastern USSR39 
37 1944 USSR, 
Finland 
Post-conquest 
transfer  
After USSR re-conquered Karelia 
from Finns who had invaded in 
1940 at same time as Nazis, 
purportedly “voluntary” transfer 
of approx. 400,000 ethnic Finns 
from Soviet-incorporated Karelia 
to Finland; many of refugees had 
also fled in 1940, briefly 
returning with successful Finnish 
counterattack40 
38 1944
–45 
USSR,  
Baltic states 
Wartime 
expulsion of 
people claimed as 
own nationals 
After USSR “liberated” Baltics 
from Germans, approx. 150,000 
ethnic Balts were deported41 
39 1944
–47 
USSR, 
Ukraine 
Civil war 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
More than 200,000 ethnic 
Ukrainians suspected of 
supporting the nationalist 
insurgency deported from 
Ukraine to Siberia42 
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40 1944
–47 
USSR,  
Poland 
Compulsory 
population 
exchange 
agreements 
Approx. 518,000 ethnic 
Ukrainians, Byelorussians and 
Lithuanians removed from 
Poland to USSR;43 approx. 1.5 
million ethnic Poles and Polish 
Jews expelled from USSR to 
Poland44 
41 1945
+ 
USSR,  
Japan 
Forced expulsion 
of ethnic Japanese 
Approx. 400,000 ethnic Japanese 
removed by USSR after it 
conquered Sakhalin island45 
42 1945
+ 
USSR Post-war forced 
“repatriation” 
About 2,270,000 “displaced 
persons” in Germany at end of 
war were claimed by USSR as its 
nationals; shipped to USSR for 
execution, gulag, labor camps; 
15–20% survived46 
43 1945
+ 
Greece, 
Yugoslavia 
Post-war 
expulsion 
120,000 ethnic Bulgarians 
expelled from Greece, 
Yugoslavia47 
44 1945
+ 
Romania, 
Yugoslavia, 
Czecho-
slovakia 
Post-war 
expulsion or flight 
185,000 ethnic Hungarians 
expelled or fled from Romania, 
Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia48 
45 1945
–46 
Germany, 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Czecho-
slovakia 
Post–war 
expulsion to 
Germany of ethnic 
German 
populations 
Authorized in principle by U.S., 
USSR and UK agreement at 
Potsdam in Aug. 1945,49 3.5 
million Germans expelled from 
Poland; approx.  3.2 million 
Germans expelled from 
Czechoslovakia,50 and about 
225,000 from Hungary;51 the 
expellees were resettled in 
Germany52 
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46 1945
–46 
Romania, 
Yugoslavia, 
USSR 
Wartime and post-
war expulsions 
and deportations 
Without permission from Allied 
powers, approx. 70,000 ethnic 
Germans expelled from Romania 
and approx. 100,000 from 
Yugoslavia;53 in addition, the 
USSR forcibly removed some 
70,000 ethnic Germans from 
Romania and 100,000 from 
Yugoslavia to the USSR54 for 
“reconstruction work”55 
47 1945
–46 
USSR, 
Czecho-
slovakia  
Protocol for 
compulsory 
population 
exchange, 
attached to treaty 
signed at Moscow 
in June 1945; 
agreement of July 
1946 for 
repatriation of 
Czechs from 
Soviet Volhynia 
Approx. 4500 to 50,000 ethnic 
Russians and Ukrainians 
transferred from Czechoslovakia 
to USSR, approx. 42,000 ethnic 
Czechs and Slovaks from USSR 
to Czechoslovakia56 
48 1945
–48 
Hungary, 
Czecho-
slovakia  
Forced expulsion 
of ethnic 
Hungarians from 
Czechoslovakia; 
also population 
exchange treaty of 
Feb. 1946 
Approx. 25,000 to 30,000 ethnic 
Hungarians, including many 
Nazis and Nazi sympathizers, 
expelled;57 Treaty of 1946 
between Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia agreed to 
exchange ethnic Hungarians of 
Czechoslovakia for ethnic 
Slovaks of Hungary; anywhere 
from 60,000 to 400,000 people 
ultimately exchanged;58 treaty of 
exchange was “compulsory for 
the Hungarians living in 
Czechoslovakia and optional for 
Slovaks living in Hungary”59 
49 1946 Yugoslavia, 
Hungary 
Population 
exchange treaty of 
Sept. 1946 
1946 agreement for the exchange 
of 10,000 Magyars and 40,000 
Serbs and Croats between 
Yugoslavia and Hungary60 
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50 1946
–48 
China,  
Japan 
Post World War II 
(inter-state war) 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Approx. 1 million Japanese 
emigrants in China were 
transported back to Japan by the 
Chinese government operating 
with U.S. military support61 
51 1946
–49 
Greece Intra-state war; 
flight or expulsion 
of own nationals 
During Greek civil war, attacks 
on ethnic minority Macedonians 
killed 17,000 and forced approx. 
50,000 to flee;62 refugees and 
descendents “are denied 
permission to regain their 
citizenship, to resettle in, or even 
to visit, northern Greece”63 
52 1946
–53 
USSR,  
Baltic states 
Intra-state war; 
expulsion of own 
nationals (USSR 
claimed 
sovereignty over 
Baltics) 
During Baltic guerilla wars 
against Soviets,64 USSR expelled 
approx. 200,000 Lithuanians, 
160,000 Latvians, 60,000 
Estonians65 
53 1947 USSR Peacetime 
expulsion 
Approx. 58,000 ethnic Greeks 
removed from Black Sea coastal 
area66 to cleanse area of 
“politically unreliable 
elements”67 
54 1947
–49 
India, 
Pakistan 
“Partition;” 1947 
agreement 
between Indian 
National 
Congress, Muslim 
League and 
British 
See main text for details. 
“Neither country expected the 
refugees to return home and 
each with varying degrees of 
success resettled its refugees;”68 
post-partition New Delhi Accord 
of 1950 regulated repatriation69 
55 1947
–49 
UK-
controlled 
Palestine, 
Israel,  
Arab states 
End of British 
Mandate; civil 
war in Palestine; 
Israeli War of 
Independence 
See main text for details 
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56 1948 Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon), 
India 
Expulsion/flight 
of denationalized 
people 
Following independence, Sri 
Lanka enacted laws to 
disenfranchise, denationalize 
and otherwise drive out Indian 
Tamils; this begins a several-
decades long process, in part 
coordinated with India, in which 
nearly 9 million leave under 
duress for India70 
57 1948
–49 
Burma Peacetime 
expulsion of de 
facto 
denationalized 
people  
After independence in 1948, 
Burma granted citizenship to few 
of country’s 9,000,000 ethnic 
Indians and took other measures 
to drive them out of the country; 
at least several million left71 
58 1948
–51 
Iraq,  
Israel 
Wartime (Israeli 
War of 
Independence) 
and post-war 
expulsion or flight 
of own nationals 
and 
denationalized 
persons 
Pogroms, harassment, seizure of 
property and other anti-Jewish 
laws made life precarious for 
Jews of Iraq; more than 120,000 
fled to Israel, many during Israeli 
airlift72 
59 1948
–52 
Egypt Wartime (Israeli 
War of 
Independence) 
and post-war 
expulsion or flight 
of own nationals 
and 
denationalized 
persons 
Due to property seizures during 
the war, official and private 
harassment, and tenuous rights 
due to lack of citizenship, 
approx. 20,000 Jews left Egypt73 
60 1950
–51 
Bulgaria Peacetime 
expulsion  
Approx. 140,000 to 160,000 ethnic 
Turks expelled from Bulgaria74 
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61 1952 Japan Peacetime 
expulsion of 
denationalized 
people 
During WW II, Japan moved 
approx. 2 million Koreans to 
Japan; after war, encouraged 
them to leave; about 700,000 
remaining in 1952 were stripped 
of Japanese citizenship75 and 
many thousands were 
deported.76 
62 1956
–58 
Egypt Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals  
As a result of Suez War, Nasser 
government expelled about 
13,000 French and British 
citizens77 and expropriated and 
caused to flee approx. 23,000 to 
25,000 Jews78 
63 1956
–59 
China,  
Tibet 
Intra-state war; 
forced flight or 
expulsion of 
conquered people 
80,000 Tibetans fled Chinese 
invasion and repression, 
resettled in India79 
64 1957
–58 
Indonesia, 
Netherlands 
Denouement of 
anti-colonial 
struggle 
After Indonesia gained 
independence from Holland, and 
after several years of voluntary 
departure from Indonesia of 
native Dutch and mixed race 
“Indos,” Indonesia government 
expelled approx. 40,000 to 50,000 
remaining Dutch80 
65 1959
–62 
Rwanda Intra-state war; 
expulsion or 
forced flight of 
own nationals 
1959 revolution ousted Tutsi 
monarchy, replaced with Hutu 
government; approx. 120,000 – 
200,000 Rwandans (primarily 
ethnic Tutsi) fled or expelled to 
neighboring countries81 
66 1960 Belgian 
Congo/ 
Zaire 
Denouement of 
anti-colonial 
struggle 
Expelled approx. 100,000 whites 
after Belgian colonial regime 
fell82 
67 1961
–62 
Egypt Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Egypt expelled about 40,000 
ethnic Greeks83 
68 1962
+ 
Burma Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
Burma persecuted and drove out 
perhaps as many as 1,500,000 
Burmese of Indian descent84 
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69 1964 India,  
Sri Lanka 
Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
“India and Sri Lanka agreed to 
‘repatriate’ hundreds of 
thousands of so-called Indian 
Tamils to India, which most of 
them had never seen”85 
70 1965, 
1970 
Ghana Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Ghana “expelled several 
hundred thousand foreigners, 
many of them Nigerian, 
including children born in the 
country” 
71 1965 Indonesia Peacetime 
massacre and 
flight of own 
nationals  
Ethnic Chinese minority and 
indigenous communists in 
Indonesia are attacked, approx. 
200,000 to 500,000 killed, many 
thousands fled or expelled86  
72 1969 Honduras Wartime 
expulsion of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals  
Longstanding tensions erupted 
in massacre of ethnic 
Salvadorans in Honduras 
followed by brief war between El 
Salvador and Honduras and 
expulsion or flight of approx. 
130,000 ethnic Salvadorans from 
Honduras87  
73 1969 Ghana Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals  
Approx. 200,000 to 500,000 non-
Ghanaian Africans, primarily 
Nigerians, expelled from 
Ghana88 
74 1969
–72 
Iraq,  
Iran 
Peacetime 
expulsions of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals  
As relations soured over issues 
like navigation of Shatt-al-Arab 
River and militarization of a 
disputed border, Iraq expelled 
approx. 60,000 Iranians89 
75 1970 Libya Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
During “Day of Vengeance,” 
Khaddafi government expelled 
some 150,000 Italians 
76 1971 Zambia Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“In 1971 Zambia expelled all 
aliens—about 150,000 nationals 
of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zaire, 
Tanzania and Somalia—without 
valid work permits”90 
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77 1971 Iraq Intra-state war 
(against Kurds) 
Iraq expelled as many as 40,000 
Faili Kurds.91  In the next decade,  
more than 100,000 more were 
expelled after being declared 
non-nationals92 
78 1971 East and West 
Pakistan, 
India 
Intra-state war, 
with Indian 
intervention 
India entered civil war because 
believed West Pakistan was 
intentionally driving millions of 
Hindus out of East Pakistan into 
India; after West Pakistan 
surrendered and East (now 
Bangladesh) declared 
independence, most of the 
9,000,000 refugees returned93 
79 1971
–72 
Uganda Peacetime 
expulsion 
More than 40,000 people of 
Indian or Pakistani descent 
expelled for racial and economic 
reasons94 
80 1972 Burundi Intra-state war Hutu revolt against Tutsi 
government led to killing of 
100,000 to 200,000 Hutus by 
government and 
flight/expulsion of approx. 
300,00095 
81 1972
–74 
Bangladesh, 
Pakistan 
Post-war 
agreement 
 
When Bangladesh became 
independent from Pakistan in 
1972 after the war, it desired to 
remove Urdu-speaking Biharis, 
some of whom had collaborated 
with Pakistan in the war; several 
massacres of Biharis occurred; in 
1974, Pakistan agreed to take 
170,000;96 Biharis in Bangladesh 
were de facto stateless97 
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82 1974 Cyprus, 
Greece, 
Turkey 
Intra-state war; 
inter-state war 
Inter-communal violence started 
in 1963; in 1974, Turkey invaded 
on behalf of ethnic Turks and 
imposed partition; approx. 
160,000 to 200,000 ethnic Greeks 
and 40,000 to 45,000 ethnic Turks 
fled across the de facto partition 
line98 
83 1974
–76 
Angola Denouement of 
anti-colonial 
struggle 
As Angola gained independence, 
Portuguese lost political rights 
and had property confiscated; 
more than 505,000 fled to 
Portugal99  
84 1975 Iraq Intra-state war; 
flight of own 
nationals  
After Kurdish rebellion against 
Iraqi government failed, approx. 
250,000 Kurds fled from Iraqi 
forces to Iran; many returned in 
next several years after amnesty 
offered100 
85 1975 Cambodia Intra-state war; 
expulsion of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals  
When Khmer Rouge took city of 
Phnom Penh, approx. 2,000,000 
people expelled, including many 
of the persecuted ethnic 
Vietnamese minority; 
additionally, the Khmer Rouge 
killed between 1,000,000 and 
3,000,000 people before being 
overthrown101 
86 1976 Morocco, 
Western 
Sahara 
Wartime 
expulsion of 
population of 
disputed territory 
Invasion and subsequent abuses 
by Moroccan troops drove out 
more than 50,000 ethnic Sahrawi 
people from Western Sahara102 
87 1976 Libya Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Libya expelled for political 
reasons some 130,000 
foreigners, mainly Egyptians, 
Mauritians, and Tunisians103 
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88 1977
–78 
Somalia, 
Ethiopia 
Ogaden War 
(inter-state and 
intra-state war) 
After Somalia under Siad Barre 
regime invaded the Ogaden 
region of Ethiopia where many 
ethnic Somalis lived, more than 
1,000,000 ethnic Somalis forced 
to flee104 
89 1978 Cambodia Intra-state war; 
expulsion of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals 
Khmer Rouge atrocities caused 
flight of additional 170,000 ethnic 
Vietnamese (and many 
Cambodians as well)105 
90 1978 Burundi Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“In 1978, Burundi expelled 
40,000–50,000 Zaireans, mostly 
Bembe refugees, from the 1964 
Mulelist rebellion, and jobless 
migrant workers”106 
91–
92 
1978 Burma, 
Bangladesh 
Intra-state war; 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
Burmese military operation 
against insurgency expelled or 
put to flight approx. 2,000,000 
ethnic Bengali Muslims, called 
Rohingya, to Bangladesh;107 
Bangladesh in turn expelled 
approx. 200,000 back to 
Burma;108 years later after 
conflict winds down Burma 
agreed to allow return of those 
remaining abroad, and many 
did109 
93 1978
–79 
Vietnam Inter-state war 
(Sino-Vietnamese 
War); expulsion of 
own nationals and 
foreign nationals 
“[B]order war with China . . . 
resulted in a deliberate policy to 
encourage the departure of 
ethnic Chinese from Vietnam.  In 
1978-9, some 450,000 ethnic 
Chinese left Vietnam or were 
expelled across the land border 
with China”110 
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94 1978
–81 
Bangladesh Intra-state war; 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
Accused of collaborating with 
Pakistan in the war and 
discriminated against by 
government, Chakmas—an 
indigenous hill tribe—launched 
insurgency; Bangladeshi military 
persecution drove approx. 40,000 
civilians to India111 
95 1978
–81 
Ethiopia Eritrean War of 
Independence 
(intra-state war); 
forced flight of 
own nationals 
Well over 500,000 ethnic 
Eritreans fled from Ethiopia to 
Sudan because of brutal counter-
insurgency tactics by Ethiopian 
army112 
96 1979 Thailand, 
Cambodia 
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
(refugees who had 
fled Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia) 
“[F]orced repatriation . . . of 
40,000 Kampuchean refugees by 
the Thai government”113 
97 1980
–88 
Iran,  
Iraq 
Iraq-Iran War 
(inter-state war); 
wartime expulsion 
of alleged foreign 
nationals  
“About 350,000 of the Iraqi 
refugees in Iran were expelled 
from Iraq at the time of the Iraq-
Iran war because of their 
suspected Iranian origin, and 
have lived in the western region 
of Iran for almost two decades. 
In many cases, their citizenship 
is disputed by both Iran and 
Iraq, in effect, rendering many of 
them stateless.”114 
98 1982 Uganda Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
75,000 to 80,000 minority 
Bayarwanda people were  
expelled115 
99 1983 Nigeria Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Approx. 1,300,000 to 2,000,000 
alleged illegal  immigrants from 
African nations expelled from 
Nigeria116  
100 1985 Nigeria Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Approx. 100,000 Ghanaians 
expelled by Nigeria117 
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101 1985 Libya Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Libya expelled approx. 20,000 
Egyptians and 30,000 
Tunisians118 
102 1988 Iraq Genocide and 
forced flight of 
own nationals 
During Iraq’s genocidal “Anfal” 
campaign against Kurds, approx. 
100,000 Kurds fled to Iran and 
27,000 to Turkey119 
103 1988 Ethiopia Intra-state war 
(Eritrean War of 
Independence); 
wartime massacre 
and forced flight 
of own nationals 
Ethiopian army killed ethnic 
Eritrean civilians; 40,000 fled to 
Sudan120 
104 1988 USSR 
(Armenia, 
Azerbaijan) 
Peacetime 
expulsions/flight 
of foreign 
nationals 
In response to attacks on ethnic 
Armenians in Azerbaijan, 
Armenia expelled approx. 
200,000 Kurds and ethnic 
Azeris;121 several hundred 
thousand ethnic Armenians fled 
from Azerbaijan to Armenia122 
105 1988
–89 
USSR 
(Armenia,  
Azerbaijan) 
Intra-state war 
(Nagorno-
Karabakh war); 
wartime 
expulsions and 
flight of own 
nationals 
In response to Armenian 
separatist rebellion in Nagorno-
Karabakh, Azeri government 
launches punitive attacks;123 
approx. 180,000 ethnic 
Armenians fled to Armenia;124 
more than 200,000 ethnic Azeris 
fled rebels125 
106 1989 USSR 
(Uzbekistan) 
Peacetime 
expulsion/flight 
of own nationals 
and stateless 
people 
Persecution by Uzbeks caused 
flight of approx. 63,000 to 70,000 
Meskhetian Turks (whom Stalin 
had displaced there from 
Georgia during World War II)126 
107 1989 Mauritania Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals 
Inter-ethnic conflict lead to 
expulsion of 40,000 to 75,000 
Senegalese and Mauritanians of 
Senegalese descent127 
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108 1989 Bulgaria, 
Turkey 
Peacetime 
expulsion or 
forced flight of 
own nationals 
Long-running conflict between 
Christian Bulgarian government 
and Muslim minority; after 
Bulgarian government 
crackdown on ethnic Turkish 
demonstrations, including killing 
and expulsion of activists, 
approx. 300,000 to 350,000 ethnic 
Turks/Muslims fled Bulgaria;128 
after 1990, political opening in 
Bulgaria allowed approx. 110,000 
to return129 
109 1989
–90 
USSR 
(Georgia)  
Intra-state war 
(against 
separatists in 
South Ossetia); 
wartime expulsion 
or flight of own 
nationals  
Bitter civil war over South 
Ossetia’s desire to secede from 
Georgia; approx. 50,000 S. 
Ossetians fled to join kinsmen in 
Russia (N. Ossetia), 23,000 S. 
Ossetians in Georgia proper 
displaced to S. Ossetia and 
23,000 Georgians in S. Ossetia 
fled/expelled to Georgia 
proper130 
110 1989
–90 
Liberia Intra-state war; 
wartime expulsion 
or flight of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals  
The Doe government’s Armed 
Forces of Liberia (AFL), mainly 
ethnic Krahn, fought the rebel 
National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL), mainly Gio and 
Mano; both sides committed 
ethnic massacres; about 730,000 
Liberians fled to neighboring 
countries131 
111 1990 Sri Lanka Intra-state war; 
wartime expulsion 
of own nationals 
by de facto 
government of 
part of Sri Lanka 
In October 1990, the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
forcibly expelled the ethnic 
Muslim population (approx 
75,000) from the Northern 
Province of Sri Lanka132 
112 1990 Senegal Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“In 1990, Senegal deported 
approximately 500,000 
Mauritanians”133 
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113 1990 Iraq,  
Egypt 
First Iraq War 
(inter-state war), 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Prior to and during the First Gulf 
War, Iraq expelled approx. 
500,000 Egyptians (Egypt joined 
anti-Iraq military coalition) and 
other migrant workers134 
114 1990
–91 
Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen 
post-First Iraq 
War  (inter-state 
war); expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Large number of Yemenis 
expelled from Saudi Arabia to 
punish Yemen’s support for Iraq; 
estimates range from 350,000 to 
more than 700,000135 
115 1990
–95 
Bhutan, 
Nepal 
Peacetime 
expulsion and 
flight of 
denationalized 
people  
Bhutan denationalized the 
Lhotsampas (ethnic Nepalis);  
more than 100,000 fled Bhutan136 
116 1991 Dominican 
Republic 
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
alleged foreign 
nationals 
Dominican Army rounded up 
and trucked to Haiti approx. 
35,000 “suspected Haitians,” 
claiming they were illegal 
immigrants137 
117 1991 Iraq Intra-state war 
after First Iraq 
War; massacre 
and expulsion or 
flight of own 
nationals   
After failed Shi’a and Kurd 
uprising against Saddam 
Hussein government, Iraq killed 
approx. tens of thousands of 
Kurds and approx. 1,500,000 fled 
to Iran or Turkey;138 thousands 
of Shi’a “Marsh Arabs” killed 
and approx. 40,000 fled to Iran139 
118 1991 
 
Ethiopia, 
Sudan 
Post-intra-state 
war (Ethiopia); 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“Following the overthrow of 
Ethiopia’s Mengistu regime in 
May [1991], approximately 
285,000 Sudanese refugees from 
the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) camps in 
southwestern Ethiopia were 
forced to return to Sudan”140 
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119 1991 D.R. Congo Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“Tens of thousands of Zairians 
have been expelled from 
neighboring Congo … as the 
Government here has ordered 
them out as illegal aliens”141 
120 1991
–92 
Kuwait post-First Iraq 
War; peacetime 
expulsion 
After Iraqi forces removed from 
Kuwait by U.S.-led coalition, 
Kuwait expels approx. 300,000 to 
380,000 Palestinians because they 
were thought to have supported 
Iraq;142 at same time, expels 
about 150,000 bidun143 
121 1991
–92 
Burma Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
Burmese persecution caused 
approx. 270,000 Rohingya 
Muslims flee to Bangladesh144 
122 1991
–95 
Yugoslavia, 
Croatia. 
Bosnia 
Intra-state war 
accompanying 
independence of 
Croatia 
After Croatia declared 
independence in 1991, the 
Yugoslav army (primarily Serb) 
began ethnic cleansing of ethnic 
Croats; Croats mobilized and 
resisted; Bosnian Croat 
paramilitaries ethnically 
cleansed areas of Bosnian Serbs; 
approx. 300,000 to 350,000 Serbs 
and perhaps more than 400,000 
Croats fled145 
123 1992
–93 
Georgia Intra-state war 
results in de facto 
partition of 
Georgia 
Ethnic cleansing by Abkhazian 
militias lead approx. 200,000 to 
270,000 ethnic Georgians to flee 
disputed region146 
124 1992
–93 
Zaire Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
In bid to cling to power, Mobutu 
regime incited Shaban people to 
attack and expel Kasaians; 
several hundred thousand fled 
or were expelled147 
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125 1992
–95 
Bosnia, 
Yugoslavia, 
Croatia 
Intra-state war 
accompanying 
independence of 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
After Bosnia & Herzegovina 
prepares to declare 
independence in 1992, Yugoslav 
army (Serb), Bosnian Serb 
paramilitaries and Bosnian Croat 
paramilitaries attack Muslims 
and each other; widespread 
genocide and ethnic cleansing of 
Bosnian Muslims by Serbs and 
Croats and ethnic cleansing of 
Bosnian Serbs by Croats; inside 
Yugoslavia, Serbian 
paramilitaries also attack 
Muslims; NATO intervenes 
against Serbs in 1994148 
126 1992
–97 
Tajikistan Intra-state war  During civil war sparked by 
revolt by ethnic minority Pamiris 
from Gorno-Badakhshan region 
and other minority groups, 
approx. 60,000 refugees fled to 
Afghanistan in 1992–93 and 
nearly 200,000 to other 
countries149 
127 1993 Cambodia, 
Vietnam 
Intra-state war; 
massacre and 
flight of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals  
After massacre of ethnic 
Vietnamese by Khmer Rouge 
army, approx. 30,000 fled to 
Vietnam150 
128 1993
–96 
South Africa, 
Mozambique 
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
South Africa “forcibly deported” 
approx. 310,000 refugees from 
the Mozambique civil war151 
129 1994 Greece, 
Albania  
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
30,000 Albanians declared to be 
illegal immigrants and expelled 
by Greece152 
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130 1994 Rwanda Genocide and 
flight 
Approx. 500,000 to 1,000,000 
Rwandans killed in 6 week 
period, mostly Tutsis killed by 
Hutus; approx. 250,000 fled to 
Tanzania; as Tutsi rebel group 
began to take over country, Hutu 
government organized mass 
flight of 800,000 Hutu to Zaire153 
131 1994 Greece Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
In retaliation for criminal 
conviction in Albania of Greek 
dissidents, Greece expelled more 
than 30,000 Albanians154 
132 1994
–95 
Gabon Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Gabon expelled approx. 55,000 
foreign workers155 
133 1995 Libya Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“Libya expelled 30,000 
Palestinians in 1995 to express its 
opposition to the Middle East 
peace process”156 
134 1996 Tanzania, 
Rwanda 
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
In Dec. 1996, Tanzania expelled 
approx. 500,000 Rwandan 
refugees, mainly Hutus; 
Tanzania was concerned with 
military activities emanating 
from refugee camps and believed 
that many who committed 
genocide were sheltered in 
them;157 the UNHCR approved 
Tanzania’s demand for 
immediate repatriation158 
135 1996 Burundi, 
Rwanda 
Expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Burundi expelled approx. 75,000 
Rwandan refugees159 
136 1996 United Arab 
Emirates 
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
The U.A.E. expelled approx. 
145,000 illegal residents, mainly 
from India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh160 
137 1997 Dominican 
Republic 
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
alleged foreign 
nationals 
Dominican Army rounded up 
and trucked to Haiti approx. 
25,000 “suspected Haitians,” 
claiming they were illegal 
immigrants161 
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138 1997 Iraq Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
Deportations pursuant to Iraq’s 
Arabization campaign in the 
predominantly Kurdish cities of 
Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and Douz 
increase;162 estimated about 
120,000 to 140,000 expelled 
during 1990s, mostly Kurds but 
also Turkmen and Assyrians163 
139 1997 Tanzania, 
Rwanda, 
Burundi, 
Congo/Zaire 
Peacetime 
expulsions of 
foreign nationals 
Tanzania expelled tens of 
thousands of refugees from 
Rwanda, Burundi, and 
Congo/Zaire164 
140 1998
–99 
Yugoslavia, 
Kosovo 
Intra-state war 
preceding 
independence of 
Kosovo 
In response to Kosovar 
Albanian’s move for 
independence, murder and 
ethnic cleansing of Kosovar 
Albanians committed by Serb 
military, paramilitary and police 
forces; approx. 30,000 Kosovar 
Albanians killed, approx. 850,000 
to 900,000 expelled and 550,000 
internally displaced; NATO 
intervened against Yugoslavia 
(Serbs) in 1999, and transferred 
control of province to 
Albanians;165 at this point, most 
displaced Albanians return to 
Kosovo but retaliatory violence 
and insecurity caused approx. 
160,000 Serbs and 90,000 Roma to 
flee166 
141–
42 
1998
–
2000 
Eritrea, 
Ethiopia 
 
Eritrean–
Ethiopian War 
(inter-state war); 
expulsion of own 
nationals and 
foreign nationals 
 
Ethiopia denationalized and 
deported 67,000 to 75,000 
Ethiopians of Eritrean ethnicity; 
as many as 70,000 Ethiopians 
expelled from Eritrea167 
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143 1998
–
2001 
Afghanistan Intra-state war As Taliban advance north taking 
Northern Alliance territory, 
Taliban murdered approx. 3,000 
to 6,000 Hazara (Persian 
speaking Shi’a Muslims) men 
and boys in 1998; other 
massacres in 1999, 2001; approx. 
60,000 Hazaras were internally 
displaced and many times that 
number fled to Iran and 
Pakistan168 
144 1999 Indonesia, 
East Timor 
Intra- (or inter-?) 
state war 
accompanying 
independence of 
East Timor 
After East Timorese voted for 
independence in a 1999 
referendum, Indonesian military 
and military-backed militias 
retaliated, murdering some 
supporters of independence and 
leveling most towns; approx. 
300,000 East Timorese were 
internally displaced and 200,000 
either fled or were forcibly 
expelled to West Timor, 
Indonesia169 
145 2001 Iraq Peacetime 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
“[A]s many as 100,000 people, 
mostly Kurds, Assyrians, and 
Turkomans, [were] recently 
expelled from central-
government-controlled Kirkuk 
and surrounding districts in the 
oil-rich region bordering the 
Kurdish-controlled north”170 
146 2002 Malaysia Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Malaysia “expelled hundreds of 
thousands of undocumented 
Indonesian workers”171 
147 2003 Iran Expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
to country at war 
Iran expelled 50,000 to 60,000 
Afghan refugees, whom it 
describes as illegal immigrants172 
148 2003 Djibouti Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Djibouti expelled approx. 100,000 
allegedly illegal immigrants, 
mostly Ethiopians, Somalis, and 
Yemenis173 
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149 2003
–05 
Libya Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Libya deported approx. 145,000 
people, mainly sub-Saharan 
Africans; Libya claimed were all 
illegal economic migrants and 
that most went willingly; both 
claims are suspect174 
150 2003
–09 
Sudan Intra-state war; 
massacre and 
expulsion of own 
nationals 
From 2003–05, at least 200,000 
ethnic Africans in Darfur, Sudan, 
were killed by Sudan 
government-backed Arab 
“janjaweed” militias, and at least 
2,000,000 driven into exile175 
151 2004
–05 
Angola Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
In Operation Brilhante, Angola 
expelled from 125,000 to 250,000 
foreigners176 
152 2005 
 
Malaysia Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“When Malaysia expelled 
380,000 foreign labourers in 2005, 
most of them from impoverished 
Indonesia, . . . those that did not 
leave before the deadline were 
hunted by 300,000 vigilantes 
recruited and armed by the 
government and forcibly 
expelled”177 
153 2006 Angola Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“During 2006, Angola reportedly 
expelled hundreds of thousands 
of illegal migrants without 
meaningful screening for 
refugees or asylum seekers”178 
154 2007
–09 
Angola,  
D.R. of Congo 
Expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
to country at war 
More than 200,000 Congolese 
refugees expelled by Angolan 
government179 
155 2007
–08 
Iran, 
Afghanistan  
Expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
to country at war 
Iran expelled more than 720,000 
Afghan refugees180 
156 2009 Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen 
Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
In December 2009, Saudi Arabia 
expelled 54,000 Yemeni workers181 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
03 KENT(DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
262 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:1 
157 2009 D.R. of Congo Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
“Tens of thousands” of 
Angolans, many with refugee 
status, expelled by D.R. Congo; 
total expelled plus those who left 
to avoid expulsion was approx. 
50,000182 
158 2009 Angola Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Angola “expelled tens of 
thousands of allegedly irregular 
migrants and their families-most 
of them from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” including 
many refugees and asylum 
seekers183 
159 2009 Yemen Peacetime 
expulsion of 
foreign nationals 
Likely that tens of thousands of 
Ethiopian refugees were forcibly 
deported by Yemen184 
 
Table 2.  1900–1950: Instances of the Emergence of Independent States 
During or After Ethnic Armed Conflict185 
Case 
# 
New State Lost 
Territory 
Year Ethnic Conflict Year(s) 
1 Poland Germany, 
Russia, 
Austro-
Hungarian 
Empire 
1918 Poles v. Germans, Ukrainians, 
Russians 
1917–
19 
2 Czecho-
slovakia 
Austro-
Hungarian 
Empire 
1918 Czechs v. Sudeten Germans 
(1918), Poles (1919) 
1918–
19 
3 Estonia Russia 1918 Estonians v. Baltic Germans  1918–
20 
4 Ukraine Russia 1918 Ukrainians v. Ukraine Poles, 
Russians  
1918–
19 
5 Armenia Russia, 
Ottoman 
Empire 
1918 Armenians v. Turkey, 
Azerbaijani Tatars, Kurds 
1917–
18 
6 Azerbaijan  Russia 1918 Muslim Azeris, Turkey v. 
Armenians, Dashnaks 
1918 
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7 Hungary Austro-
Hungarian 
Empire 
1919 “White Terror”: Anti-
communist Hungarians, aided 
by Romania, kill or drive out 
communists and Jews 
1919–
20 
8 Ireland UK 1922 Irish Catholics v. UK, Irish 
Protestants  
1916, 
1919–
23 
9 Czecho-
slovakia 
Germany 1945 Czechs, Slovaks v. Sudeten 
Germans  
1945–
46 
10 Albania Italy 1945 Fascist Albanians v. Serbs, 
Montenegrins; simultaneously, 
Albanian communists fought 
Italian and then German 
invaders, and non-communist 
Albanian resistance 
1941–
46 
11 Pakistan India/UK 1948 Sikhs, Hindus v. Muslims 1946–
48 
12 Israel UK 1948 Jews v. Arabs 1947–
49 
13 Indonesia Netherlands 1949 During independence struggle, 
the Dutch co-opted Sundanese, 
Madurese, Dayaks and other 
ethnic groups; Islamic groups 
rejected both Dutch rule and 
independence under a secular 
government 
1945–
50 
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Table 3.  Major “Voluntary” Refugee Repatriations,  
by Country of Origin 
 
1. Time period 1992 to 2008 
2. Data from UNHCR yearly statistical reports; voluntariness of 
return asserted by UNHCR186 
3. Numbers given in 1000s, rounded to nearest 1000 
4. Threshold to list is 10,000 in given year, and 100,000 or more 
total during 1992–2008 time period 
 
1992–2000 
 
 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
Afghanistan 1577  329 348 159 87 107 253 292 
Angola 85   13  54 22 20  
Bosnia & H. 10    101 121 129 32 19 
Burundi 48  271  108 91 24 12  
Croatia 29     16 25 11 19 
Dem. Repub. 
of Congo 
15     45 66 17 14 
Eritrea 70   22     51 
Ethiopia 12 57 40 35 28 10 13   
Iraq 18   18 82 10 12 21  
Liberia 81 16  10  15 240 104 42 
Macedonia 
 
         
Mali    39 22 35 27   
Mozambique 159 604 804 159      
Myanmar  46 85 66 23 10    
Rwanda   120 241 141 221 11 38 26 
Fed. Rep. of 
Yugoslavia  
       807 125 
Sierra Leone 13      195  41 
Somalia  67 61 43  52 52 26 46 
Sudan      63    
Timor-Leste 
(East Timor) 
       128 49 
Togo 
 
  126 79 66 12    
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
2012] PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN 265 
2001–2008 
 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
Afghanistan 26 1958 646 880 752 388 373 278 
Angola 13 88 133 90 54 47 12 13 
Bosnia & H. 19 42 14      
Burundi 28 53 82 90 68 48 40 95 
Croatia 12 17 10      
Dem. Repub. 
of Congo 
 14  14 39 41 59 54 
Eritrea 33 20 10 10     
Ethiopia 10        
Iraq   55 194 56 20 45 26 
Liberia  22 21 57 70 108 44 11 
Macedonia 
 
90 11       
Mali         
Mozambique         
Myanmar         
Rwanda 22 39 23 14 10   11 
Fed. Rep. of 
Yugoslavia  
26 14       
Sierra Leone 92 76 33 26     
Somalia 51 32 10 18 12    
Sudan     19 42 130 90 
Timor-Leste 
(East Timor) 
18 32       
Togo 
 
        
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013 4:01 PM 
 
266 
 
                                                     
1 See BENJAMIN LIEBERMAN, TERRIBLE FATE: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE MAKING 
OF MODERN EUROPE 42-44 (2006). 
2 See JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN, POSTWAR POPULATION TRANSFERS IN EUROPE, 
1945-1955, at 22 (1962). 
3 LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 58-67; VLADIMIR ORTAKOVSKI, MINORITIES IN THE 
BALKANS 117-18 (2000). 
4 Dimitrije Djordevic, Migrations During the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars and World 
War One, in MIGRATIONS IN BALKAN HISTORY 115, 120 (Radovan Samardzic & 
Dimitrije Djordevic eds., 1989). 
5 LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 69-72. 
6 NORMAN M. NAIMARK, FIRES OF HATRED 27-28 (2001). 
7 LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 88-91; Eric Lohr, The Russian Army and the Jews: 
Mass Deportation, Hostages, and Violence During World War I, 60 RUSSIAN REV. 404, 
404 & n.1 (2001). 
8 LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 83-85. 
9 PERTTI AHONEN ET AL., PEOPLE ON THE MOVE: FORCED POPULATION 
MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH 7 (2008); 
NAIMARK, supra note 6, at 29-37, 40-41. 
10 LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 86-87. 
11 PAVEL POLIAN, AGAINST THEIR WILL: THE HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF 
FORCED MIGRATION IN THE USSR 59-60 (2004). 
12 CLAUDENA M. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE 31-32 (1995). 
13 See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 22; SKRAN, supra note 12, at 44; 
ORTAKOVSKI, supra note 3, at 119-20; Jennifer Jackson Preece, Ethnic Cleansing as an 
Instrument of Nation-State Creation: Changing State Practices and Evolving Legal 
Norms, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 817, 824 (1998). 
14 Special Rapporteur on the Expulsion of Aliens, Third Rep. on the Expulsion 
of Aliens, ¶ 100, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/581 (Apr. 19, 2007) (by 
Maurice Kamto). 
15 Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, 
Jan. 30, 1923, 32 L.N.T.S. 75, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPPLEMENT: OFFICIAL 
DOCUMENTS) 84 et seq. (1924) (providing in Article 1 that “there shall take place a 
compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion 
established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion 
established in Greek territory”). 
16 See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 22-23. 
17 Preece, supra note 13, at 824. 
18 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 341-43.  The 1925 agreement is reprinted as 
Convention Between Bulgaria and Turkey Respecting Conditions of Residence, 
Oct. 18, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 137 (1926). 
19 See Protocol Annexed to the Treaty of Friendship Between Bulgaria and 
Turkey, Oct. 18, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 129, 131 (1926). 
20 POLIAN, supra note 11, at 328. 
21 SKRAN, supra note 12, at 48-49, 54. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
2012] PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN 267 
                                                                                                                        
22 J.R., The Exchange of Minorities and Transfers of Population in Europe Since 
1919—Part I, 21 BULLETIN INT’L NEWS 579, 588 (1944).  The 1936 agreement is  
reprinted as Convention Between Roumania and Turkey Regulating the 
Emigration of the Turkish Population of Dobrudja, Sept. 4, 1936, 195 L.N.T.S. 431 
(1939).  
23 See POLIAN, supra note 11, at 98-100. 
24 Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, A Historical Survey of Twentieth Century 
Expulsions, in REFUGEES IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR 15, 21 (Anna C. Bramwell ed., 
1988). 
25 Philipp Ther, A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of 
“Ethnic Cleansing,” in REDRAWING NATIONS: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN EAST-CENTRAL 
EUROPE, 1944-1948, at 43, 51 (Philipp Ther & Ana Siljak eds., 2001). 
26 POLIAN, supra note 11, at 36-37. 
27 ROBERT CONQUEST, THE NATION KILLERS: THE SOVIET DEPORTATION OF 
NATIONALITIES 64-65, 210 (1970); SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 265, 271; de Zayas, 
supra note 24, at 21; Joseph B. Schechtmann, The Option Clause in the Reich’s Treaties 
on the Transfer of Population, 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 356, 357 (1944); J.R., The Exchange of 
Minorities and Transfers of Population in Europe Since 1919—Part II, 21 BULLETIN 
INT’L NEWS 657, 661-64 (1944) [hereinafter Exchange Part II]; Special Rapporteurs 
on the Human Rights Dimensions of Population Transfer, Including the 
Implantation of Settlers and Settlements, Preliminary Report on the Human Rights 
Dimensions of Population Transfer, Including the Implantation of Settlers, ¶ 10, Sub-
Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/17 (July 6, 1993) (by Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh & Ribot 
Hatano) [hereinafter Preliminary Al-Khasawneh and Hatano Report].  The 
Germany-Latvia treaty is reprinted as Treaty Between Germany and Latvia 
Regarding the Repatriation to Germany of Latvian Citizens Ethnically of German 
Nationality, Oct. 30, 1939, 200 L.N.T.S. 231 (1940). 
28 Preece, supra note 13, at 826 & n.46. 
29 Emily Haslam, Population Expulsion and Transfer, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 7, available at 
http://www.mpepil.com/sample_article?id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-
e861&recno=18& (last updated Nov. 2008). 
30 ANDREW BELL-FIALKOFF, ETHNIC CLEANSING 35 (1996).   
31 Nurit Kliot, Resettlement of Refugees in Finland and Cyprus: A Comparative 
Analysis and Possible Lessons for Israel, in POPULATION RESETTLEMENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 57, 58 (Arie M. Kacowicz & Pawel Lutomski eds., 2007). 
32 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 30; Dariusz Stola, Forced Migrations in 
Central European History, 24 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 324, 333-34 (1992). 
33 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 23, 30, 377; Exchange Part II, supra note 27, at 
665. 
34 de Zayas, supra note 24, at 21; Preece, supra note 13, at 825. 
35 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 46. 
36 KLEJDA MULAJ, POLITICS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING 37 (2008). 
37 ORTAKOVSKI, supra note 3, at 133; BERND J. FISCHER, ALBANIA AT WAR: 1939-
1945, at 87, 238 (1999). 
38 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 46. 
39 de Zayas, supra note 24, at 28. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
03 KENT(DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
268 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:1 
                                                                                                                        
40 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 23; POLIAN, supra note 11, at 331-32; Kliot, 
supra note 31, at 58-59. 
41 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 30; Stola, supra note 32, at 335. 
42 Orest Subtelny, Expulsion, Resettlement, Civil Strife: The Fate of Poland’s 
Ukrainians, 1944-1947, in REDRAWING NATIONS, supra note 25, at 155, 156; POLIAN, 
supra note 11, at 166. 
43 POLIAN, supra note 11, at 166. 
44 Id. at 166; Subtelny, supra note 42, at 155-56.  See also Konstantinos 
Tsitselikis, Population Exchange: A Paradigm of Legal Perversion, in EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
MINORITIES BY THEIR KIN-STATE 135, 143 (2002) (stating that the agreement was for 
“compulsory population exchange”). 
45 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 39. 
46  Stola, supra note 32, at 336. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See Timothy William Waters, Remembering Sudetenland: On the Legal 
Construction of Ethnic Cleansing, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 63, 71-75 (2006). 
50 See BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 37-38. 
51 Stola, supra note 32, at 336.  The actual number of Germans expelled 
exceeded what the victorious Allied powers had authorized.  See BELL-FIALKOFF, 
supra note 30, at 37.  Moreover, the Allied powers approved the transfers of ethnic 
Germans in large part because it was already occurring anyway and they wanted 
to attempt to regularize the process and protect innocent civilians.  See Joseph B. 
Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: A Survey, 15 REV. POLITICS 151, 
153-54 (1953). 
52 The Resettlement of Expellees and Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Austria, 68 INT’L LAB. REV. 166, 167 (1953). 
53 See Stola, supra note 32, at 335. 
54 SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 268-69, 273. 
55 Schechtman, supra note 51, at 162-63. 
56 See SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 43-47; Stola, supra note 32, at 337.  See also 
Tsitselikis, supra note 44, at 143 (stating that the agreement was for “compulsory 
population exchange”). 
57 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 38-39. 
58 See de Zayas, supra note 24, at 27; BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 38-39; 
POLIAN, supra note 11, at 42; Preliminary Al-Khasawneh and Hatano Report , supra 
note 27, at ¶  140. 
59 Tsitselikis, supra note 44, at 143. 
60  Preliminary Al-Khasawneh and Hatano Report , supra note 27, at ¶ 140. 
61 See PAUL K. MARUYAMA, ESCAPE FROM MANCHURIA, at xvi (2010) (estimating 
that 1 million were repatriated).   
62 ORTAKOVSKI, supra note 3, at 179, 326. 
63 Id. at 181. 
64 See BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 30. 
65 Stola, supra note 32, at 335-36. 
66 See POLIAN, supra note 11, at 168-69. 
67 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
2012] PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN 269 
                                                                                                                        
68 Myron Weiner, Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants in South Asia, 28 
ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1737, 1738 (Aug. 21, 1993). 
69 See Agreement Between the Governments of India and Pakistan Regarding 
Security and Rights of Minorities (Nehru-Liaquat Agreement), art. B, Apr. 8, 1950, 
Indian Treaty Series, available at http://www.liiofindia.org/in/other/ 
treaties/INTSer/1950/9.html (providing that refugees “from East Bengal, West 
Bengal, Assam and Tripura, where communal disturbances have recently 
occurred,” may return and reclaim their landed property if they do so by 
December 31, 1950).  Note that this provision of the Agreement did not cover 
refugees from the Punjab region, where most of the violence and refugee flows 
originated.  In any event, India’s legislature soon enacted the Immigrants 
(Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950, which gave the government discretion to 
remove any person who had come into Assam from “any place outside India,” 
undercutting the repatriation rights in the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement.  See VIVEK 
CHADHA, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS IN INDIA, at Appendix I (2005) (reprinting the 
act). 
70 Weiner, supra note 68, at 1738-39. 
71 Id.  at 1738. 
72 See MOSHE GAT, THE JEWISH EXODUS FROM IRAQ, 1948-1951, at 1 (1997); 
Esther Meir-Glitzenstein, Iraqi Jews in Israel: From “Refugees” to “Zionists” and Back 
Again, in POPULATION RESETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 31, at 
115, 116-27.    
73 See MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH, JEWISH PROPERTY CLAIMS AGAINST ARAB 
COUNTRIES 39-42 (2008). 
74 See INIS L. CLAUDE, NATIONAL MINORITIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 192  
(1955); SCHECHTMAN, supra note 2, at 345-54, 363; ORTAKOVSKI, supra note 3, at 170; 
Schechtman, supra note 51, at 174-75; Huey L. Kostanick, Turkish Resettlement of 
Refugees from Bulgaria, 1950-1953, 9 MIDDLE E. J. 41, 41 (1955). 
75 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE 89 (1995). 
76 RUTLEDGE LIBRARY OF MODERN JAPAN, SHOWA JAPAN 204 (Stephen S. Large 
ed., vol. 2 1998). 
77 JOEL BEININ, THE DISPERSION OF EGYPTIAN JEWRY 87 (2005). 
78 MICHAEL R. FISCHBACH, RECORDS OF DISPOSSESSION 174 (2003). 
79  Rachel Lostumbo, Tibetan Refugees in Nepal: From Established Settlements to 
Forcible Repatriation, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 911, 911 (1995).  “Since 1959, over 130,000 
refugees have escaped Tibet.” Id. 
80 See JOSEPH B. SCHECHTMAN, THE REFUGEE IN THE WORLD 303-05 (1963); 
Andrea Smith, Coerced or Free? Considering Post-Colonial Returns, in REMOVING 
PEOPLES: FORCED REMOVAL IN THE MODERN WORLD 395, 401 (Richard Bessel & 
Claudia B. Haake eds., 2009). 
81 See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S 
REFUGEES 1995, at 32 (1995) [hereinafter UNHCR 1995]; CASSANDRA R. VENEY, 
FORCED MIGRATION IN EASTERN AFRICA 8 (2007); MINORITIES AT RISK PROJECT, 
CHRONOLOGY FOR HUTUS IN RWANDA (2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/469f38d51e.html. 
82 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 40. 
83 Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, The Collective Expulsion of Foreign Nationals, 
AUSTL. INT’L L. NEWS 70, 72 (1985). 
84 Weiner, supra note 68, at 1738. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
03 KENT(DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
270 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:1 
                                                                                                                        
85 DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 198 (1985). 
86 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 43. 
87 Id. at 43. 
88 See Aderanti Adepoju, Illegals and Expulsion in Africa: The Nigerian 
Experience, 18 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 426, 430 (1984); de Zayas, supra note 24, at 32. 
89 See DANIEL PIPES, THE LONG SHADOW: CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST 83 (1989); BBC News, On This Day: December 30, 1971, Iranians Deported from 
Iraq, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/30/newsid_ 
2547000/2547551.stm. 
90 Adepoju, supra note 88, at 430. 
91 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE & NORWEGIAN REFUGEE 
COUNCIL, IRAQ: LITTLE NEW DISPLACEMENT BUT IN THE REGION OF 2.8 MILLION IRAQIS 
REMAIN INTERNALLY DISPLACED 44 (2010), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/pdfid/4b90da1d2.pdf [hereinafter IDMC & NRC IRAQ]. 
92  Id. at 43; On the denationalization of Feili Kurds, see Philippe Leclerc & 
Rupert Colville, In the Shadows: Millions Seek to Escape the Grim World of the 
Stateless, REFUGEES MAGAZINE, Sept. 25, 2007, at 4, 5. 
93 Weiner, supra note 68, at 1740-41. 
94 de Zayas, supra note 24, at 31–32. 
95 VENEY, supra note 81, at 50. 
96 Weiner, supra note 68, at 1739. 
97 Sumit Sen, Stateless Refugees and the Right to Return: The Bihari Refugees of 
South Asia—Part I, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 625, 625 (1999). 
98 See generally, BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 140–41; U.S. COMM. FOR 
REFUGEES, 1981 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 27 (1981); Kliot, supra note 31, at 59; 
Preece, supra note 13, at 830. 
99 Smith, supra note 80, at 403. 
100 HUM. RTS. WATCH, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE IRAQI KURDS? (1991), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1991/IRAQ913.htm.  
[hereinafter HRW KURDS]. 
101 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 44. 
102 HUM. RTS. WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN SAHARA AND IN THE TINDOUF 
REFUGEE CAMPS 23–25 (2008). 
103 HELEN CHAPIN METZ, LIBYA 231 (2004). 
104 See VENEY, supra note 81, at 8; Ismail I Ahmed & Reginald Herbold Green, 
The Heritage of War and State Collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local Level Effects, 
External Interventions and Reconstruction, 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 113, 118 (1999). 
105 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 44. 
106 Aderanti Adepoju, The Politics of International Migration in Post-Colonial 
Africa, in THE CAMBRIDGE SURVEY OF WORLD MIGRATION 167 (Robin Cohen ed., 
1995). 
107 Weiner, supra note 68, at 1739. 
108 Rony Brauman, Foreward to WORLD IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF SURVIVAL AT 
THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at xxiii (Doctors Without Borders ed., 1997). 
109 Weiner, supra note 68, at 1740. 
110 Minority Rts. Grp. Int’l, World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples—Vietnam: Chinese (Hoa) (2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/49749c7f8.html. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
2012] PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN 271 
                                                                                                                        
111 Weiner, supra note 68, at 1740. 
112 See AFR. WATCH, EVIL DAYS: 30 YEARS OF WAR AND FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA 114–
17, 125 (1991) [hereinafter EVIL DAYS]. 
113 HENCKAERTS, supra note 75, at 107. 
114 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, Iraqi Refugees in Iran, 20 
REFUGEE REPS. (June 1999), available at http://reliefweb.int/report/iran-islamic-
republic/iraqi-refugees-iran. 
115 See HENCKAERTS, supra note 75, at 117; Alan Dowty, Emigration and 
Expulsion in the Third World, 8 THIRD WORLD Q. 151, 172 (1986). 
116 See MICHEL BEN ARROUS & LAZARE KI-ZERBO, AFRICAN STUDIES IN 
GEOGRAPHY FROM BELOW 269 (2009); de Zayas, supra note 24, at 32. 
117 Micah Bump, Country Profiles: Ghana: Searching for Opportunities at Home 
and Abroad, MIGRATION INFORMATION SOURCE (March 2006), 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/display.cfm?ID=381. 
118 Michael Goldsmith, Tunisians Expelled from Libya Tell of Jail, Beatings, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 10, 1989, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/ 
archives/archive.mpl/1985_43339/tunisians-expelled-from-libya-tell-of-jail-
beating.html 
119 HRW KURDS, supra note 100; IDMC & NRC IRAQ, supra note 91, at 61. 
120 EVIL DAYS, supra note 112, at 237, 240. 
121 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE COUNTRY REP. ON HUM. RTS. 
PRACTICES 1993—AZERBAIJAN (Jan. 30, 1994), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/3ae6aa472c.html. 
122 See Claire Messina, Refugee Definition in the Countries of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States, in REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES 136, 138 (Frances Nicholson 
& Patrick Twomey eds., 1999). 
123 See Charles King, The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s 
Unrecognized States, 53 WORLD POLITICS 524, 529–530 (2001). 
124 Id. at 529. 
125 See Messina, supra note 122, at 138–39. 
126 See, Robert J. Kaiser, Ethnic Demography and Interstate Relations, in 2 THE 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF EURASIA: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ETHNICITY IN RUSSIA 
AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 248–49 (Roman Szporluk ed., 1994); COMM. ON 
MIGRATION, REFUGEES AND POPULATION, COUNCIL OF EUR., The Situation on the 
Deported Meskhetian Population, Doc. No. 10451 (2005), available at  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc05/EDOC10451.htm. 
127 See HENCKAERTS, supra note 75, at 82–83; U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND 
IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1998—MAURITANIA (1998), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a8b548.html. 
128 See HENCKAERTS, supra note 75, at 110–11; ORTAKOVSKI, supra note 3, at 173–
74; VENEY, supra note 81, at 87; Preece, supra note 13, at 830. 
129 ORTAKOVSKI, supra note 3, at 174. 
130 Sarah Cross, Unique Movements in the Caucasus: The Soviet Legacy in Current 
Migration Crises, in FORCED MIGRATION AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 47, 51 
(Andrzej Bolesta ed., 2003). 
131 BUREAU OF REFUGEE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, WORLD REFUGEE 
REPORT 33 (1992) [hereinafter WORLD REFUGEE REPORT 1992]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
03 KENT(DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
272 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:1 
                                                                                                                        
132 B. Muralidhar Reddy, Sri Lanka: Muslim Concerns, FRONTLINE (Aug. 11–24, 
2007), available at http://frontlineonnet.com/fl2416/stories/ 
20070824505104200.htm. 
133 Aderanti Adepoju et al., Promoting Integration Through Mobility: Free 
Movement Under ECOWAS, 29 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 120, 136 n.31 (2010). 
134 Author Name, Cycles of Conflict in the Middle East and Africa, in CENTER FOR 
SCIENCE AND INT’L AFFAIRS, HARV. U., THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 227 (Michael Edward Brown ed., 1996). 
135 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 47; INT’L LABOUR ORG., Social and Labour 
Issues Concerning Migrant Workers in the Construction Industry 34 (1995). 
136 Mahendra P. Lama, Bhutanese Refugees in Nepal, in PROTRACTED REFUGEE 
SITUATIONS 277 (Gil Loescher et al. eds., 2008); HUM. RTS. WATCH, LAST HOPE: THE 
NEED FOR DURABLE SOLUTIONS FOR BHUTANESE REFUGEES IN NEPAL AND INDIA (2007), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/05/16/last-hope-0; REFUGEES 
INT’L, LIVES ON HOLD: THE HUMAN COST OF STATELESSNESS 37 (2005), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47a6eba00.html.  
137 HUM. RTS. WATCH, "ILLEGAL PEOPLE": HAITIANS AND DOMINICO-HAITIANS IN 
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 16 (2002) [hereinafter ILLEGAL PEOPLE], available at 
http://repository.forcedmigration.org/show_metadata.jsp?pid=fmo:5405. 
138 IDMC & NRC IRAQ, supra note 91, at 61. 
139 HUM. RTS. WATCH: THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT ASSAULT ON THE MARSH ARABS 
1–3, 8–9, 13–15 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/ 
01/25/iraqi-government-assault-marsh-arabs. 
140 WORLD REFUGEE REPORT 1992, supra note 131, at 47. 
141 Kenneth B. Noble, Congo Expelling Zairian Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
1991, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/13/world/congo-expelling-
zairian-citizens.html. 
142 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 47; HUM. RTS. WATCH, JORDAN: THE SILENT 
TREATMENT: FLEEING IRAQ, SURVIVING IN JORDAN 92 n.292 (2006), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/11/27/silent-treatment-0 [hereinafter 
SILENT TREATMENT]. 
143 SILENT TREATMENT, supra note 142, at 92 n.292. 
144 UNHCR 1995, supra note 81, at 23; WORLD REFUGEE REPORT 1992, supra note 
131, at 82. 
145 NAIMARK, supra note 6, at 156–58, 173–74; Paul Prettitore, Return and 
Resettlement as a Result of Ethnic Cleansing in Post-Conflict Former Yugoslavia, in 
POPULATION RESETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 31, at 79, 80. 
146 BELL-FIALKOFF, supra note 30, at 47; Cross, supra note 130, at 47, 49. 
147 FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 1993–1994, at 596 (1994); 
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA, ZAIRE: UPDATE TO RESPONSE TO 
INFORMATION REQUEST ZAR1271 ON THE SITUATION OF KASAIENS TODAY (1993), 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aac41c.html. 
148 NAIMARK, supra note 6, at 159–73. 
149 Messina, supra note 122, at 139. 
150 UNHCR 1995, supra note 81, at 67. 
151 Chris Dolan, Repatriation from South Africa to Mozambique: Undermining 
Durable Solutions, in THE END OF THE REFUGEE CYCLE? 85, 98–99 (Richard Black & 
Khalid Koser eds., 1999). 
152 HENCKAERTS, supra note 75, at 100. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
2012] PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN 273 
                                                                                                                        
153 VENEY, supra note 81, at 42; UNHCR 1995, supra note 81, at 32. 
154 HENCKAERTS, supra note 75, at 18. 
155 NICHOLAS SHAXSON, POISONED WELLS: THE DIRTY POLITICS OF AFRICAN OIL 
66 (2008); Migrants Expelled from Gabon, 2 MIGRATION NEWS, no. 3, March 1995, 
available at http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=600_0_5_0. 
156 Farzaneh Roudi, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, Final Peace in the Middle 
East Hinges on Refugee Population, available at http://www.prb.org/Articles/ 
2001/FinalPeaceintheMiddleEastHingesonRefugeePopulation.aspx?p=1; see also 
HUM. RTS. WATCH, LIBYA: STEMMING THE FLOW: ABUSES AGAINST MIGRANTS, ASYLUM 
SEEKERS AND REFUGEES 25 (2006) [hereinafter STEMMING THE FLOW] (also estimating 
30,000). 
157 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1997—
TANZANIA (1997), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a8a637.html. 
158 JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
933 (2005). 
159 AMNESTY INT’L, GREAT LAKES REGION: STILL IN NEED OF PROTECTION: 
REPATRIATION, REFOULEMENT AND THE SAFETY OF REFUGEES AND THE INTERNALLY 
DISPLACED 3 (1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/3ae6a98c3.html. 
160 Michael S. Teitelbaum, International Migration as a Pivotal Issue, in THE 
PIVOTAL STATES 270, 283 (Robert Chase et al. eds., 1999). 
161 ILLEGAL PEOPLE, supra note 137, at 16. 
162 IDMC & NRC IRAQ, supra note 91, at 62. 
163 Id. at 222; HUM. RTS. WATCH, IRAQ: FORCIBLE EXPULSION OF ETHNIC 
MINORITIES 2–4 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 
2003/03/13/iraq-0. 
164 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 1998—
TANZANIA (1998), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a8c5c.html. 
165 NAIMARK, supra note 6, at 175–82. 
166 ORTAKOVSKI, supra note 3, at 266–67; Prettitore, supra note 145, at 80–81. 
167 HUM. RTS. WATCH: THE HORN OF AFRICA WAR: MASS EXPULSIONS AND THE 
NATIONALITY ISSUE 3, 5, 33, 36 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
en/node/12364/section/1; U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD 
REFUGEE SURVEY 2000—ETHIOPIA (2000), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/3ae6a8cc1c.html. 
168 HUM. RTS. WATCH, MASSACRES OF HAZARAS IN AFGHANISTAN 2–5 (2001), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/afghanistan/; Hum. Rts. 
Watch Backgrounder, Afghanistan: Ethnically-Motivated Abuses Against 
Civilians (Oct. 2001), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/afghan-
bck1006.htm; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban Killed 4,000 in Ethnic Cleansing Drive, 
Electronic Telegraph (Pakistan), Sept. 10, 1998, available at 
http://www.rawa.org/mazar6.htm.   
169 HUM. RTS. WATCH, INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR: FORCED EXPULSIONS TO WEST 
TIMOR AND THE REFUGEE CRISIS 2 (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
en/reports/1999/12/01/east-timor-forced-expulsions-west-timor-and-refugee-
crisis. 
170 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2001—
IRAQ (2001), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b31e16413.html. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
03 KENT(DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
274 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 34:1 
                                                                                                                        
171 HUM. RTS. WATCH, ACEH UNDER MARTIAL LAW: PROBLEMS FACED BY 
ACEHNESE REFUGEES IN MALAYSIA 8 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
en/node/12153/section/5. 
172 UNHCR, CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN IRAN, APRIL 2004 (July 2004), available 
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4133432c4.html. 
173 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2004—
DJIBOUTI (May 25, 2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
40b45938c.html; IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BD. OF CANADA, DJIBOUTI/ETHIOPIA: 
FORCED DEPORTATION OF OROMO REFUGEES FROM DJIBOUTI TO ETHIOPIA 
(2004), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/41501c7723.html.    
174 STEMMING THE FLOW, supra note 156, at 3–4, 52–53. 
175 HUM. RTS. WATCH, CHAD: “THEY CAME HERE TO KILL US”: MILITIA ATTACKS 
AND ETHNIC TARGETING OF CIVILIANS IN EASTERN CHAD 14 (2007), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11075/section/9; HUM. RTS. WATCH, DARFUR 
DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN 
SUDAN (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/12133/section/1. 
176 Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola (2008) 
AHRLR 43, http://www.chr.up.ac.za/index.php/browse-by-institution/achpr-
commission/198-angola-institute-for-human-rights-and-development-in-africa-v-
angola-2008-ahrlr-achpr-2008-.html. 
177 SATVINDER SINGH JUSS, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 6 
(2006). 
178 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2007—
ANGOLA (2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46963879c.html. 
179 UN News Service, U.N. Agency Monitors Mass Expulsion of Congolese 
Living in Angola (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/48b287c71a.html; U.N. Secretary-General, Thirtieth Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. S/2009/623 (Dec. 4, 2009), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b2224182.html. 
180 U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 2009—
IRAN (2009), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a40d2a84a.html; see also 
Waliullah Rahmani, Iran's Decision to Expel Refugees May Destabilize Western 
Afghanistan, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION (May 8, 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/ 
single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4141. 
181 Henry Smith, Yemen’s Next Steps, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 28, 2010, available 
at http://www.newstatesman.com/middle-east/2010/01/saudi-arabia-yemen-
conference. 
182  Press Release, UNHCR, UNHCR Airlifts Emergency Relief Items for 
Expelled Refugees in Angola, (Nov. 3, 2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
4af04ee49.html. 
183 HUM. RTS. WATCH, ANGOLA: EVENTS OF 2009, http://www.hrw.org/ 
en/world-report-2009/angola-0. 
184 HUM. RTS. WATCH, YEMEN: HOSTILE SHORES: ABUSE AND REFOULEMENT OF 
ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES IN YEMEN 11–12, 24–25, 34–38 (2009), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/12/21/hostile-shores-0. 
185 To find newly independent states, I used version 4.01 of the Correlates of 
War, Territorial Change data set.  See Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul Diehl & 
Gary Goertz, Territorial Changes, 1816–1996: Procedures and Data, 16 CONFLICT 
MANAG. & PEACE SCI. 89 (1998).  This version provided data for the time period 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol34/iss1/3
03 KENT (DO NOT DELETE) 1/21/2013  4:01 PM 
2012] PALESTINIAN RIGHT OF RETURN 275 
                                                                                                                        
1816 through 2008.  I used other sources to determine whether the independence 
struggle leading to the creation of a new state was an ethnic conflict or, if not, 
whether the independence struggle nevertheless took place at the same time as an 
armed ethnic conflict in the same territory.  First, I used the Ethnic Armed Conflict 
(EAC) data set.  See Lars-Erik Cederman, Brian Min & Andreas Wimmer, Ethnic 
Armed Conflict Dataset, http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/ 
StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=36583&tab=files&studyListingIndex=0_97b9ed8df80ed
0b9756e3b8ce034 (click on tab “Data & Analysis”).  As described in the codebook 
(download “Ethnic Armed Conflict Coding”), the EAC coding of wars: “is based 
on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Data Set (ACD) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). ACD 
defines armed conflict as any armed and organized confrontation between 
government troops and rebel organizations, or between army factions, that 
reaches an annual battle-death threshold of 25 people. Massacres and genocides 
are not included because the victims are neither organized nor armed; communal 
riots and pogroms are excluded because the government is not directly involved.”  
An armed conflict passing this screen was defined as ethnic by EAC using the 
following criteria:   
Ethnic/nonethnic conflicts are distinguished by the aims of the armed 
organizations and their recruitment and alliance structures, in line with 
other ongoing coding projects (Sambanis 2009).  Ethnic wars typically 
involve conflicts over ethnonational self-determination, the ethnic 
balance of power in government, ethnoregional autonomy, ethnic and 
racial discrimination (whether alleged or real), and language and other 
cultural rights.  We define all other war aims as nonethnic. . . . Regarding 
recruitment and alliance structures, we define ethnic wars as those 
fought by armed organizations that recruit fighters predominantly 
among their own ethnic group and who forge alliances on the basis of 
ethnic affiliation.  For a conflict to be classified as ethnic, armed 
organizations have to both explicitly pursue ethnonationalist aims, 
motivations, and interests and recruit fighters and forge alliances on the 
basis of ethnic affiliations.   
Id.  Because the EAC data set begins only in 1946, for the period 1900–1945 I coded 
conflicts as ethnic/non-ethnic myself, using the same definition of ethnic conflict 
as EAC.  To determine whether a conflict met these criteria, I relied on a range of 
sources, most significantly Library of Congress Country Studies, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/, U.S. Department of State Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/, the CIA 
World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/, the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Armed Conflict 
Database, http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_WorldMap.asp, 
reports from GlobalSecurity.org and Human Rights Watch, and, where necessary, 
historical monographs covering specific countries or conflicts. 
186 See 2001 U.N.H.C.R Stat. Y.B., Stat. Annex tbl.A.14; 2005 U.N.H.C.R Stat. 
Y.B., Stat. Annex tbl.B.7; 2006 U.N.H.C.R Stat. Y.B., Stat. Annex tbl.4; 2007 
U.N.H.C.R Stat. Y.B., Stat. Annex tbl.17; 2008 U.N.H.C.R Stat. Y.B., Stat. Annex 
tbl.19, available at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a02afce6.html.  Where refugee 
numbers for a given year were later revised by UNHCR, the most recent data was 
used. 
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